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I 
HERBERT HOOVER - AN EVALUATION 
Seldom, if ever, in the history of the United States, has a 
sident assumed office under more favorable conditions and with 
achievement than did Herbert Hoover on 
4, 1929. In more or less specific contrast to his prede-
cessors, Warren G. Harding and Oalvin Ooolidge, he had but lim-
ited political experience to recommend him, so it was as an ex-
1 
administrator that he was elected. Throughout the first 
rId War he had served the country both at home and abroad in 
2 
a.dministrative positions. From close personal contacts he had 
come to know the American people with a sympathetic, understanding 
a.nd to have an appreciation of the problems of foreign peoples as 
3 
1. During the Presidential campaign he had been portrayed as 
"a superman whose engineering genius would reform and elevate the 
1 Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency, !n Interpreta-
tion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), 132. 
2 This refers to the positions he held as Ohairman of the 
erican Oommission for the Relief of Belgium from 1914 to 1917; 
United States Food Administrator in 1917 and 1918; and Director 
General of the American Relief Administration in the months fol-
lowing the Armistice in November, 1918. A detailed explanation 
1s given in Appendix A. 
3 Ashman Brown, "The Real Hoover,tI The Forum, 84: 290, 
ovember, 1930. 
2 
))4 
art of government. As Secretary of Oommerce during the Harding 
and Ooolidge administrations, he had been an "integral part of' 
5 
the government." Here he had instituted significant changes and 
bad gained a reputation as "a stickler for business and adminis-
6 
trative efficiency.rf Working closely with leaders of finance, 
~usiness, and industry, he had built up the economic structure of 
the nation, which led to a period of unprecedented prosperity. 
4 Orphaned at the age of ten, Hoover's childhood was one of 
~eprivation and hard work. (His father died in 1880 and his moth-
~r in 1884.) Due in part, no doubt, to his early hardships, he 
[determined to make something of himself through his own efforts. 
pyer the protests of his Quaker relatives, with whom he had made 
~is home after the death of his parents, he registered in the en-
~ineering course at the newly opened Leland Stanford Junior 001-
~ege in 1891. It was necessary for him to work his way through 
pollege and even at this early period of his life he established 
~ record for accomplishment. 
Upon his graduation in the pioneer class in 1895, he served 
pis apprenticeship at the practical work of mining engineer in 
~evada Oounty, Oalifornia. Having proved that he was capable of 
~reater responsibility, he sought wider fields for the practice of 
~is chosen profession. His reputation as a mining expert brought 
pim assignments in South Wales and later in China. His interest 
~nd skill in developing mines led the Hoovers (before going to 
phina he married Miss Lou Henry, a Oalifornia girl whom he had met 
~t Leland Stanford) to obscure corners of the earth, including 
~ustralia, Africa, Mexico, Burma (India), and any place where 
~here were mines to be worked. Wherever there were special prob-
~ems in mining engineering, his advice was sought. Living among 
~any peoples, he gained a personal knowledge of many governments 
~nd of world affairs.--Vernon Kellogg, Herbert Hoover, the Man ~ 
~. Work (New York: D. Appleton and Oompany, 1920), 17-32; 45-49; 
~9-7a;-g0-101; 102-123; and Mary R. Parkman, Heroes of Today (New 
~ork: The Century Company, 1917), 305-309. 
5 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, ~ ~ Campaign - An 
~nalvsis (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1935), 4. 
6 Frederick A. Ogg and P. Orman Ray, Introduction to American 
lovernment (New York: D. Appleton Oentury Company, 19321: 380. 
3 
Already famous both at home and abroad for his record ot 
achievements, the American electorate looked to him for an admin-
istration of unequalled accomplishments. "Here," according to 
Oharles Evans Hughes, "was the perfect leader." In an address in 
st. Joseph, Missouri, during the 1928 campaign, Hughes told the 
people: 
••• if any difficult situation 
should arise, the one man who more 
than anyone else could be depended 
upon to bring the widest knowledge 
and the greatest resourcefulness 
to the devisin~ ot means to meet 
the emergency would be Herbert Hoover. 7 
This opinion finds support in a statement by another authority: 
Here is a man long experienced in 
leading masses of humanity in pub-
lic and private enterprise, famil-
iar with all the world--not merely 
with his own section ot it--and 
skilled in the art of getting men 
to do as he wants them to do. This 
art is the art of leadership, wheth-
er it be political leadership or bus-
iness leadership. 8 
Regarding his ability a well-known press correspondent in Washi 
ton in 1930 commented: 
-
7 Peel, 4. 
Always he was the quiet unspec-
tacular organizer, conCiliator, and 
administrator. His reputation and 
genius became legendary among his 
countrymen. 'Let Hoover do it' had 
8 Brown, 290. 
4 
9 
become a national byword. 
The student of history must keep constantly aware that, 
man had ever taken the office of President of the United 
more auspicious record of attainments and with a 
detailed knowledge of government, yet--paradoxically enough-
President since Ulysses S. Grant possessed less actual politi-
The office of Secretary of Commerce--while it 
knowledge of government--is regarded as "almos 
if not absolutely, the least political of the executive depart-
10 
ants. II In a study on American government Hoover is described as 
11 
ing in reality "a novice in politics." 
Despite an auspicious beginning, it transpired that the year 
that Hoover served as the thirty-first President of the United 
States comprise an era that is recognized as one of the most cri 
cal in our history. Events unforeseen in the spring of 1929 
laced upon him burdens such as few executives have had to assume 
12 
in times of peace. His task from the beginning became one of 
9 Robert S. Allen, IfHoover--Manager of United States,1f World 
I~~.' 55:234, February, 1930. 
10 Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Al-
fred A. Knopf, 1947), 227. 
11 Ogg, 286. 
12 Charles Merz, "Hoover's First Three Years, If The New York 
I~~~' Sunday, February 28, 1932, Section IX, 3. 
Herbert Corey, The Truth About Hoover (Boston: Houghton 
fflin Company, 1932), 3. 
6 
13 
less emergencies. 
5 
Public interest centered in his dealings with Congress, and 
14 
it was here that misunderstandings oocurred. Faced with a crisis 
the serious aspects of which fell just short of the consequences 
of war--the sudden collapse of the stock market in the fall of 
1929 and the subsequent depression and period of unemployment--he 
seemed wholly incapable of assuming the leadership of Congress in 
15 
the emergency. From close personal association with the Presi-
dent, Theodore G. Joslin, who was his secretary from 1931 to 1933 
has observed in his writings: "None of his acts aroused that fire 
of enthusiasm sufficient to cause them to follow his leadership 
16 
unquestionably." His inability to assume this leadership was de-
rived, in part, no doubt, from his aooeptance of a rigorous oon-
oept of the separation of powers, the basis for whioh is found in 
17 
his pronounced individualism. An apt statement of this concept 
is found in Hoover's own words, where he deolared: 
• • • the weakenin~ of the legislative 
arm 20f governmen~1 leadLi? to enoroach-
ment by the executive upon the legisla-
13 Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover Q!f the Record (New York: 
Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1934), 13. 
14 Brown, 291. 
15 Laski, 132. 
16 Joslin, 13. 
17 Laski, 132. 
See footnote 23 in Chapter II. 
tive and judicial functions and in-
evitably that encroachment is upon 
individual liberty • • • the mili-
tant safeguard to liberty • • • L1,s7 
••• legislative independence. 18 
Authorities are agreed that, while he approached his tasks 
6 
a zeal and sincerity rarely surpassed, he was frequently mis 
erstood and his accomplishments misjudged because of dominant 
rsonal traits. His policy of silence, his sensitiveness to per 
and his inability to interpret himself and his 
those outside of immediate associates formed handicaps so 
serious that they became the focal point from which stemmed antag 
19 
onism and widespread dissatisfaction. 
Joslin has declared that his silence was close to the root 
of the antagonisms that developed against him. Because of it the 
can people neither understood the chaotic conditions during 
s administration, nor were they cognizant of the untiring ef-
forts he was making to alleviate distress. When urged to publi-
cize certain trying situations, his inevitable reply was: If This 
20 
is not a showman's job. I will not step out of character." A 
18 Herbert Hoover, The Challenge 1Q Liber~ (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), 125-126. 
19 Joslin, 2-13. 
A professor of history at the University of Michigan has 
said of Hoover, "~e7was the most sensitive to criticism of any 
man in public life.~--Dwight Lowell Dumond, Roosevelt to ~~~~~ 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), 383. 
Specific instances of these characteristics will be found 
in succeeding chapters. 
20 Joslin, 2. 
student of political science has described one of his personal 
bandicaps in these words: 
It Lias hi~7absence of the common 
toucb that was largely responsible for 
the defeat of Mr. Hoover. He was full 
of good-will; he worked relentlessly at 
his task. But he never gave his constit-
uents the impression of entering into 
their problems upon the plane on which 
they encountered them. 21 
7 
ThiS inability to convey his real feelings to the people outside 
of his intimate assooiates is pertinent because of the confidence 
22 
and loyalty whioh he inspired in his colleagues. He was at his 
best, we are told, when dealing with small groups of men. To 
these limitations of character, not previously known, and to his 
political philosophy is attributed in large part the lack of un-
derstanding between the President and Congress that became appar-
ent in the first year that Herbert Hoover directed the affairs of 
23 
the nation. 
A study of the facts of Hoover's life affords ample evidence 
that his emotional attitudes and philosophy were alike the result 
of the influence of his religion and bis early environment. Born 
into a Quaker home in West Branch, Iowa, of a long line of Quaker 
ancestors on August 10, 1874, he was reared, both at home and at 
21 Laski, 36. 
22 Joslin, 2-13. 
23 , "Hoover Has Failed,1t The World Tomorrow, 13: 291, 
July, 1930. 
L 
8 
Obool , in an atmosphere that favored the formation of an individ 
s 24 
ualistic philosophy. In the Hoover home, as in other Quaker home 
tbe children and their parents shared in the performance of tasks 
and in the enjoyment of the homely pleasures afforded by the rou-
25 
tine activities and social life of the household. By placing 
greater emphasis upon the needs and aspirations of the individual 
than upon the sUbject-matter, the Quaker schools had an individu-
26 
alizing effect on the group. 
From his childhood training stems, in some degree, his seDse 
justice and fair play in business. The welfare of peoples who 
treated unfairly because of race, creed, or color held more 
than a passing interest for the Quakers. They held to the convi 
tion that all transaotions in business should be tempered by a 
e of justice and equity. In the Quaker principle that a def-
relationship exists between the eoonomic order and human 
Ifare is found an explanation for the economic policies of the 
27 
resident. 
In the Quaker meeting-house that the young Hoover attended 
in the prosperous and quiet community of West Branoh, his mother, 
24 Vernon Kellogg, Herbert Hoover, the Man and His Work (New 
rk: D. Appleton Company, 1920), 12-15. 
25 There were two other children in the Hoover family--a 
ther Theodore, who was three and one-half years older than He 
ert, and a younger sister, Mary.--Ibid., 16. 
26 Walter Friar Dexter, Herbert Hoover and American 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932r;-54-58. ~~~~ 
Dexter 
rr= 
. So mini ster, 
28 
sometimes addressed the congregation. This 
9 
~as hers by virtue of her unusual mental gifts, her spiritual in 
sight, and her moral courage. She was in reality, "a religious 
2 
individualist," not a pastor in the common meaning of the word. 
Freedom of conscience was a dominant ideal of the Society of 
Friends. Their meetings allowed a liberal amount of freedom, re 
quiring at the same time a social responsibility. Anyone who be 
lieved in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man could 
,e a member of this organization. This friendly idealism both 
stimulated and dominated the activities of Hoover's childhood and 
30 
youth. 
Without an appreciation of this phase of his religious 
training, Hoover's philosophy of American individualism cannot be 
31 
properly understood. Regarding it, Walter Friar Dexter has writ-
ten: "Failure to understand his philosophy of friendship leads 
28 Hoover's mother, Hulda Minthorn Hoover, has been de-
scribed by people who knew her as being unusually shy and reserve 
in spite of her color and attractiveness.--Kellogg, 15. These 
traits are obviously an honest legacy of her son, Herbert Hoover. 
29 "A minister, in the SOCiety of Friends, carried the title 
in recognition of his spiritual gifts rather than in recognition 
of a professional or educational training in religious technique.' 
--Dexter, 26. 
30 Dexter, 27. 
31 "An American individualist is a person, who, having 
learned the intrinsic value of man and having found within him-
self an inescapable desire to know right relationships, has de-
veloped a spirit of gratitude, an attitude of tolerance, and a 
social mind, to all of which he gives expression in an inclusive 
program of friendly service."--Dexter, 110. 
10 
32 
misinterpretation of his idea of individualism." That 
the ideal of service inherent in the philosophy of the ~uakers 
.ade a lasting impression upon the convictions of the young Hoo-
~er is brought out in the following quotation: 
He learned from ibis Quaker an-
cestori7that men are not mere abstrac-
tions; . that they are individual units 
of a social order. Among them he exper-
ienced individualism raised to a high 
level of mutual interdependence. Asso-
ciation with them gave him a sense of 
social progress through individual 
growth and achievement. He developed a 
patriotically and spiritually motivated 
faith in this type of structural frame-
work, which is at once dynamiC and prac-
tical. It fints expression in much that 
he thinks and does for the people whom 
he serves. 33 
Of the influence of the Quaker religion on his life and work 
David Hinshaw--in an article entitled "Friends of the Truth"--has 
given the following analysis: 
Hoover the Quaker, given to reti-
cence, distinctly modest, quick in sJ!m-
pathy for the oppressed, with great 
strength and instinctive gentleness, and 
with astounding audacity of the spirit 
is full of the manners and methods of 
this peculiar people. He does not rep-
resent Quakerism in its rigid interpre-
tation, but the indelible impressions 
of childhood have matured into a manhood 
concerned with the things of the spirit 
and the fiber of that spirit makes it 
pliable but unbreakable. 34 
32 Dexter, 27. 
33 Ibi~., 60. 
3 w, "Friends of the Truth, It The Century, 120: 
l 
11 
From men intimately associated with the President during 
tb8Se trying years we learn that, in spite of his inherent shynes 
and inevitable reserve, few of our chief executives have ever de-
35 
sired companionship and friendship more sincerely than Hoover. 
explanation of this seeming paradox in his nature is timely 
Onto the acquired shyness of a Quaker 
Lh!7pile~ the shyness of a growing 
boy whose feelings are so exquisitely 
acute that he fears to show a~ of 
them lest he show all • • • LThi~7 dual 
shyness, combined with his own ideas of 
taste in conduct, long kept him a mys-
tery to the public. 36 
Because of the miBunderstandings that oOcurred during his 
administration, Herbert Hoover has been called the most criticiz 
37 
President since Lincoln. A man of many contrasts--neither "sup 
man" nor "a 1{Orking machine"--he labored oonscientiously in spite 
38 
of assaults to forward the polioies in which he believed. Sinoe 
the kind of man the President shows himself to be bears an inti-
mate relation to the power and meaning that he gives his offioe, 
and since the fulfillment of his program depends upon his rela-
tionships with Congress, a knowledge of these facts is signifi-
oant. 
35 Joslin, 6-7. 
36 Will Irwin, "Herbert Hoover, an Intimate Portrait," The 
I~~~~ MagaZine, 109: 126, May, 1930. 
37 Notable examples of criticism leveled at the President 
be brought out in the suoceeding chapters. 
38 Joslin 5-6. 
II 
FROM CONFIDENCE TO CONFUSION 
The Hoover administration had its inception in the midst of 
1 
an era of unprecedented stock speculation. Warnings from econom-
iO experts regarding the precarious state of the stock market 
failed to shake the President's confidence in the stability of 
the postwar prosperity. He held to the conviction that the sys-
tem of free enterprise in the United States would soon eradicate 
2 
poverty. In his inaugural address he gave expression to this co 
fidence when he said: 
If we survey the situation of our na-
tion both at home and abroad, we find many 
satisfactions; we fin~ some causes for con-
cern. We have emerged from the losses of 
the Great War with increased virility and 
strength. From this strength we have con-
tributed to the recovery and progress of 
the world. • •• In the large view we have 
reached a higher degree of comfort and se-
ourity than ever existed before in the his-
tory of the world. • • • 
Ours is a land rich in resources, 
stimulating in its glorious beauty, filled 
with millions of happy homes, blessed with 
comfort and opportunity •••• In no nation 
are the fruits of accomplishment more se-
cure. I have no fears for the future of 
our country. It is bright with hone. 3 
1 William starr Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover ~=== 
istration. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sone, 1936), 14. In 
the succeeding pages this work will be referred to as Myers. 
2 Binkley, 233. 
3 William Starr Myers, The State Papers and Other Public 
Writings of Herbert Hoover. -rGarden City, New York: Doubleday, 
Doran and Company, 1934), Vol. I, 3, 12. In the succeeding pages 
this work will be referred to as State Paners. 
12 
13 
to his philosophy of government is found in the presenta-
tiOn of his views on self-government: 
Our people have in recent years de-
veloped a new-found capacity for coopera-
tion among themselves to effect high pur-
poses in public welfare. It is an advance 
toward the highest conception of self-
government. Self-government does not and 
should not imply the use of political agen-
cies alone. Progress is born of coopera-
tion in the community--not from governmental 
restraints. 4 
Strangely enough, in spite of the optimistic outlook of the 
resident, the major issues of this administration were precipi-
tated by a business depression which constituted the gravest eco-
nomic crisis ever experienced by the American people, following 
the collapse of the stock market in October of the inaugural 
5 
year. Problems requiring legislative action during his earliest 
months in office dealt with farm relief, tariff revision, and law 
enforcement. It is with these issues and with the cumulative 
problems arising from the economic crisis beginning in October, 
1929, and continuing through the four years of the Hoover admin-
istration that this discussion will be concerned. 
The dispatch with which President Hoover treated the problem 
confronting him in his first few weeks in office, including his 
selection of capable men for the Cabinet, the fulfilment of cam-
aign pledges and the establishment of amicable relations with 
4 State Papers, 7. 
5 Merz, 3. 
14 
the press, augured well for his success and popu16rity and charac 
ter1zed him at the outset as an active President. In an address 
the Gridiron Olub on April 13, a few days before the call-
1ng of the special session of Oongress, President Hoover explai 
h1s v1ews on the relationship between the Executive and Oongress. 
S1nce his statement on this occasion of the concept he held of 
the r1ght and duty of Oongress was later used as the basis for un 
favorable criticism, and since this concept had a vital bearing 
6 Albert Bushnell Hart, The American Year Book, (New York: 
American Year Book Oorporation, 1929), 9, 67. 
Allan Nevins, "President Hoover's Record,1t Ourrent History 
387-388, July 1932. 
Myers, 12, 13. 
The President announced 
Henry L. Stimson, 
Andrew W. Mellon, 
James TN. Good, 
William D. Mitchell, 
WalterF. Brown, 
Oharles Francis Adams, 
Ray Lyman Wilbur, 
Arthur M. Hyde, 
Robert P. Lamont, 
James J. Davis, 
his Oabinet members as follows: 
Secretary of State; 
Secretary of the Treasury; 
Secretary of War; 
Attorney-General; 
Postmaster-General; 
Secretary of the Navy; 
Secretary of the Interior; 
Secretary of Agriculture; 
Secretary of Oommerce; 
Secretary of Labor. 
cretary Mellon and Secretary Davis were continued in the office 
held in the Oabinet of President Ooolidge. The Senate promp 
confirmed all nominations. 
7 State Papers, I, 27. 
On this same occaSion, the President paid tribute to the 
ces of the Press, noted its importance in the process of 
ernment--which he termed Ita government by opinion"--and stated 
s desire to cooperate in making authoritative news available to 
e public by twice-weekly press conferences. 
With a touch of humor, the President also gave his version 
f the fate of plain, well-intentioned statements when once en-
sted to the eager representatives of the Prese, an explanation 
ich may well account for the fact that the reading public fre-
tly got unfavorable and erroneous impressions of the Presi 
of hi 
44 
on bis subsequent relations with Congress, it should be noted 
l1ere : 
.. 
8 
• • • One of the important problems 
of every President is the relation-
ship between the Executive and Con-
gress. 
The mere fact that the founders 
of the Republic provided checks and 
balances in our governmental struc-
ture was never indicated as an invi-
tation to those charged with differ-
ent duties to constantly differ in 
their views or to endeavor to shirk 
responsibility on the shoulders of 
others, and thus waste their own en-
ergies, time, and money in useless 
controversy. . 
I know of no more able and de-
voted legislative body in the world 
than our Con~ress. It is the right 
and duty of Congress to investigate 
and formulate legislation: 8 Both 
the dignity of the two arms and the 
efficiency of the whole Federal struc-
ture will be best served by mutual 
recognition of each other's ri~hts and 
responsibilities, and real progress is 
made in both administrative and legis-
lative arms by cooperation through 
frank discussion, and by the temperate 
exchange of views directly between the 
Executive and the leaders of Congress, 
out of which wise policies are evolved 
and prudent courses are pursued. 
I am well aware of the difficul-
ties of 'a pro~ramme1of close coopera-
tion. It is much less heroic for the 
President to cooperate than to carry the 
banner of the people against the bas-
tions of Congress. To the extent that 
each may be helpful to the other, it is 
our duty to render unselfish assistance. 
The object to be gained by cooper-
ation within an administration between 
the Administration and Congress, between 
reference to this statement in footnote 14 and in 
"l 
the Administration and the leaders 
of our economic and social forces, 
are not the pawns of politics; they 
are not the headlines of the news-
papers. They are the prosperity, 
the contentedness, the moral, and 
spiritual advancement of the American 
people. 9 
16 
Of the problems requiring legislative action, to which ref-
erence has already been made, President Hoover seemed most con-
cerned over that of disregard and disobedience of law, but he 
gave prompt attention to all three. Party pledges made during 
the presidential campaign made the calling of a special session 
10 
of Congress to deal with farm relief obligatory. Accordingly, 
the Seventy-first Congress was called in extraordinary session 
on April 15, 1929, less than six weeks after the President as-
sumed office. On Tuesday, April 16, a message in writing from 
the President was communicated to the House where a quorum of 
both Houses was assembled. Recommendations made at this time 
included tariff readjustment, adjustment of production, and im-
proved marketing. In his opening remarks he stated: 
I have called this special ses-
sion of Congress <to redeem two pledges 
given in the last election--farm relief 
and limited changes in tariff. 
There being no disagreement as to 
the need for farm relief, the problem 
before us becomes one of method by which 
9 state Papers, I, 30. 
10 Merz, 3. 
Irwin, 17. 
The American Year Book, 1929, 11. 
relief may be most successfully brought 
about. 11 
17 
believed that the rates on some agricultural products 
should be increased but hoped to avoid the dangers of a fullscale 
tariff revision. What he wished from Congress at this time was 
a revision upward of the agricultural schedule and a renewal of 
executive authority to make the necessary adjustment in other 
12 
rates. In outlining his plan for farm relief, the President 
stressed the fact that--since the agricultural depression result-
ed from a great number of problems--no single plan or principle 
could be generally applied. He urged the creation of a farm 
board, conposed of members qualified to analyze the farmer's sit-
uation and vested with sufficient authority to deal with his 
13 
problems. Excerpts from his message explaining the plan are not 
worthy since the President was later credited by his critics with 
saying within a month after his taking office that "since tariff-
making and farm relief were among the prerogatives of Congress, 
he could not furnish anything like a detailed program of 
11 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 34. 
12 Joslin, 30, 31. 
13 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 46, 47. 
I have long held that the multi-
plicity of causes of agricultural de-
pression could only be met by the crea-
tion of a great instrumentality clothed 
with sufficient authority and resources 
to assist our farmers to meet these 
problems, each upon its own merit. 15 
18 
The creation of such an agency, he thought, would result in 
constructive action, since it would take the agricultural ques 
ut of politics and place it in the realm of economics. This 
Ian was further amplified in his message and emphasis placed on 
is philosophy that no action should be taken by the government 
t would infringe on individual liberty: 
The pledged purpose of such a Feder-
al farm board is the reorganization of 
the marketing system on sounder and more 
stable and more economic lines. • . • • 
• • .Certain vital principles must be ad-
hered to in order that we may not under-
mine the freedom of our farmers and of our 
people as a whole by bureaucratic and gov-
ernmental domination and interference. We 
14 Binkley, 228. 
"Less than a month after his inauguration he Dresident 
.~nn~ro~7 was being criticized for announcing that since tariff-
aking and farm relief were among the prerogatives of Congress, 
could not furnish anything like a detailed program of action." 
e same statement appears in other critical works, but investi-
ion has failed to reveal evidence that the President ever made 
announcement attributed to him. The statement of the Presi-
nt from which this conclusion may have been drawn is quoted on 
age 16 in this chapter. See also footnote 8 in this chapter. 
Objection to this same statement was expressed by Repre-
entative Williams at the speoial session of the Seventy-first 
ss in April, 1929. See pages 22 and 23 and footnote 22 in 
chapter. See also footnote 37 in Chapter I. 
15 state Paners, I, 34, 35. 
must not undermine initia-
tive. There should be no 
fee or tax imposed upon the 
farmer. No governmental 
agency should engage in the 
buying and selling and price-
fixing of products, for such 
courses can lead only to bu-
reaucracy and domination. 
Governmer-t funds should not 
be loaned. 16 
From the beginning of the special session of the Seventy-
first Congress, the President received the cooperation of the 
House where the Republicans held a majority of one hundred and 
one votes, but the reluctance of the Senate to go along with 
19 
the President was apparent early in the session and posed a real 
difficulty in the regular session which convened December 2, 1929~ 
The Republicans in the Senate numbered fifty-six, but fourteen 
were "Prop:ressive tl Republicans who threw their influence with 
the thirty-nine Democrats and one Farmer-Labor member--forming a 
16 State P§pers, I, 34, 35. 
20 
17 
coalition of obstruction to the President. Even the so-called 
~Old Guard", who numbered forty-two could not always be counted 
18 
on to cooperate. 
The matter of farm relief was given prompt consideration. 
In response to the President's message, a bill prepared by the 
oommittee on Agriculture of the House designated as H. R. 1, was 
reported to the House of Representatives by Representative Haug-
en, Republican of Iowa, Chairman of the Committee, on April 15 
17 Myers, 32. 
The American Year Book, 1929, 2. 
Se~tor Robinson, Democrat of Arkansas, was chosen floor 
leader of the Senate; Representative John N. Garner of Texas was 
ohosen Democratic floor leader of the House and John W. Tilson 
of Connecticut, Republican floor leader. Representative Nicho 
Longworth, Republican of Ohio~ was chosen sneaker of the House. 
William Allen White, 'Herbert Hoover,--The Last of the 
Old Presidents or the First of the New?" ~aturday Evening Post, 
205:7, March 4, 1933. The "Prop;ressive" Republicans came from 
the Northwest, from the territory snreading south from Michigan 
to Oklahoma and west to the coast. The President's inability to 
win these men to him is attributed to certain "limitations of 
oharacter" described as "a oertain deen integrity of self-re-
spect" Lwhic1l7 "stayed his blandishing ~ hand"" in dealing wi th 
them; and to his "forthright quality"--acquired in part from his 
business training--"which rejected what may be called the sala-
cious quality of political equipment." 
Binkley, 230. This group was at first deeply concerned 
over the election of Hoover because "once more they feared to be 
confronted with that greatest threat to their prestige, a Presi-
dent, elected as a 'popular idOl', intended as a strong leader 
of the Jackson-Lincoln type." Many of the Republican Senators 
regarded him as only a recent oonvert to Renublicanism and "henc 
of doubtful party standing." 
18 Myers, 32. 
21 
19 
and was printed in the Record on April 16. The avowed purpose 
of the bill was to provide for the establishment of a Federal 
Farm Board to promote the effective merchandising of agricultur-
al commodities and to place agriculture on a basis of economic 
equality with other industries. On April 18 discussion of the 
bill was opened by Thomas S. Williams, Republican of Illinois, 
whO called attention to salient features of the bill: 
The aim of the bill is to finance 
the farmers, to enable them through 
19 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 27, 49. 
The bill declared it "to be the policy of Congress 
(1) To promote the effective merchandising of agricul 
al commodities in interstate and foreign commerce, SO that the 
industry of agriculture will be placed on a basis of economic 
equality with other industries; and 
(2) to that end to protect, control and stabilize the 
current or interstate and foreign commerce in the marketing of 
agricultural commodities and their food products by minimizing 
speculation, preventing inefficient and wasteful methods of dis-
tribution, and limiting undue and excessive price fluctuations; 
by encouraging the organization of producers into cooperative as 
sociations and promoting the establishment and financing of a 
farm marketing system • • • by aiding in preventing and control-
ling surpluses in any agricultural commodity, through orderly 
production and distribution" • • • 
The bill further provided for the creation of a Federal 
Farm Board to "consist of a chairman and five other members to 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate 
and of the Secretary of Agriculture, ex offi~io" ••• The salary 
of each appointed member was set at #12,000 a year, except the 
chairman, whose salary was to be fixed by the President. This 
board was to work with and in the interests of cooperative mar-
keting associations. The board was to have at its disposal the 
sum of $500,OOO,000--appropriated by Congress--to be used as a 
revolving fund, for making loans and advances upon application 
oooperative associations, for effective merchandising of agricul 
tural commodities, the construction or acquisition of marketing 
facilities, the formation of clearing house associations and for 
d8xtending the membership of the cooperative associations. This one according to stipulations detailed in the bill 
cooperative associations, organized 
and controlled by them, in cooperation 
with the board, to market their commod-
ities in their own way, in other words, 
to do as nrovided in the declaration of 
policy. - 20 
22 
Opportunity to discuss the bill was given under the five-
m1nute rule. In opening the discussion Williams stated that the 
prompt consideration of the bill evinced the purpose of Congress 
to make good the campaign pledges of both the Democrat and 
11can parties. The bill, he further noted, represented the 
thought and jUdgment 'of the Committee on Agriculture and was not 
prepared on the outside by the Department of Agriculture. This 
was in accord with the expressed conviction of the President 
that it was lithe constitutional duty of Congress to take the in-
21 
1tiative in formulating legislation." He stated his objections 
to statements widely circulated at this time that the attitude 
of the President indicated that he had no plan or definite ideas 
as to the legislation necessary to cope adequately with the pro 
22 
1em at hand. The President's adherence to the dogma of legisla-
tive independence--regarded by some as a corollary to his doc-
trine of individual liberty--was not interpreted by Williams as 
an indication that President Hoover had no definite idea or poli 
eies on the character of agricultural or tariff legislation 
20 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 132. 
21 Ibid., 124. 
22 See footnote 14 in this chapter. 
needed. Regarding this he said: 
The committee felt complimented 
that he LPresident Hoover? gave it the 
credit for having the capacity and the 
good sense to draw a proper bill. 
There was no justification for the 
statement • • • that because the Presi-
dent recognized the proper relationship 
between the executive and legislative 
branches of the Government and insisted 
on Congress performing its constitution-
al functions in formulating legislation, 
he had no definite policies ••• of 
legislation necessary to redeem the 
pledges he and his party made during the 
campaign. 23 
23 
In support of his view, Williams cited passages from two speech-
es of the President that set forth the same plan for farm relief 
as explained by the President in his recent message to Congress. 
These unequivocal statements, he countered, left little doubt as 
2 
to the exact nature of the legislation desired by the President. 
In the House discussion that followed, conflicting opinions 
on the merits of the bill were expressed, but on the whole, the 
25 
House supported the measure. Noteworthy was the attitude taken 
by Representative Aswell, Democrat of Louisiana, House Minority 
leader, in defense of President Hoover as well as of the measure 
23 See footnote 17 in Chapter I. 
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 124. 
24 Ibid., 124, 125. These were at St. Louis, near the end 
of the Presidential campaign, and in his speech of acceptance 
when nominated for the Presidency of the United States. 
25 Ibid., 124-131, 157-180, 451-484. 
The bill has been as oarefully 
studied and written as any measure 
with whioh I have ever been oonneoted. 
Farm legislation was drawn into the 
reoent, national oampaign •••• He 
LFresident Hooveil made olear his po-
sition on the equalization fee. • •• 
He deolared for sound and oonstruotive 
legislation for the effeotive merohan-
dizing of agrioultural oommodities. 
This is his plan ••• I, for one, shall 
help him put his ideas into law •••• 
I appeal to my Demooratio oolleagues to 
support this measure without amendment. 26 
24 
Merits of the bill as well as the dispatoh of the President in 
handling the matter were pointed out by Representative Goodwin, 
Republioan of Minnesota, when he said: 
The present bill, for the first 
time in my memory will yield to the 
farmer the right • • • to oontrol the 
oommodity he produces ••• in an or-
derly manner. • • • 
The stabilization oorporation 
provision of the bill is one of the 
strongest features of the bill in my judgment •••• 
President Hoover is to be oom-
mended for so promptly redeeming his 
oampaign pledges to oall Congress into 
a speoial session to deal with the agri-
oultural program. It is now up to Con-
gress to do its part. 27 
Analysis of the bill made by Representative Purnell, Repub-
lioan of Indiana, stressed the appropriateness of its provisions 
and likewise expressed approval of the President's stand: 
26 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 129. 
27 Ibid., 577, 578. 
Congress is now dealing with the 
most important question that any Con-
gress or committee of Congress has ever 
undertaken to solve since the beginning 
of the government •••• 
The bill now presented • • • meets 
the situation at hand. 
In my judgment the best speech that 
will be made for this bill will be found 
in the President's message. 28 
25 
That the members of the House disagreed over the Administration 
measure was apparent in the opinions expressed by Representative 
Clarence Cannon, Democrat of Missouri, and Marion Jones, Democra 
of Texas. Cannon declared: 
This bill is the greatest gold 
brick ever handed to the American 
farmer by' any Congress. • • • It fails 
by every major test. • • • The program 
of farm relief through farm tariffs, if 
it is ever to be carried out, must be 
carried out through this bill. And yet 
there is not a line or a word in this 
bill to redeem the pledge of the Presi-
dent and the Republican and Democratic 
parties in the last election that the 
farmer will be given the benefit of the 
tariff. • •• 29 
Jones, who favored the debenture plan advocated by the Senate, 
was critical but less caustic in his remarks: 
I regret exceedingly that I cannot 
support the bill in its present form. 
I am not going to throw any blocks in 
the way of its passage •••• I do not 
believe it anything like aporoaches a 
solution of the farm problem. 
28 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 131. 
29 Ibid., 128. 
If amended • • • to include the 
debenture plan, I should be happy to 
support it. 30 
26 
The Agricultural Marketing Bill, written substantially in acco 
ance with the President's ideas and without the debenture plan, 
was voted on and passed by the House April 25, 1929, by a vote 
31 
of three hundred sixty-six yeas against thirty-five nays. 
From the beginning of the deliberations over agricultural 
relief, certain farm organizations and some of the progressive 
senators urged upon the President the "Export Debenture-,Plan"--
32 
a plan which had not been mentioned during the 1928 campaign. 
The Senate bill, known as S. 1, was introduced on April 18 in 
same form as the House bill by Senator Charles McNary, Republi-
oan from Oregon and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agricul-
ture, but was revised to include this so-called export debenture 
33 
plan. Its introduction at this time was looked upon as an ob-
structive measure since no mention of such a provision had been 
made when the plan of principles for farm relief was drawn up by 
the Republican Convention at Kansas City, and represented, there 
30 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 130. 
31 lbid,., 572. 
32 Myers, 381. 
Stat~ Paner~, I, 39. 
33 Congressional Record, Seventy.rirst Congress, first ses-
Sion, 102, 1269, 1270, 2880. 
re 
a complete departure from the party principles. The to , 
disapproved of the idea and--in compliance with a request 
27 
trom a small group of senators for his opinion--stated his obj 
t10ns , which were based upon an analysis made at his request by 
the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture and Treasury, in a let-
34 
tar dated April 20, 1929, addressed to Senator McNary. The plan 
he observed, in addition to being a complete departure from the 
principles discussed in the 1929 campaign, would require a sub-
stantial increase in taxes. The issue and redemption of deben-
tures, if generally applied, would decrease the treasury receipt 
by an amount in excess of $200,000,000 a year. He believed that 
"the theoretical benefits would not be reflected to the American 
farmer; that it would create profiteering," and that it contai 
3 
provisions "which would bring American agriculture to disaster." 
34 State Papers, I, 39. 
The request came from Senators McNary, Capper, Heflin, 
Norbeck, and Ransdall, acting as a sub-committee of the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture. 
35 State Papers, I, 39-42. 
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 2884. • 
-In his comments on the debenture plan Senator Caraway no 
ted that it was not a new idea and explained the plan to the Se 
ate members as follows: 
The plan Simply provides, since farm products to 
a large extent must find a market beyond our borders 
where tariff protection cannot go, that for the com-
modity so exported, and, of course, denied any bene-
fit from the tariff, fifty per cent of whatever rate 
Congress thought was fair as a tariff protection on 
such article shall be paid to the farmer on his pro-
ducts which had thus to be sold in the open mark~t of 
the world. 
For specific examples of how the plan would work, and fo 
further explanation of the plan as given in the New York Times 0 
June 10 1929 see Appendix C. 
28 
senator Borah, Republican from Idaho, who was chiefly re-
tponsible for President Hoover's summoning of the special sessi 
and one of the "Progressives" who made a determined stand for 
the debenture plan on the theory that it would secure l1economlc 
equality for agriculture", took issue with the President's ob-
jections and defended the Senate action when he said: 
Something has been said and often 
repeated in the Republican press to the 
effect that the debenture 'plan was not 
specifically discussed in the campaign, 
as if that closed the controversy as 
far as the Congress is concerned. But 
the Republican party pledged itself to 
the solution of the problem. Will any-
one contend that if the solution is at 
hand we are foreclosed by the fact that 
it was not specifically discussed in 
the campaign? • • • We were pledged to 
solve the problem and that covers any 
plan which will solve it. 36 
In an exchange of views with Senator Edge, Mr. Borah further ex-
plained that "the curse of the Hoover bill was that it did so 
37 
little for American agriculture." Staunch supporters of the de-
benture plan in addition to Senator Borah included Senators Cop 
land of New York, Fletcher and Trammell of Florida, Broussard of 
Louisiana, Walsh of Massachusetts, Dill of Washington, Tydings 
of Maryland, Carter Glass of Virginia, Caraway of Arkansas, and 
Brookhart of Iowa. 
36 New York Times, June 11, 1929. 
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 2592. 
37 New York Times, June 11, 1929. 
29 
In defense of the plan these men maintained that it would 
tender additional assistance to depressed agriculture by giving 
the farmer what amounts to a bounty on the farm product he ex-
ports; that it was not a subsidy--it would take no money out of 
the Treasury; it would arrest the flow of money into the 
tram customs' duties--and that it would serve, when in operation, 
to replenish the revolving fund to be administered by the Fed 
Farm Board. Senator Tydings went so far as to say that any plan 
that did not carry the debenture plan would result in "nothing 
but extravagance, bureaucracy gone mad, and a raid upon the Fed-
38 
eral treasury of approximately half a billion dollars." Among 
the supporters of the Administration measure were Senators Van. 
denburg of Michigan, Edge of New Jersey, and Allen, junior Sena-
tor from Kansas. 
On May 4 the coalition of Democrats and Progressives voted 
to adopt the Export Debenture Plan as a part of the Agricultural 
Marketing Bill in spite of the President's professed disapproval. 
The President in conference with Republican senators expressed 
hope that the Senate opposition to the House bill would cease 
temporarily so as to expedite passage of the measure, but the 
Senate on May 13 passed the bill after striking out the House bil 
38 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 2652. 
39 30 
provisions and inserting the text of the Senate Bill. The bill 
as then returned to the House where it was decided to send it 
" 40 
to conference. On June 5, after more than a week in deadlock, 
the Senate and House conferees reached a decision to eliminate 
the Export Debenture Plan. The bill as reported by the oonferee 
lI'as passed by the House on June 7, but the Senate refused to a-
gree to the conference report by a vote a forty-seven to forty-
four, and--upon the insistence of the coalition group--requested 
41 
a second conference to consider the debenture plan. 
Regarding the motives of the senators who gave their suppo 
to the debenture plan the New lork Times, on the eve of this co 
ference, commented: 
The question which agitates Congress 
and which will be in the back of the heads 
of most of the Democratic Senators who at-
tend the conference will not be whether the 
debenture is right or wrong, but what ef-
fect support or opposition to it will have 
on party prospeots in next year's Congres-
sional election and the election over the 
Presidency in 1932. 42 
39 Year Book, 1929, 11. 
Myers, 387, 388. 
In other particulars the Senate Bill was at variance 
with the President's ideas. Briefly it included the export de-
benture amendment and utilized the cooperatives but laid more 
phasis on the Farm Board and Stabilization Corporation and their 
activities, while the "House Bill stressed the farm cooperatives, 
requiring the Farm Board to work through them and largely on 
their initiative. 
40 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Bion, 1455. 
41 Myers, 390, 391. 
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 2870, 2887, 2894, 2938. 
42 New York Times, June 10, 1929. 
IMMA 
31 
Distressed over the delay caused by the Senate, the Presi-
dent at this juncture issued a public statement in which he ex-
pressed disappointment over the Senate's refusal to consider the 
oonferees' bill--an action which he felt might seriously jeop-
ardize the enactment of the bill--and again condemned the deben-
ture plan: 
• • • No matter what the theory of the 
export subsidy may be, in the practical 
world we live in, it will not bring e-
quality but will bring further dispar-
ity to agriculture. It will bring im-
mediate profits to some speculators and 
disaster to the farmer. 43 
Views expressed in the Republican Press that the stand taken on 
the debenture plan was an attempt to embarrass the President met 
vigorous protests from some of the Democratic senators. Senator 
Walsh, who disapproved of both the conferees' and the debenture 
plans, stoutly defended his colleagues: 
There is no effort here to embarrass in 
any way the passage of some kind of farm 
relief bill. • • . Rare~y has there been 
a measure in this body that had behind 
it more of the spirit of crusaders than 
that motivating those who supported the 
debenture;plan. 44 
That politics was a major consideration of many of the sen-
ators in their decisions on the agricultural relief pro~ram was 
charged in the New York ~imes when it was said: 
43 Myers, 392. 
The President's statement was issued on June 11, 1929. 
44 Qongressional Recorq, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Bion, 2649. 
In spite of claims to the contrary, 
there is no doubt that the Democratic • 
leaders of the Senate have sought to 
make the debenture a party matter. • • 
Some of the senators who were op-
posed to the debenture on principle 
yielded to the argument that in snite 
,of the opinion exnressed in the con-
ference, party loyalty demanded that 
the Democratic side'of the Senate should 
present a solid front. 45 
But this charge was resented and vehemently denied by Senator 
Copeland, one of the Democratic senators represented as voting 
32 
for the debenture solely because·of party loyalty, and by other 
Democratic members. Senator Copeland stated: 
There have been many disagreeable 
things in the Press about members of 
the Senate who have seen fit to favor 
the debenture. We have been accused 
of playing nolitics--flpeanut politics"--
at the expense of the American farmer. 
• • • So far as I am concerned, however, 
I have no desire to embarrass the Pres-
ident; I am not plaving politics; and 
any intimation to the contrary • • . is 
a cowardly insinuation. 46 
Senator Robinson, Democratic floor leader who stated earlie 
that the Democratic senators wished to proceed in an orderly way 
with all matters brought before the speCial session, decaared at 
this time also that the advocates of the debenture plan had not 
delayed longer than was necessary to secure fair consideration 
'45 New York Times, June 10, 1929. 
46 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 2649-2651. 
33 
{Or the provisions for which they stood. It was his conviction 
tbat the measure without the debenture nlan did not fulfill the ~ 47 
pledges made in the Platform Plank of 1928. The President's 
policy of seeking advice from experts before deciding on action 
'las ridiculed by Senators Caraway and Brookhart. Senator Cara-
'lay, who claimed that President Hoover's reply to a delegation 
of senators who went to him for his views was: "I do not know 
anything about it," referred to President Hoover as the "master 
mind fl who said he would take his opinions from Secretary of Agri 
oulture Hyde--whom Caraway insinuated didn't have an opinion of 
hiS own--and from Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, whom Caraway 
admitted was a man of great ability in his own field but not an 
48 
expert on farm problems. In Senator Brookhart's remarks the 
President was aooused of negleot in dealing with the farm prob-
lem: 
Herbert Hoover said in his speeoh 
of aooeptanoe that this farm problem was 
the greatest problem of the Amerioan peo-
ple. I think ••• it should have had 
more of his attention and I think it has 
been negleoted and turned over to maohine 
politios. 49 
47 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 2871. Senator RObinson's statement was made on June 14, 
the day the Senate approved of the bill without the debenture 
amendment. 
48 Ibid., 2658. 
See footnote 34 in this ohapter. 
49 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 2650. 
34 
When the House, on June 13, again refused by a vote of two 
hundred fifty to one hundred thirteen to approve the debenture 
plan, the Senate on the following day yielded to the President's 
"lshes and passed the Agricultural Marketing Bill by a vote 'of 
seventy-four to eight. The bill in its final form created the 
50 
Federal Farm Board but omitted the "Export Debenture iPlan." The 
aotion of the Senate was explained by Senator Dill of Washington 
"ho, like many other senators, expressed dissatisfaction with 
the bill: 
There is this to be said about it, 
at least it is some kind of farm legis-
lation ••• the form in which it goes 
to the White House is due to the fact 
that it is the only kind of a bill the 
Congress feels the President will sign. 
• • • Instead of Senators supporting 
the debenture to embarrass the President, 
it could now properly be said that Sena-
tors have opposed the debenture because 
the President asked them to. • . . 51 
Thus recognition of the President's victory in this--the 
first controversy between the Executive and Congress--was admit-
ted even by the Senators themselves. Doubtless the President 
was gratified over this gesture of cooperation signified by the 
passage of the bill in substantially the same form as advocated 
50 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Bion, 2886, 2935. 
Among the eight who voted against the bill were Senators 
LaFollette of Wisconsin, Caraway of Arkansas, Copeland of New 
York, Walsh of Massachusetts, and Wheeler of Montana. Thirteen 
members did not vote. 
51 Ibid., 2881. 
the Administration. However, opposition enoountered during bY 
tbe deliberation in the Senate must have given some indioation 
35 
of the rooky poli tioal road ahead, and may have given the Presi-
dent oause to wonder if the "hands off tt polioy in dealing with a 
congress where his own politioa1 leadership was not strong would 
~ork in aotua1 praotioe. The bill was signed by President HOOT 
on June 15, 1929, at whioh time he expressed his satisfaotion 
~hen he remarked: 
After many years of oontention we 
have at last made a oonstruotive start at 
agrioultural relief with the most important 
measure ever passed by Congress in aid of a 
single industry. 52 
With the tariff problem Congress made even less rapid prog-
ress and showed even greater reluotanoe to oooperate with the 
President. In his first message to the speoial session, Presi-
dent Hoover urged a limited revision of rates in keeping with 
52 Myers, 393, 394. 
As a result of a oanvass of farmers' organizations and 
agriou1tural oolleges, oonduoted by Seoretary of Agriou1ture 
Hyde, for their views on qua1ifioations for membership on the 
era1 Farm Board, President Hoover appointed the following mem-
bers: Alexander Legge of Chioago, president of the Interna-
tional Harvester Company, ohairman; 
James C. Stone, Kentuoky, founder and former president 
of the Burley Tobaooo Growers' Co-operative Assooiation 
Carl Williams, Oklahoma, of the Farmers' Co-operative 
Assooiation; 
C. B. Denman, Missouri, of the National Livestook Produoer 
Assooiation; 
Charles S. Wilson, New York, professor of agrioulture, 
Cornell University; 
William F. Sohilling, Minnesota, of the National Dairy 
Assooiation; 
Ex-Governor Samuel MoKe1vie, Nebraska; and 
C. C. Teague, California of California Fruit Growers'Assn 
1928 platform in which the Republican party was committed to an 
Se in agricultural tariffs and a moderate revision of in-1porea 53 
tariff. He believed that tariff duties should be main-
taiped that would represent the difference between cost of pro-
duction at home and abroad, that they should be effectively fl 
1ble to changing economic conditions, and that tariff fixing 
should be placed in the hands of a bi-partisan tariff commission 
54 
with power to determine rates. 
He favored a continuance of the Tariff Commission which had 
functioned since 1922, but recommended basic changes in its or-
ganization that would take tariff-making out of politics--namely 
to leave to the discretion of the President, with the approval 
of the Senate, the appointment of seven commissioners rather 
than limiting him to three from each party. He believed that 
secondary changes in tariff could be acted upon by the commissi 
which would give more security to industry. Congress was urged 
to take into consideration the broad interests of the country as 
a whole including our trade relations with other countries as 
well as the needs of agrioulture: 
• • • An effective tariff upon agricul-
53 Myers, 388. 
State Papers, I, 31. 
54 Ray Lyman Wilbur and Arthur Masteck Hyde, The Hoover Pol 
iCies, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), 181. 
tural products, that will compensate 
the farmers' higher costs and higher 
standards of living, has a dual pur-
pose. LIt7not only protects the farm-
er in our domestic market, but it also 
stimulates him to diversify his crops 
and to grow products that he could not 
otherwise produce, and thus lessens 
his dependence upon exports to foreign 
markets. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 
••.• the test of necessity for revi-
sion is • • • whether there has been a 
substantial slackening of activity in 
an industry • • . and a consequent de-
crease of employment due to insurmount-
able competition in the products of 
that industry. 55 
A new tariff bill known as H. R. 2667 was reported in the 
56 
37 
House on Mav 9 by the Committee on Ways and Means. Changes had 
been made in from fifteen to twenty per cent of the items in the 
existing schedule--changes that Hoover thought could have been 
better considered by the new Tariff Commission. The President 
had hoped, not only for a limited revision and a flexible tariff 
clause, but also that the measure would be disposed of summarily 
by the House, where the rules made it possible to limit debate, 
but the Republican extremists and the free trade advocates in the 
House opposed the moderate policy of the President. Lengthy dl 
cussion, prompted by sectional as well as partisan feeling, led 
55 State Paners, I, 35, 36. 
56 Myers, 387. This committee under Chairman Hawley had 
concluded its hearings in the previous short session of Congress. 
38 
to extensive hearings covering hundreds of items and delayed ac-
57 
tiOn on the bill. Among those upon whom the President relied 
support were Republican representatives Longworth of Ohio, Sp 
er of the House, Treadway of Massachusetts, and Snell of New 
york, while the opposition included such prominent leaders as 
Democratic Representatives Garner of Texas and Rainey of Illinoi 
To expedite passage of the bill, President Hoover summoned 
House leaders into conference at the White House where he urged 
an early vote on the measure and pOinted out that a bill con-
taining a flexible tariff clause would take care of mistakes and 
work out later injustices. Subsequently oertain reduotions were 
made in the proposed tariff rates, but in its final form the 
measure still contained rates that were too high in the opinion 
of the President. It did, however, oarry out his recommendation 
regarding membership on and salary increases for the Tariff Com-
mission, but made changes in the flexible tariff provision. The 
new bill required an adjustment of tariff duties by the Preside 
on the basis of equality of competitive conditions in the prin-
cipal domestic markets rather than on the basis of equality of 
57 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Con~ress, first ses-
Sion, 1235, 1273, 1274-1279. A typical argument was that ad-
vanced by Representative Snow, Republican from Maine, who de_ 
clared that he was proud to be a Republioan and was anxious to 
follow the Republican leadership of men like Longworth, Tilson, 
and Snell, but inasmuch as the Special Session had been oalled I i 
for the avowed purpose of giving aid to the farmers, and the po-
tato farmers in his district were getting no relief, he could 
Bupport the bill. 
39 
58 59 
produotion. The bill was passed by the House on May 28. 
partisan oritioism, noticeably on the inorease, during the 
Souse debates on the tariff, was observed an.d condemned by 
adway when he remarked: 
As disoussion of this bill has pro-
gressed, it has been quite remarkable to 
see the Democratic Members returning to 
their old methods of partisan criticism. 
In view of the representations made by 
the Democrats during the campaign last 
fall, it was expected that, if those rep-
resentations were sincere, a tariff bill 
would not have the same element of parti-
sanship in debate as had previously been 
oustomary_ Unfortunately this has not 
~roven to be the case, and the Democrats 
are running true to form in abusing what 
the people will eventually decide to be 
the best tariff bill ever written. The 
bill is such a good one and will be of 
such ultimate benefit to the country at 
large that it is right and fair that 
those who are directly responsible for 
its preparation and passage should re-
oeive their full share of credit for its 
accomplishment. 60 
The new tariff bill was referred to the Committee on Fi-
n&noe in the Senate on June 11, where the debates over revision 
were so prolonged that action on the measure dragged on into the 
58 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 1284, 1285. 
In theory the flexible tariff clause in the tariff law of 
1922 had proven to be an excellent one, but in operation it had 
been impractical; the length of time required for an investiga-
tion had nullified the value of the findings, aocording to testi-
mony given by Representative Treadway. 
59 Myers, 391. 
60 ~ongreSSiOnal Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Bion, 12 8. 
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regular session of Congress instead of being consummated d 
the Special Session as the President had wished. Motives of 
eident Hoover in recommending certain changes in the adminis-
law as well as the methods he used in pro-
such revisions aroused partisan criticism by ftepublican 
ssives as well as Democrats and created, at what might be 
the outset of the Administration, an unhappy situation for 
the new President. 
Controversy centered on the flexible tariff clause, the re-
uest of the President for revision of the Tariff Commission on a 
partisan basis--with power to revise schedules, and changes 
the industrial schedule under consideration by the Senate. 
two the President remained adamant in his 
Efforts to win the support of Senator Borah, who 
disapprove of the Administration proposals from the time the 
61 
11 was introduced, were of no avail. When conferences with 
ther Senate leaders failed to bring the Senate into accord, the 
sident resorted to a Press statement in September, in which he 
fended his stand on both the flexible tariff and the administr 
61 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 2779. 
A resolution was introduced by Senator Borah on June 18, 
929, to limit the hearings and recommendations of the Finance 
ommittee on the bill, H. R. 2667, to agriculture and related 
chedules. This was more restrictive than President Hoover rec 
ed. The proposal failed by a vote of 38 to 39. 
Myers, 397. 
on's changes in the Oommission, and admitted that there will a 
be injustices in tariff laws, due in part to changing e 
conditions. He left no doubt as to his convactions when he 
••• I have no hesitation in saying 
that I regard it as of the utmost im-
portance in justice to the public; as 
a sound protection for the sound pro-
gress in our economio system, and for 
the future proteotion of our farmers 
and our industries and our consumers 
that the flexible tariff, through rec-
ommendations of the Tariff Oommission 
to the Executive, should be maintained. 62 
maintained that the principle of the flexible tariff would be 
troyed if recommendations were referred to Oongress for action. 
s he made clear when he said: 
Any person of experienoe in tariff 
legislation in the last half-oentury 
knows perfeotly well that Oongress oan-
not re-open single items of tariff with-
out importing disoussion all along the 
line ••• without the constant unsettle-
ment of business. 63 
Debate over this moot question oontinued in the Senate with 
members resorting to oaustio oritioism of the Presi-
for the stand he was taking on the flexible tariff. The 
was assailed by Progressives as well as Demoora~, and 
62 State Paners, I, 104. 
63 Ibid., I, 103. 
of the regulars. Most voluble in his condemnation of the 
osed measure, as well as of the President's defense of it, 
42 
s senator Borah, who requested that the President advise the 
te--in fact the whole country--of his attitude toward the in-
schedules in the bill, the same as he did on the 
His comment on the President's statement to the Press 
his disapproval of President Hoover's action. Regarding 
t he said: 
The President has deemed it proper 
to take part in this discussion, to take 
a hand in the proceeding. . • • It is not 
my idea of the division of the departments 
of the Government under the Constitution. 
• • • Having undertaken to shape this bill, 
the President must go through to the end, 
and assume with us the responsibility for 
its terms. 64 
That they were concerned over the power that the bill would 
from Congress and give to the Executive was apparent in the 
s of many Senators, including McKellar of Tennessee and La 
llette of Wisconsin, as well as Borah. In a lengthy refutation 
f the President's arguments for the measure, Senator McKellar de 
• • • We ought not give to the President 
this great power of raising revenue. It 
is immaterial ••• as it has been admin-
64 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
n, 3971. 
istered heretofore LEe referred to the 
Administration of Harding and Coolid~7 
but the great trouble is that it is a 
club which we put in the President's 
hands for the future • • • toward the 
industries, toward the farmers, and to-
ward the consumers. 65 
43 
tor LaFollette urged the repeal of the flexible provisions a 
. restoration of the Tariff Commission as a bipartisan commis-
sion because of the "scandalous record tf of the existing commiesi 
in the "exercise of the functions and duties imposed upon it by 
flexible provision." Referring to this record he said: 
... LI17 ... is a demand for the re-
peal of that section of the statute. We 
can expect no other result so long as 
this tremendous power to raise and lower 
duties rests with a commission subservient 
to the PreSident, who is not only the Chief 
Executive but the titular head of a great 
political party. That holds true. " •• 
regardless of the incumbent in the office. 66 
The sharpest criticism came from Senator Borah in one of his 
lengthy discourses on the issue: 
••• For a President of the United 
States, the leader of his party, hold-
ing in his control at the beginning of 
his term a patronage which belon~s to 
no ruler upon the earth, to declare 
that this or that provision should or 
should not be voted for in the Senate 
65 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
ion, 3995. 
66 Ibid., 35!39. 
or Congress is • . • establishing a 
practice and a precedent which we 
will in time have cause to regret. 67 
44 
defense of the President's action in taking part in sh 
ins the tariff law, Senator Reed of Pennsylvania said that Bo-
rah'S remarks sounded like a "caustic criticism," •.• nas if 
the president were invading our field by issuing that statement 
and giving advice," Senator Reed referred to a paragraph of the 
Oonstitution describing the duties of the President, which he 
said meant very plainly 
that it is for the President's judgment 
to settle the time and the subject of 
his recommendations • • • that he does 
recommend to our consideration this pro-
vision for a flexible tariff. 68 ~ 
Senator Fess of Ohio also defended the President when he de-
clared that there was no basis for Senator Borah's claim that, if 
the President expressed an opinion on a policy, he had to express 
it in detail. He explained that the President feels concerned 
when Congress is dealing with a policy and "has a right to speak. 
He continued: 
• • • if • • • there is before Congress 
an item of tremendous importance and it 
is a policy determining item, dealing 
67 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 3971. 
68 Ibi~., 3975. 
not with administration, and not with 
detail, but with a policy of the Nation 
in an effort to mitigate political in-
fluence in tariff legislation • • • he 
has a right to speak. • •• When it 
comes to saying what this item should 
be • • • or what this schedule should 
be • • • that certainly would not be 
expected from the President by anyone 
who really recognizes what the Presi-
dent's function ls. 69 
45 
As sectional and group conflicts over schedules continued, 
the President became even more insistent upon the inclusion of 
the flexible clause--he was convinced that the Commission could 
oorrect any mistakes and unjust rates in the schedule. Senators 
Reed, Smoot, Edge, and Fess--staunch supporters of the Administ 
t10n measure--were urged by President Hoover in White House Con-
ferences to hold out for the flexible clause even though other 
70 
major changes might be made in the bill. The advantages to the 
oountry of having a Tariff Commission to adjust rates was empha~ 
sized by Senator Fess when he told the Senate on September 27: 
If the tariff legislation is to 
be of any substantial value to the coun-
try, it must be carried on with the least 
possible political influence that might 
prejudice against the facts which have 
been selected by a scientific body. I 
meant to say that the thinking people of 
69 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
s1on, 4018. 
70 Myers, 406, 407. 
the country would like to minimize the 
political influence. The Tariff Com-
mission is one agency which we hope will 
help to do it, and if a body of experts 
directed to collect facts upon which we 
can make our decisions can not do it, 
then I think it is rather hopeless. 71 
46 
Progress of the bill was further impeded, when early in Octo 
the "coalition" group defeated the flexible tariff provision 
a vote of forty-seven to forty-two. Still later in the month 
the progressives, who were disappointed over the elimination of 
the Export Debenture Plan from the Agricultural Marketing Act, 
72 
8ucceeded in having it included in the Tariff bill. About this 
time some of the regulars began to despair of the bill's passage. 
Senator Reed, speaking in Philadelphia, stated that in his opin-
ion the bill was dead, but told the Senate, a few days later, tha 
he believed with Senator Smoot of Utah, that it could be passed 
if the Senate would confine itself strictly to debate upon the 
73 
and if reasonable limitation were placed upon debate. When 
the Special Session adjourned November 22, 1929, the bill was 
Itill under consideration. 
In his message to the First Regular Session of the Seventy-
71 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 4015. 
72 Myers, 407, 411. 
73 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
sion, 4958. 
fitst Oongress in December, 1929, President Hoover told the mem-
bers that his views on tariff were unchanged and that 1t would be 
.oat helpful "if action should be taken at an early time. n Again 
be emphasized the need for a flexible tariff when he said: 
• • • I have been most anxious that the 
broad principle of the flexible tariff 
as provided in the existing law should 
be preserved and its delays in action 
avoided by more expeditious methods of 
determining the costs of production at 
home and abroad, with executive authority 
to promulgate such changes upon recom-
mendation of the Tariff Oommission after 
exhaustive investigation. 74 
The trying situation which had developed in the Senate, where the 
regular Republicans, sometimes referred to as "Old Guards" were 
in the minority, continued during the regular session and was to 
show little change in the months ahead--the forty-two regulars 
ing outnumbered by the coalition of fourteen Progressives and 
thirty-nine Democrats and one Farmer-Labor vote. Even some of 
the Old Guard Republicaas were showing a reluctance to cooperate 
th the Administration program. The House, while a Republican 
75 jority prevailed, continued to be cooperative. 
Difficulties over the passage of the bill continued'and the 
ertainties resulting from the protracted deliberations over 
having a demoralizing effect on the business world 
re chaotic conditions resulting from recent collapse of the 
74 State Papers, I, 148. 
75 Myers, 32. 
48 
.tookmsrket, already existed. Opposition to the Administration 
heightened by the influence of Senator Grundy, recent 
to the Senate, who was known to favor protection for in-
to be strongly opposed to the moderate policy of the 
president. Many of the so-called Old Guards joined the Progres-
sives and Democrats further to impede the passage of the bill. 
During the deliberations individual Democrats and Progressives, 
beoause of special interests, voted more than one thousand times 
76 
tor increases, or against decreases in tariff duties. 
Deeply concerned over the dilatory tactics of the Senate, 
the President--on February 24, 1930--conferred with leaders of 
the House and Senate and Secretaries Mellon and Mills of the 
Treasury, where he again emphasized his views on the tariff bill 
77 
and urged their support. A bill which included the Export Deben-
ture Plan but omitted the flexible tariff provision was finally 
aaed by the Senate on March 24 after about ten months' deliber-
ation. It was obvious that the frequent exhortations of the 
76 Myers, 426. 
Merz, 3. . 
Con~ressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
Sion, 4927- 929. Senator Borah blamed the influence of Senator 
Grundy for the prolonged session. 
77 Myers, 425, 426. Senators Watson and McNary, Floor lead-
ers Smoot and Jones of the Senate, Speaker Longworth and Floor 
leader Tilson of the House--as well as Congressmen Snell, Wood, 
and Hawley--attended this conference at the White House. 
49 
sident had fallen on barren soil. 
After further consideration by a conference committee, the 
was reported to the House on May 3, where the members again 
trated their loyalty to the President by rejecting the "Ex-
Debenture Plan" amendment and the Senate changes in the flex 
78 
tariff. When no agreement could be reached by the conferees 
President was asked if he had any reason for changing his 
1awS on the Export Debenture Plan, to which he replied in a let-
to Republican floor leader, John ~. Tilson, that he had not, 
further condemned the measure by explaining that an esti-
Tariff Commission placed the cost of the plan to 
Treasury, if put into operation, at about $280,000,000 annu-
79 
The House refused to give ground on the measure and some ac-
was mandatory. The Senate finally yielded and released the 
from their promise to stand by the Senate amendments 
down the Export Debenture clause and the flexible tar-
ff changes. The way was thus cleared for final action, and the 
78 con~ressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first ses-
ion, 8472- 480, 8496. 
The American ~ Book, 1930, 3. The House refused to 
the Senate proposal to remove the flexible tariff provi-
s by a vote of 236 to 154. 
79 Myers, 432, 433. 
50 
to the conference committee for ~inal revisions. The 
at this point demanded the inclusion of the flexible 
in accordance with his ideas. This was accomplished 
tbrOugh the influence of Representative Hawley and senat8~ Smoot 
their Republican colleagues in the House and Senate. There 
still much dissatisfaction manifest over the industrial sche 
ules and the flexible provisions, but the Senate passed the bill 
in conference on June 13 by a vote of forty-four to 
The House approved it the following day by a vote of 
81 
two hundred twenty-two to one hundred fifty-three. During the 
months that the tariff measure had been under consider-
by Congress, much unfavorable publicity was given to it by 
those who opposed it, resulting no doubt in much pressure being 
brought to bear on the Congressmen by special interest groups. 
There were many who felt that a more satisfactory bill could 
have been written and that it could have been handled more expedi 
tlously if the President had established his leadership at the 
outset and made flat demands for the recognition of his recommen-
80 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, second ses-
Bion, 10133, 10134, 10698, 10846. 
The.American Year Book, 1930, 3. 
The vote on the flexible tariff was 42-42 making it 
cessary for Vice-President Curtis to break the tie. The vote 
on the debenture clause was 43 to 41--37 Republican and 6 Demo-
cratic votes carried the measure; 12 Republican, 28 Democrat and 
1 Farmer-Labor voted "No". 
81 IQig., 34. Senators LaFollette and Blaine of Wisconsin 
Borah of Idaho were among the Republicans who joined most of 
Democrats in the final vote. 
51 
but such a course he seemed unable to pursue--it being 
to his concept of the separation of powers in the gO~Q~~~ 
__ until the exigencies of the situation left him no other 
82 
He deemed a conciliatory method to be the most effica-
83 
clous in view of the divisions within the party. President Hoo-
r si~ned the bill on June 15, 1930. In a detailed analysis of 
statute, he expressed gratification that the campaign pledges 
of the Republican party had been fulfilled. "Platform pledges 
not be empty gestures," he said in this regard. He consid-
the new basis for the operation of the "largely inoperative 
provision of the flexible provisions of the 1922 law" 
the outstanding accomplishment of the tariff legislation. By his 
insistence he said that: 
• • • the means are established for ob-jective and judicial review of • • • 
rates upon principles laid down by the 
Congress free from pressures inherent 
in the legislation. 84 
The matter of disrespect and diSObedience for law seemed to 
President Hoover to be the most serious of all the problems con-
fronting the nation, and soon after assuming office he took steps 
82 See footnote 18, Chapter I. 
The American Year Book, 1929, 3. 
Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The PreSident, Congress, and 
Legislation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 131. 
The World Tomorrow, 291. 
83 JOBlin, 30, 31. 
84 State PaDers, I, 315. 
52 
remedy conditions. To the need for greater respect for law in 
he directed attention in the campaign by promising 
law-enforcing commission and again in his inaugural 
he referred to it as "the most malign of all the 
confronting the countrytl and declared "the worst evil of 
sregard for some law is that it destroys respect for all law." 
to appoint a national commission for a searching in-
stigation of the whole structure of the Federal system of juri 
"to include the method of enforcement of the Eighteenth 
and the causes of abuse under it." Its purpose, he 
"will be to make such recommendations for reorganization of 
the administration of Federal laws and court procedure as may be 
85 
und desirable." 
Having become, from his engineering practice, a firm be-
ever in the solution of problems by experts--after scientific 
thorough investigation--Herbert Hoover came to the Presidency 
conviction that the major problems of government likewis 
could be solved most effectively by groups of citizens, qualified 
and willing to devote time to such study, rather than by a polit-
ically dominated and busy Congress. Thus the early years of his 
administration were made notable by the appointment of one impor-
tant fact-finding commission after another, the most notable be-
85 Merz, 3 
State Papers, I, 6. 
uu 
86 
~ the Wickersham Commission. This practice was not looked ino 
53 
.ith favor by the Congress who preferred to do its own investiga 
ting. and no effort was made to conceal this feeling in the case 
of the Law Enforcement Commission. No work, perhaps, was ever 
undertaken with a more sincere desire of accomplishment, but 
the time the preliminary report of the Commission 
both the purpose and methods of the Commission as well as the i 
tentions of the PreSident, were criticized and condemned by the 
87 
Oongress. 
The Comm1ssion--official1y known as the Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Observance, but more commonly referred to as the 
Wickersham Commission (after the chairman, former Attorney Gener-
al George W. Wickersham),--was appointed by President Hoover on 
88 
May 20, 1929. At the initial meeting of the Commission on May 
29, the President--after stating that "the American people are 
deeply concerned over the alarming disobedience of law," ex-
86 Wilbur and Hyde, 41. 
Ogg, 310. 
87 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, seoond ses-
Bion, 1668, 1731, 2359, 2473, 11812-11814. 
88 Wilbur and Hyde, 551. 
The members of the Commission besides Mr. Wickersham wer 
tormer Seoretary of War, Newton D. Baker; U. S. Cirouit Judge 
William S. Kenyon; U. S. Distriot Judges Paul MoCormiok and Will-
iam GrUbb; former Chief Justioe Kenneth MaoKintosh of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court; Dean Rosooe Pound of Harvard; Dootor Ada 
Comstook; and Messrs. Henry Anderson, Monte Leman, and Frank 
Loesch. 
hope that the Commission would 
secure an accurate determination of 
fact and cause, following them with 
constructive, courageous conclusions 
which would bring public understand-
ing and command public support of its 
solutions. 89 
54 
The preliminary report including certain conclusions drawn 
bY the members was submitted in writing to President Hoover by 
the chairman on November 21, 1929, and reported in the Senate 
January 13, 1930. Thereafter it was discussed in both the House 
90 
and the Senate. An article written by Howard Lee McBain for the 
lew ~ork World and printed in the Record at the request of Sena-
tor Walsh, analyzed and condemned the report, labeling it "one of 
the most extraordinary public documents that has ever emanated 
from a nonpartisan agency of inquiry" and stating that the decla 
ations, "disclosed a perfectly amazing amount of ignorance of, or 
indifference to, both the law and the actual practice of district 
91 
attorneys under the law." Two of the four specific recommenda-
tions that called forth criticism in the form of sarcasm and rid-
ioule were the proposals that enforcement be moved out of Treas 
89 State Papers, I, 63. 
90 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, second ses-
Sion:, 1502, 1504. The report stated that it had given "careful 
consideration, among other things, to the question of tha obser-
vance and enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment and the Nation-
al Prohibition Actl1 ••. and that "before embarking on public 
hearings" it had made a careful study of the whole question, se-
curing information from responsible officers of government, 
printed reports, and from hearings before Congressional committee. 
91 IQ!g., 2359, 2360. Howard Lee. McBain was a Ruggles Pro-
fessor of Constitutional Law at Columbia University at the time. 
Department to the Department of Justioe, and one that stated, 
"_e think it is possible to provide a hearing in the United 
states Distriot Court before a magistrate provided trial by jury 
in that oourt LState Court? 1s preserved to the aooused." They 
considered it feasible to make use of the existing system of 
92 
united states Oommissioners. Certain statements in the report 
regarding legal prooedures were branded as utterly false in the 
McBain artiole. Members were oharged with attempting to do away 
with the safeguards to the preservation of trial by jury by Rep-
resentatives Blaok and Oliver, respeot1vely: 
• • • the mountains labored and all 
they bave brought forth is a mess, a 
ridioulous legal mess. • • 
••• the President's ••• Commission 
met, meditated, and mimeographed. •• 93 
The Commission was oharged with expending large sums of 
money for investigation of matters other than the violation and 
enforoement of the prohibition law. Senator Glass, author of 
the provision for the defioienoy appropriation of #250,000 made 
January 18, 1930, for the stated purpose of "investigating the 
problem of enforoing prohibition" deolared that "the only ques-
tion of law enforoement before the oountry was 'fenforoement of 
92 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, seoond ses-
Sion, 1504, 1505. 
93 Ibid., 1668. 
56 
the Eight~4nth Amendment and the statutes enaoted in aooordanoe 
_i tb it." This, of oourse, was not what the President had in 
.ind, nor the meaning he meant to oonvey in any of his statement 
or utteranoes where he stressed "the need for investigation into 
the oause and remedy for orime in general and the determination 
of the reform needed in our judicial and administrative machin-
95 
ery." An appropriation of $100,000, requested by President Hoo-
ver, to oarry out the work of the Oommission was cut out of the 
appropriation bills by the Senate on June 27, 1930. ThiS, no 
doubt, disappointed the PreSident, but it did not deter him from 
authorizing a oontinuation of the Oommission's work. In a publi 
statement he said that he would be able to seoure from private 
souroes the #100,000 needed to complete the work undertaken by 
96 
the Oommission. 
The final report of the Commission was submitted January 20, 
1931, Unfavorable comments and publioity that preceded its ap-
pearanoe ooupled with the rapidly aooumulating problems resulting 
from the business depression both here and abroad tended to less-
en appreciation of the oarefully prepared findings on this very 
94 Oongressional Reoord, Seventy-first Oongress, seoond ses-
sion, 1911, 11814. 
This amount was out out of the bill by the House beoause 
the Senator had limited its use to investigation of the prohibi-
tion aot. 
95 State Papers, I, 344. 
96 Myers, 445. 
57 
important national problem. The group as a whole voted against 
outright repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, the restoration in 
any form of the legalized saloon, the federal or state govern-
ments entering into the liquor business, or any modification of 
the volstead Act. Conflicting views of individual members, fil 
in separate reports, showed that two favored repeal, six favored 
modification, and four were willing to see the experiment cont 
ued. In the opinion of a recognized authority in the field of 
history, Lewis M. Hacker, in the accumulation of evidence agains 
national prohibition, the report "oonstituted one of the most 
97 
illuminating publio doouments of modern times." Faots gathered 
olearly indioated that prohibition had broken down and that the 
ourrent organization for enforoement was inadequate. All membe 
a.greed that, if the Amendment was revised, "the regulation and 
prohibition of the manufaoture, traffio, transportation and ex-
98 
portation of liquor should be a power resting with Congress." 
Before the Speoial Session had adjourned, the nation was 
facing an unexpeoted turn of ~vents with the collapse of the 
stock market in the middle of Ootober, 1929. The first shock on 
October 23 was followed by more serious crashes and partial re-
ooveries on October 26 and 29. While the people generally did 
97 Louis M. Haoker, "The Rise and Fall of PrOhibition", 
~ History, 36:671, September, 1932. 
98 Myers, 467, 468. 
Haoker, 671. 
58 
rea11ze the seriousness of the situation until months later, 
it was reflected in a few weeks in a fall in prices of agricultur 
commodities and in a slight decrease in employment. The orgy 
stock speculation that was sweeping the country at the time of 
inauguration gave the President cause for concern early in 
99 
s administration over the financial stability of the country. 
When speculation with borrowed money began to reach an all-
time high and legitimate business was unable to obtain needed 
loans from banks, the President conferred with the Federal Res 
and Secretary of the Treasury Mellon. Efforts were made to 
discourage the ever-increasing wave of stock speculation by re-
stricting credit to banks loaning money for speculation. Warni 
of Secretary Mellon and the Federal Reserve Board went undeeded 
and the inevitable climax came when owners of large blocks of 
100 
stock began selling out their enormous holdings. 
Realizing the seriousness of the situation but not revealing 
his deep concern over the effect this crisis might have on busi-
ness and industry and upon the social and economic status of the 
people, the President laid plans to forestall an increase in un-
employment and a lowering of wages. On November 15 he began to 
summon leaders of industry, business and labor to conferences at 
99 Myers, 17. 
See Appendix D, for summary of causes of the stock market 
Collapse. 
100 Myers, 14-16. 
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tbe White House to secure their cooperation in preventing unem-
and hardship. It was his idea that the best ~esults 
_ould be obtained through the individual efforts of the people, 
_1sely guided and stimulated by competent leadership. He planned 
to expand public works and construction to provide work for those 
_bo might be in need--an idea carried over from his work as 
101 
man of the Unemployment Conference in 1922. 
A conference with nearby railroad presidents on November 19 
to discuss maintenance of normal construction work was followed 
by meetings with leaders of the major industries and outstanding 
labor leaders on November 21. The means recommended to the in-
dustrialists included maintaining planned construction for the 
present and the distribution of available work among all employee 
--by a shortening of the work week, if necessary. Each industry 
was encouraged to look after the distress of its own employees. 
In every instance the leaders expressed willingness to cooperate 
with the program. The President announced in a Press statement 
after the first conference that the railway executives were unan-
imous in their decision to maintain business progress and employ-
ment. The industrial leaders, too, expressed approval of the p 
of organization, subject to the agreement of the leaders of labor 
This was secured in the afternoon meeting with labor leaders, 
101 Myers, 24, 25. 
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~hich included the Secretary of Labor, James J. Davis and Willi 
102 
The results of these conferences were highly gratifying. 
the success of the President in securing their cooperation was 
revealed in statements made public after the meetings. The em-
ployers authorized the President to announce for them that they 
would not initiate any movement ~or wage reduction, a policy 
which they recommended for the whole country. The representa-
tives of labor authorized him to state for them that they be-
lieved and recommended that "no movement beyond those already in 
negotiation should be initiated for increases in wages" and that 
103 
labor should cooperate with industry in solving its problems. 
Conferences followed with leaders of building and construction 
industries, national agricultural organizations and public util-
ities. Governors and mayors throughout the country were also 
asked to cooperate in providing employment by expansion of public 
works. 
On December 12, 1929, the first regular session of the Sev 
ty-first Congress convened. As stated earlier in this chapter, 
the Senate remained unfriendly to the recommendations of the 
President. Consequently the President had to go out of his way 
to secure the cooperation of enough members to secure passage of 
102 State Papers, I, 134. 
103 Ibid., 136, 137. 
This accomplishment bears out the statement made in 
ter I 7 
needed legislation. While the House retained a Republican maj 
ity, their loyalty and cooperation could usually be counted on to 
break down the obstruction policies practiced by the Senate. In 
biB first annual message to Congress on December 3, he reviewed 
tbe economic situation in the country and expressed confidence 
tbat normal conditions would be restored if the means adopted 
were carried out: 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The country has enjoyed a large de-
gree of prosperity and sound progress 
during the past year with a steady im-
provement in methods of production and 
distribution and consequent advancement 
in 'standards of living. • • • 
Fortunately, the Federal Reserve 
System had taken measures to strenghthen 
the position against the day when specu-
lation would break, which together with 
the strong position of the banks has car-
ried the whole credit system through the 
crisis without impairment •••• 
The sudden threat of unemployment 
and especially the recollection of the 
economic consequences of previous crash-
es under a much less secured financial 
system created unwarranted pessimism and 
fear. • • • 
I have, therefore, instituted sys-
tematic, voluntary measures of coopera-
tion with the business institutions and 
with state and municipal authorities to 
make certain that fundamental businesses 
of the country shall continue as usual •• 
We have canvassed the Federal Govern-
ment and instituted measures of nrudent 
expansion in such work that should be 
helpful, and upon which the different de-
partments will make some early recommenda-
tions to Congress. 
I am convinced that through these 
measures we have reestablished confi-
dence. Wages should remain stable. A 
very large degree of industrial unemploy-
ment and suffering which would otherwise 
have occurred has been nrevented. Agri-
cultural prices have reflected the re-
turning confidence. The measures taken 
must be vigorously pursued until normal 
conditions are restored. 104 
62 
Early in January Congress was asked to authorize increases 
1n appropriations for the Public Building program, Rivers and 
Harbors, Public Roads and the Colorado River Dam, ceilings on 
the amounts to be apprepriated for each project being indicated 
by President Hoover. The budget presented to Congress on Decem-
ber 4, 1929, for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1930, showed 
that the appropriations for these items as well as for the re-
volving fund administered by the Farm Board could be made without 
a noticeable increase in expenditures, if recommended reductions 
105 
were made in other directions. 
By the middle of February there were indications that the 
danger of a general panic had been averted. Reports submitted to 
the President showed that stock-brokers' loans of eight and a 
half billion dollars had been liquidated to three billion with 
aid of the Federal Reserve System--the apprehension among 
tors had abated; the index of all employment, prepared by the De-
partment of Labor, showed the drop from 93.3 in October to 86.0 
104 State Papers, I, 145, 146. 
105 Myers, 34, 35. 
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1n Deoember had inoreased to 92.8, and reports from governors in 
thirty-six states showed that no unusual amount of distress had 
106 
resulted from unemployment. 
Meanwhile a temporary organization of business and labor 
leaders had been formed at a oonferenoe with President Hoover on 
Deoember 5, 1929. In an address to several hundred representa-
tives, the President emphasized the responsibility of business 
and the need for their oooperation in maintaining eoonomio sta-
bility. He gave the whole oountry some good advioe when he told 
them: 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Beyond this; a great responsibil-
ity for stability and prosperity rests 
with the whole people. I have no de-
sire to preach. I may, however, men-
tion one good word--work. 107 
Statistios oompiled from a house-to-house oanvas of employed and 
unemployed, undertaken at the request of the President, showed 
that the number of unemployed in April, 1929, was apparently 
1,900,000, and that 1,200,000 had been out of employment for les 
108 
than a month. 
By the end of May, reports from eoonomists and oommeroial 
and industrial authorities, inoluding Charles M. Sohwab of the 
106 Myers, 35. 
107 State Papers, I, 184. 
108 Myers, 37. 
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Bethlehem Steel Corporation, indicated that there was good reas 
to feel that the I1recession in prosperity had run its oourse. 1t 
The President meantime had been critioized by members of Congress 
for his optimism about the future. Secretary of·Labor Davis re-
marked at the time that conditions would have been worse without 
109 
the efforts of the President. It was true that, from the sv_".~--. 
point of previous experience in relief work, the country had 
er had a leader any better qualified to take the initiative in 
determining policies that would most effectively combat the ex-
110 
lsting orisis. 
Meanwhile the measures designed to provide relief were 
oonsideration by Congress. There being little disagreement 
members of either House or Senate as to the need for relief, 
problem was to hold appropriations down to the levels recommena.e(l.l 
by the President, who was opposed to any unnecessary expenditure 
at this time. Controversy centered on three bills introduced by 
Senator Wagner, the junior senator from New York, dealing with 
relief measures and calling for appropriations far in excess of 
III 
the amounts stipulated as being adequate. 
These billS, designated S. 3059, S. 3060, and S. 3061 in 
109 Myers, 37. 
110 See footnote 2 in Chapter I and Appendix A. 
III Congressional Record, Sev.enty-first Congress, second se 
aion, 7702, 7803. 
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order named, embodied three principles--first, to provide for 
advance planning and regular construction of public works for 
stabilization of industry and for the prevention of unemployment 
during periods of depression; second, to provide for the estab-
lishment of a national employment system and for cooperation of 
the states in promoting such a system; and for that purpose, the 
oreation of a bureau in the Department of Labor to be known as 
the United States Employment Service; third, to amend the Depart 
ment of Labor Act of 1913 so as to provide unemployment statis-
tics covering all branches of trade and industry. One bill car-
ried with it an appropriation of $4,000,000 to be used for con-
ducting surveys, the others on unemployment and long-range plan-
1 
ning for public works involved an expenditure up to $150,000,000 
With very little opposition, the Senate passed all three meas-
113 
ures. 
The President considered these appropriations unnecessary 
additions to the budget and voiced his objection to the passage 
of the bills in a letter to Representative Wood, Chairman of the 
114 
House Appropriations Committee, on April 18. With minor chan~e 
the bill S. 3061, for advance planning on unemployment, was 
passed by the House on July 2 and went to the President for his 
112 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, second 
session, 9399. 
113 Ibid., 7803, 8749. 
114 Myers, 35. 
115 
signature. The bill S. 3509 provoked'more disoussion in the 
gouse • Amendments added there substantially ohanged the bill 
and upon its return to the Senate, that body, on the motion of 
senator Wagner, disagreed to the amendments and oalled for a 0 
116 
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terenoe. This was on July 1. The House on July 2, on the moti 
ot Representative Graham, insisted on the House amendments and 
the Senate Conferenoe. In oondemnation of the House efforts to 
modify the bill in oonformity with the Administration views, 
Representative Celler 'of New York questioned the sinoerity of 
the President's stand when he said: 
••• There is a disposition to mini-
mize the present unemployment and busi-
ness depression. Proolamation after 
proolamation is promulgated by the Pres-
ident that prosperity is in the offing 
and with eaoh proolamation unemployment 
and business adversity inoreases. The 
Administration must sooner or later faoe 
the truth. Why not now? • . • 
It is rather anomalous that the 
title of the bill reads: "To provide for 
the advanoe planning and regulated oon-
struotion, eto." yet the vital parts of 
the bill providing the advanoe planning 
are strioken from the bill. 117 
As far as oould be asoertained, the bill S. 3060, providing 
for the national employment system--the very prinoiple of whioh 
115 Con~ressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, seoond 
session, 122 2, 12283, 12320. 
116 Ibid., 7803, 8742, 12267, 12370. 
117 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, seoond 
session, 12271. 
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_as contrary to the President's professed concept of the func-
of the Government--was reported with amendments to the 
118 
but was not acted upon. Opposition to this measure, 
Senator Bingham, was based on the fact that it was a 
,ederal Aid proposition. His views appeared to substantiate the 
sentiment of the President. These were: 
• • • I am one of those who believe in 
representative government. I believe 
that government by the people depends 
for its sanity, its health, its safety, 
upon a strong measure of local self-
government. 119 
Congress adjourned on July 3, 1930, having passed the bills 
providing appropriations for public works in substantially the 
same amounts as requested by the President. These were, Rivers 
and Harbors, $145,000,000; Public Buildings, #530,000,000; Pub-
lic Roads subsidies to the states $75,000,000, and #165,000,000 
. 120 
for the Colorado River Dam and its subsidiaries. These appro-
priations being passed, work could be started on the dam on the 
Colorado River and other public works. 
Demands on government revenues were exceeding expectations 
and the President, early in July, urged greater economy in gov-
ernment bureaus and departments so as to equalize the increases 
necessary for relief expenditures. Conditions were further ag-
118 Congressional Rec~, Seventy-first Congress, second ses 
Sian, 11238, 11239, 11876: 
119 Ibid., 8742. 
120 40. 
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gravated in late summer when the threat of a drought in some of 
tbe farming states gave rise to the need for more extensive re-
lief measures. The states affeoted were in the Potomao, Ohio, 
and lower Mississippi river valleys, where about one million peo-
ple and twenty million animals were affeoted. A oonferenoe of 
tbe President with the governo~s of these states led to the 
1zation of the National Drought Commission under the ohairmanship 
of seoretary of Agrioulture Hyde, for the ooordination of state 
121 
and Federal aotivities to relieve drought sufferers. 
In Ootober the President announoed plans for the organiza-
t10n of a nation-wide program of measures to relieve distress 
during the winter of 1930-31. At this time he expressed a wholly 
new oonoept of national duty when he deolared that the nation had 
an obligation to prevent hunger and oold to those people who were 
122 
really in need. Prinoiples to be followed were outlined by the 
President, who was opposed to any plan that would oall for direot 
relief from the Government. The plan expressed the oonoept of 
the President regarding the role of the Government in relief work 
It provided: 
• • • That the whole must be deoen-
121 Myers, 42, 43. 
122 Wilbur and Hyde, 361. 
• 
tralized; that no central administra-
tion could competently direct such 
widespread activities; that no paid 
bureaucracy could be trained during 
an emergency; that voluntary service 
of the leading.citizens of every com-
munity on a non-political basis must 
be secured for administration; that 
these decentralized agencies must be 
given full authority with sufficient 
checks to see that the work was ef-
fectively done. 123 
JiJXU$1 . 
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The organization known as "The President's Committee for 
unemployment" was formed on October 30, 1930, under the chair-
manship of Colonel Arthur Woods. Through the cooperation of thi 
group with governors and state unemployment authorities, state-
w1de non-partisan relief committees were set up and efforts were 
made to coordinate private activities with local and federal ser 
124 
v1ces. The appointment of the commission was looked upon by 
some as an admission that the unemployment problem had not been 
adequately met. 
In the light of happenings in the months that followed the 
inauguration, the PreSident's prediction of prosperity for the 
country expressed on that occasion appears to have been ill-
timed, yet the succession of events that led to the economic con-
tusion in later months could hardly have been foretold at that 
time. 
123 Myers, 123. 
124 Ibid., 53. 
CHAPTER III 
MID-TERM RELATIONSHIPS, 1930-1931 
From the beginning of the depression President Hoover held 
the Federal government had an obligation to alleviate the 
of the depression and to facilitate recovery. This con-
national duty was reiterated by the President in October, 
1930, when he stated: "As a nation we must prevent hunger and 
1 
cold to those of our people who are in honest difficulties." 
had a conviction about the best way to mitigate 
suffering. This was to organize the individual efforts of 
people in the community by offering stimulation and leader-
ship so that governmental aid could be extended that would not 
2 
infringe on individual liberty. To this end, at the outset of 
the depression, he held conferences with leaders of industry to 
determine ways and means of maintaining wages and of preventing 
3 
strikes. 
In organizing relief measures Hoover insisted that certain 
principles be observed in order to administer relief work effec-
tively in every community and to avoid politics, waste, and cor-
ruption. Summarily these included a decentralized administra-
1 Wilbur and Hyde, 361. 
State Papers, I, 402. 
2 The American Year Book, 1932 , 17. 
3 See Chapter II, pages 55 and 56. 
Myers, 34. 
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on, the securing of voluntary service of leading citizens on a 
~political basis--he did not believe that a paid bureaucracy 
~oould be trained and organized in a depression--and that the de-
'oentralized agencies be given ample authority under careful 4u-
pervision to see that the work was successfully carried out. 
1y when voluntary action failed was governmental action to be 
5 
As the year 1930 advanced, the business depression and un-
employment had been further aggravated by an unprecedented 
drought affecting wide-spread areas in twenty-one states result-
6 
ing in crop failures and family destitution. Partisan groups and 
agitators placed the number of destitute families at five 
but more conservative estimates made in October,1930, and 
on the application of the Department of Labor 
taken in April of that year placed the number of unemployed at 
four and a half million and the number of families without a 
earner at one and a half million. It was expected that this 
7 
ber would increase to two million in the winter ahead. 
4 Myers, 53. 
5 Wilbur, 47. 
6 Myers, 58 •. 
7 state Papers, I, 431. 
Myers, 52: Of the four and one-half million, about one a 
one-half million were normally employed but at the time were in 
the process of shifting from one job to another. Another 500, 
were considered unemployables. Of the remaining two and one-ha 
million, out of employment because of the depression, there were 
1.7 wage earners per family. This would leave 1,500,000 familie 
without any wage earner--or in the destitute class. 
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1dent warned against exaggeration in the unemployment situation. 
From the beginning of his administration President Hoover 
18.oked a real majority support of the Senate. A nominally Repub 
lioan Senate--oontaining an insurgent group from the West, who 
formed a ooalition with the Demooratio members--oreated a 
strained relationship, whioh was offset only by the effeotive 
leadership of Speaker Nioholas Longworth in the House of Repre-
sentatives, where the Republioans held a plurality of one hun-
8 
dred members. The Congressional eleotions in November, 1930, 
gave the Demoorats a deoided viotory in the House of Representa-
tives and inoreased the number in the Senate from forty-two to 
9 
forty-eight. Although seating of the new members would not take 
plaoe until the first session of the Seventy-seoond Congress in 
Deoember, 1931, this swing toward the opposition party had its 
effeot on the relations of :Bresident Hoover to Congress during 
the year 1931 and, oonsequently, on their disposal of the Admin-
istration's legislative program. Their viotory gave the Demo-
orats an opportunity to olaim that the Hoover leadership had be 
8 The Amerioan Year Book, 1931, 6. 
The Third Session of the Seventy-first Oongress was made 
up as follows: in the Senate there were fifty-three Republioans, 
forty-two Demoorats, and one Farmer-labor member; in the House 
there were two hundred sixty-six Republioans, one hundred sixty-
five Demoorats, one Farmer-labor and three vaoanoies. 
9 .!!2.1£., 6. 
The general eleotion of 1930 resulted in the return of 
hundred eighteen Republicans, two hundred sixteen Demoorats and 
one Farmer-labor member to the House; and of forty-eight Repub-
lioans, forty-seven Demoorats and one Farmer-labor member to the 
Senate. 
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repudia ted. 
However, on November 7, a few days after the election, p 
inent Democratic leaders pledged their support to recovery 
lation and to ?ooperation with the Administrative measures in 
next Congress. This pledge was the combined expression of seven 
national leaders who asserted that the recent victory afforded 
the Democratic party an opportunity to do constructive work and 
to that end it intended to cooperate with the Republicans and 
1 
other factions "without regard to selfish political advantage." 
ThiS statement, while having an antidotal effect on the tension, 
should not be considered an indication of total predisposition 
on the part of the Democrats to accept all administrative propos 
also On November 13 the right of these Democratic leaders to 
make any promises on behalf of the party was challenged by Sena-
tor Carter Glass. His statement quoted in The New York Times 
said: 
• • • he ffienator Glass? questioned the 
authority of "any undelegated group of 
gentlemen" to pledge two hundred sixty-
four Democrats in Congress Dorty-seven 
Senators and two hundred seventeen Rep-
resentative!? "to a precipitately devised 
course of action." 11 
10 The New York Times, November 8, 1930. 
The seven national leaders were "James M. Cox, John W. 
DaVis, Alfred E. Smith, the Presidential nominees in the last te 
years; Joseph T. Robinson, party leader in the Senate; John N. 
Garner, House leader; John J. Raskob, Chairman of the National 
Committee; and Jonett Shouse, head of the Executive Commission." 
11 The New York Times,November 13, 1930. 
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In a public acknowledgment of this promise, the President 
alsO inquired whether they meant cooperation in passing needed 
legi8~ation for relief to agriculture and unemployment during the 
forthcoming session. An assurance from Congressman Garner that 
politiCS would be a secondary oonsideration in the organization 
of the House led the President, early in Deoember, to make a 
statement to the Press that the leaders of both parties were co-
12 
operating on the passage of relief measures. 
Looking to an early vote on the much-needed relief measures 
1n the coming session of Congress, the President, in Nove.mber, 
set up what he deemed an adequate program of legislation, one 
which he hoped would meet the approval of leaders in both par-
ties. Of the prospects for the passage of this measure an arti-
cle in The New York Times commented; 
If the Republican and Democratic 
leaders can forget their party lines 
during the three months of the final 
session of the present Congress, there 
is every reason for the belief that 
the relief program of the Administra-
tion can be written into law and all 
appropriation bills for the running 
of the government be enacted.. 13 
Some opposition was anticipated from the Republican insurgents 
led by Senators Norris, Borah, LaFollette, and Brookhart, and 
12 Myers, 59. 
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 407. 
13 The New York Times, November 13, 1930. 
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the Demooratio insurgent Senators Wheeler, Dill, and Walsh. 
In his seoond annual message to Congress on Deoember 2, 1930 
the open.ing of the third session of the Seventy-first Congress 
president Hoover reviewed the economic situation in the country 
and expressed gratification over the accomplishments already made 
through organization in the states and munioipalities: 
During the past twelve months we 
have suffered with other nations from 
economic depression. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
In the larger view the major 
forces of the denression now lie out-
side of the United states ••• our 
reouperation has been· retarded by the 
unwarranted degree of fear and appre-
hension created by these outside 
forces • • • 
Economic depression cannot be 
cured by legislative action or execu-
tive pronouncement. Eoonomic wounds 
must be healed by • • • the producers 
and the oonsumers themselves. Reoovery 
can be expedited and its efforts miti-
gated by cooperative action. • • 
Our people are responding to these 
impulses in remarkable degree. 
The best contribution of government 
lies in encouragement of the voluntary 
cooperation in the oommunity ••• 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The Federal Government is engaged upon 
the greatest program • • • of improve-
ment in all our history • • • 
To meet the exigencies of the coming year he recommended a con-
tinuation of the same policies: 
I favor still further temporary ex-
pansion of these activities in aid to 
unemnloyment during this winter. 
14 The New York Times, November 13, 1930. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
There are certain common-sense limi-
tations upon any expansion of construc-
tion work. The Government must not un-
dertake works that are not of sound eco-
nomic purpose and that have not been sub-
ject to searching technical investiga-
tion, and which have not been given ade-
quate consideration by Congress. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I feel warranted in asking the Congress 
for an appropriation of from $100,000,000 
to #150,000,000 to provide further em-
ployment in this emergency • • • I recom-
mend that this appropriation be made dis-
tributable to the different departments 
upon recommendation of a committee of the 
Cabinet and approved by the President. 
• • Such action will imply an expenditure 
of all kinds of over #650,000,000 during 
the next twelve months. 15 
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Acting upon the President's recommendations, the House Ap-
Mn~~~'ations Committee, early in December, reported bills provid-
appropriations of #30,000,000 for drought relief and of #110, 
1 
,000 for an emergency fund to accelerate public construction. 
15 State Paners, I, 428-430. 
16 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses 
sion, 807. 
The New York Times, December 10, 1930. This figure was 
#40,000,000 less than the maximum amount suggested by President 
Hoover. 
The emergency fund bill provided that the appropriation 
of #110,000,000 be distributed $80,000,000 to the Department of 
Agriculture for apportionment to the states as a temporary ad-
vance to meet the provisions for Federal-aid highway projects; 
#25,500,000 to the War Department for flood control and rivers 
and harbors work; #3,000,000 to the Department of Agriculture 
construction and maintenance of roads and trails in the national 
forests, and #1,500,000 to the Interior for improvements in na~ 
tional parks. It also made the funds available to Sept. 1 in~ 
stead of June 30, the end of the fiscal year. 
The drought relief bill provided that the Secretary of 
Agriculture make the loans for the purchase of land, seed for 
suitable crops, fertilizers, feed, and other purposes prescribed 
77 
Both branches of the government took action on these measures on 
December ninth. The emergency fund bill was passed exactly as 
reported by the House oommittee, but the Senate demanded a larger 
appropriation for the drought sufferers. Voting without roll 
call, they authorized a $60,000,000 farm loan fund, favored by 
the Senate Agrioulture Committee, overriding the olaims of the 
17 
Administration that #30,000,000 was suf£ioient. Republioan flo 
leader Senator Watson, desirous of oooperating with the Presiden 
in keeping appropriations within a limit that would avert higher 
taxes, expressed ~isapproval of the reoommendations of the Senate 
Agrioulture Committee; but Senator Borah, on the other hand, 0 
mented that he had been observing the trend toward larger expaI"~-. 
18 
itures and he did not see how new taxes oould be avoided. 
Seoretary of Agrioulture Hyde and President Hoover were 
quiok to condemn the Senate action, the former asserting that 
the appropriation of publio loans for the purohase of human food 
would set an unusual preoedent and that it dangerously resembled 
19 
the dole system. In defense of the proposal Senator Robinson 
oalled that Congress had appropriated $20,000,000 for the relief 
of starving Russians in 1921. His oomment, quoted in The New 
~ Times, oarried a note of sarcasm: 
17 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
sion, 807-809. 
18 The New York Times, Deoember 7, 1930. 
19 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
sion, 405-409. 
It is right to give food for other 
nations, but by some mysterious and in_ 
explicable reasoning it is wrong to give 
it to our own citizens. 20 
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The President, apparently resentful over the radical changes 
~ade by the Senate in his proposed relief measures, condemned 
their action in a statement to the Press which clearly indicated 
his displeasure-~and at the same time revealed his vulnerability 
to criticism. Since the stand taken by the President brought 
stinging rebukes from the Senate and accusations that he was 
wholly without appreciation of or sympathy for the needs of the 
unemployed and the drought sufferers, his statement on this occa-
sion should be noted here: 
The gross sums which I have recom-
mended to carryon the essential func-
tions of the Government include the ex-
treme sums which can be applied by the 
Federal Government in·actual emergency 
or relief, and are the maximum which can 
be financed without increase in taxes· .• 
. . 
Prosperity cannot be restored by 
raids upon the public treasury ••• 
The leaders of both par,ties are co-
operating to prevent any such event ••• 
Some LOf these schemeil represent • 
• • the desire of individuals to show 
that they are more generous than the Ad-
ministration or that they are more gen-
erous than even the leaders of their own 
parties. They are playing politics at 
the expense of human misery. 21 
20 The New York Times, December 10, 1930. 
21 State Paners, I, 459. 
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 407. 
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When read to the Senate by Senator Caraway of Arkansas, the 
statement precipitated an avalanche of criticism culminating 
in bitter and unwarranted attacks upon the President, which gave 
the President most unfavorable publicity in the Press. An examp 
f the type of criticism to which the President was sUbjected is 
dent in Senator Caraway's remarks: 
The reputation, whatever he has • 
• • of the President of the United 
States rests upon administering a re-
lief fund which never cost him a cent. 
It rests upon extending relief to des-
titute humanity ••• yet, without hav-
ing done anything or having made one 
recommendation that would at all relieve 
the conditions, ••• the President now 
lectures the Congress of the United 
States and those organized agencies for 
relief outside of Congress who are un-
willing to sit down and see human beings 
starve because of maladministration and 
overwhelming misfortune caused by natur-
al agencies. 22 
Both Senators Caraway and Walsh questioned the meaning of 
sident's statement that the leaders of Congress are cooperati 
any such event." "As to what is included in the dec-
ration," 'said Caraway, "everyone will have to answer for him-
Additional comments of Senator Walsh of Massachusetts at-
the President's prestige: 
Why are we who dare to propose 
something additional to what he has 
proposed charged with playing politics? 
• • • the President can continue to as-
sert and insinuate that those who Pni>'-
22 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 407. See footnote 37, Chapter I. 
pose remedial measures here are 
"playing politics," but I propose 
to leave nothing undone to force 
public attention upon the need more 
than ever of constructive efforts 
and of expenditures of money--all 
that may be needed; all and more 
than Russia's hungry people had in 
1919. 23 
· :;;PSI· -
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The most caustic remarks--queted to the public by The New 
~~ Times the following day--were made by Senator McKellar, who 
condemned the President for giving his message to the newspapers 
instead of sending it to Congress, and by Senator Blaine, who 
spoke of President Hoover as the "mediocre politician now occupy-
ing the Executive chair" and as one "overtouted as a great 
24 
eer." During the filibuster thus started, and which continued 
for a week, with the Senate members denying the charge of "play-
ing politics" and countering with insinuations against the Pres-
ident, Senator Robinson of Arkansas, Democratic floor leader 
stated his disapproval of the President's remarks when he said: 
The President apparently lost 
his temper when he issued his state-
ment yesterday ••• his statement, 
of course, is to be dondemned. I do 
not propose to follow the bad example 
that has been set ••• 
But, by his challenge to his party followers for cooperation, he 
redeemed himself with these words: 
My purpose is to try to do my 
23 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
sion, 408. 24 New York Times, December 11, 1930. See footnote 37, 
duty to my party, my people, and most 
of all, to my oountry • • • I should 
like to see this Congress now aot in 
a spirit of greater oooperation. 25 
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Most of those who urged inoreased appropriations were aoti-
~ated by letters and telegrams from their oonstituents, espeoial-
ly in the areas affeoted by the drought, urging and pleading for 
help from the Federal Government in the form of loans to looal 
banks, and for food and feed. Many of these letters and tele-
grams were printed in the Congressional Reoords at the request of 
26 
senators reoeiving them. 
A oompromise agreement was finally reaohed by both Houses, 
just before the Christmas reoess on Deoember 20, setting the ap-
27 
propriation at $45,000,000 for drought relief. 
The President's relations with the Senate, never harmonious, 
grew even more strained in the suooeeding weeks of the third ses-
s~on, and further impeded the progress of the Administration's 
legislative program. At this point it is evident that undue sen-
sitivity to oritioism--always a regrettable luxury--was indeed 
the AOhille's heel whioh demoralized the oooperative relationship 
between President Hoover and his Congress. 
25 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Bion, 409. 
26 Ibid., 789-792. 
The drought-strioken areas were distributed through the 
Btates of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina, 
Virginia, Ohio, Oklahoma, Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, North Da-
kota, Montana, New Mexioo, and Missouri. 
27 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
sion, 1167. 
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Congress reconvened on January 5, 1931, faced with highly 
oontroversial issues--including further remedies for unemployment 
drOUght relief, and financial assistance to the veterans of the 
ld War I--all of which issues were made more acute by the de-
On all issues except the soldiers' bonus the encounter 
between the President and the Republican House leaders on the 
side, and the Democratic leaders and the Republican insur-
28 
gents on the other. 
A survey of the accomplishments made under the organized 
drive for increased construction by the Federal, state, and local 
governments to relieve unemployment showed that stimulated con-
struction by public utilities and governments had increased #1, 
130,000,000 in 1930 over the amount spent in 1929, while private 
construction had decreased $1,420,000,000 in the same period. It 
sthus estimated that, through the relief plan, employment had 
provided for at least a million families who otherwise would 
29 
had no income. A re-survey of the progress of the Unemploy-
Relief ASSOCiation, under the chairmanship of Colonel Woods, 
reported on December 31 that distress would be well cared for dur 
winter. Despite these reports, it was stated by sources 
the Government that, while private charity and welfare 
28 Myers, 60-61. 
29 ~., 60. 
This report was submitted to the President by the Denart-
of Commerce on December 31, 1930. 
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organizations--supplemented by appropriations from municipali-
ties--were doing their best to relieve distress, the burden was 
beooming weighty. Relief workers admitted that more drastic ac-
30 " 
tion would soon be necessary. 
Care of the drought sufferers had been in the hands of the 
Amerioan Red Cross since August, 1930. Plans for a public appea 
in January to raise an additional $lO,OOO,OOO--bringing their to 
ta.l resources to #20,000,000--had been agreed to by President 
31 
Hoover and Judge Payne, Chairman of the Red Cross. Before this 
drive got under way a proposal, sponsored by Senators Robinson, 
Borah, and others, was placed before the Senate to increase the 
#45,000,000 drought fund by #25,000,000 for human relief, by di-
32 
reot distribution of the Federal Government. This brought an 
immediate protest from Judge Payne, who expressed a great unwill-
ingness to have the money appropriated, insisting that the Red 
Oross could take care of human needs, if the Government would 
33 
provide a loan for seed and feed. 
Since the President of the United States is President of the 
30 Francis Brown, "The Unemployment Crisis," Current His-
~, 36: 414, July, 1932. In the succeeding pages this article 
will be referred to as Brown, Current History. 
31 Myers, 60-62. 
32 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Bion, 3369-3372. 
33 Ibid., 3371, 3372. 
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~ed Cross, it was suspeoted that this deoision was made in defer-
enoe to the President's philosophy that the Government should not 
infringe on individual liberty by offering direot finanoial as-
sistanoe to those in need. The oontroversy, onoe begun, oonti 
for weeks with members of the Senate again attaoking the Presi-
dent's relief taotios, and the President remaining adamant in his 
oonviotions. The sentiment of the Senators was indioated in the 
speeoh of Senator MoKellar of Tennessee: 
I am'willing to join the other Sen-
ators and stop all other legislation un-
til the neoessary appropriations are 
passed by Congress and signed by the Pres-
ident, or if he refuses to sign, until 
they are passed over his veto. 34 
Aoousations were made that the Red Cross had beoome the 
soreen behind whioh the President of the United States was under-
taking to shirk his responsibilities to see that those who are in 
need are relieved. It seemed inoredible, aooording to Senator 
Copeland of New York, that an organization "founded to give re-
lief and to administer to distressed human beings should even in-
timate that it would refuse money appropriated by Congress for 
that purpose." Furthermore, he declared that it was diffioult to 
understand how a man who had done so muoh to relieve starvation 
in other lands oould be so obstinate about relief for Amerioan 
34 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
sion, 3373. 
I 
I 
35 
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oitizens. 
A resolution appropriating the #25,000,000 passed on J 
20 by the Senate was rejected on January 29 by the House Appro-
priations Committee after Chairman Payne had declared to that 
36 
oommittee that the additional funds were unnecessary. This ac-
tion aroused the ire of Senator Borah, who replied that the ap-
propriation was not a dole but entirely in accord with govern-
mental policy. In what The New York Times termed an "impassi 
speech ll he maintained that the Red Cross was not meeting the sit 
uation and that the American people had never hesitated to take 
money from the treasury of the United States "to care for those 
37 
who are afflicted." His determination to carry through the Sen-
ate program was apparent in his remarks: 
I am perfectly willing to say 
that not another appropriation bill 
shall pass this body until the hungry 
are fed, until the sick are taken care 
of, until the Government of the United 
States has met its obligation to its 
distressed and hungry citizens. 38 
Impelled, perhaps, by the urgency for cooperation, the Pres-
ident, in a more conciliatory mood, replied to the charges of the 
35 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 3374, 3375. See footnote 37, Chapter I. 
36 Myers, 61-62. 
37 The New York Times, February 3, 1931. 
38 Congressional Recor~J Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 3759-3760. 
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same time defended his relief measures by 
to his wide experience in relief work, both 
in the Southern states, and further amplified his phi 
This is not an issue as to whether 
people shall go hungry or cold in the 
United States. It is solely a question 
of the best method by which hunger and 
cold shall be prevented • • • if the 
time should ever come that the volun-
tary agencies of the country, together 
with the local and State governments, 
are unable .to find resources with which 
to prevent hunger and suffering in my 
country, I will ask the aid of every re-
source of the Federal Government because 
I would no more see starvation amongst 
our countrymen than would any Senator or 
Congressman. 39 
The President's message led to talk of a compromise by the 
Senate. The way was opened for Congress and the Executive to get 
on common problems. On February 15 the House and Senate 
hed a compromise measure, appropriating $20,000,000, to be 
available and to be administered by the Department of 
culture for specific purposes, including loans to individuals 
in the drought-stricken area for use in the organization of local 
agricultural credit corporations, for crop production and further 
39 State pa~ers, I, 496-470. 
Myers, b. That the President's recommendations were 
quate at the time was indicated br, reports "later, that only $35, 
000,000 out of the first fund of 145,000,000 ever was used and 
only $3,600,000 of the additional fund of $20,000,000. The Red 
Cross expended less than $12,000,000 of its privately raised #15, 
000,000 fund." 
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40 
_grlcultural rehabilitation. The passage of the measure was an 
acknowledged victory for the President and his policy. 
In contrast with the fortunate events that led to the ulti-
~ate victory for the administration regarding the relief plan is 
the dispatch with which the veterans' bonus bill was passed over 
41 
the president's veto. The President expressed disapproval 
~eaBure on the grounds that the Government would be called upon 
to finance loans, which--for the most part--would go to those 
42 
vere not in distress. The di~cussion of the relative merits of 
the bill consumed several days of the third session in which it 
appeared that the number of those who favored the bill greatly 
40 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
sion, 807-810; 906. 
Chicago Daily Tribune, February 10, 1931. 
An interesting sidelight on the now famous f1#20,000,000 
compromise" appeared in the Chicago Daily Tribune: ••• "Those 
who have sat and listened to the criticisms and epithets hurled 
at the administration throughout the long controversy over relief 
looked on at a scene strange and dramatic. 
For they saw and heard Joseph T. Robinson, minority lead-
er, and Thaddeus H. Caraway, Arkansas--two democratic senators--
defend President Hoover, express confidence in Secretary of Agri-
culture Hyde, and applaud the work of the Red Cross. 
The two men who have led the fight for relief, who have 
been critical to the point of bitterness led the fight today for 
the compromise." 
41 con~ressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 584, 17, 734. 
This bill, known as the Emergency Adjustment Compensation 
Act, was introduced by Senator Bacharach of New Jersey to increas 
the loan basis of veterans' certificates to fifty per cent of the 
face value of the certificate with a provision that, in no event, 
should the rate of interest exceed four and one-half per cent, 
cOmpounded annually. 
42 Myers, 66. 
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outnumbered those who opposed it. 
opposition to the proposed bill was expressed by Secretary 
the Treasury Andrew Mellon, who asserted that an appropriation 
of approximately $1,000,000,000 would be required to meet the 
loans coming uP. Mellon stated that estimates from the best 
a~ailable sources indicated that not more than sixty per cent of 
the veterans would avail themselves of the additional privilege 
beoause of the terms of the bill and of their desire to retain 
the full amount of insurance represented on the face of the cer-
43 
tificate. 
At the request "of Senator Smoot of Utah, President Hoover 
submitted a statement of his views on the bonus legislation in 
whioh he recognized the principle that, when men have been called 
upon to place their lives in jeopardy for the nation, the nation 
as a whole incurs a special obligation to these men above that to 
44 
any other group of citizens. But he explained that he did not 
think that the country should be called upon to make loans to men 
who could support themselves. He pointed out that it would en-
payment of about $1,300,000,000 from the Federal Govern-
Of its effect on the relief program he said: 
The largest part of this huge sum • 
• • is to be available to those who are 
43 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 5076. 
44 Ibid., 5375. 
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not in distress. Such action may • • 
• result in prolongation of this per-
iod of unemployment and suffering • • 
• Placing a strain upon savings needed 
Lfor recoverY? • • • by a measure • • 
• for a vast sum beyond the call of 
distress • • • will not only nullify 
the benefits to the veterans but in-
flict injury to the country as a whole. 45 
It was apparent from the beginning of the discussions that 
the bill would be passed by both Houses even though the President 
made it known that he would veto the measure. Sentiment in favor 
of the legislation was strong among the Republicans who ordinariI, 
followed the lead of the Administration. Even Speaker Longworth 
declared that the bill was "safe, sane, and sound and provided a 
46 
scheme which offered no disturbance to the treasury. 11 
From testimony submitted by General Hines, Chief of the 
veteran's Bureau, who had already loaned to veterans on their cer· 
tificates approximately #330,000,000, it was estimated that over 
47 
300,000 veterans were out of employment. From the economic stand-
point it was argued by those who favored the bill that loan pro-
vision would increase purchasing power and therefore help to alle-
viate hunger, poverty, and unemployment. Those who opposed the .1 
bill countered that no provision for financing was made in the 
I bill. It was a case, they explained, of protecting the financial 
45 State Papers, I, 507. 
46 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 734, 1485. 
47 Ibid., 5075. 
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terests of the country and at the same time relieve distress 
48 
thereby damage the financial structure of the country. 
Aware, no doubt, of the political significance to themselves 
veterans at this time, the members of both Houses 
the bill on February 26 by large majorities, arguments ad-
against it by the President and by the Secretary of the 
The President promptly vetoed the meas 
and returned it with a message which amplified his former 
His disappointment came from the fact that the pay-
the loans to veterans would incur a heavy tax burden, and 
to this undoubtedly was added the disappointment over the failure 
of the Republicans in the House to support his efforts to avert 
49 
further tax burdens. The President's veto message was carefully 
analyzed by both Houses and the bill quickly passed over his 
50 
veto. 
Charles G. Dawes, United States ambassador to Great Britain, 
in a letter to the President dated March 10, 1931, paid tribute 
to the President's statesmanship when he said: 
• • • To veto a bonus bill in time of 
prosperity is both commendable and 
48 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-
Sion, 5073-5075. 
49 Ibid., q217, 6218, 6304. 
50 Ibid., 6230, 6308. 
The Senate vote over the veto was seventy-six yeas and 
seventeen najs; the House vote, three hundred twenty-eight yeas 
and seventy-nine nays. Senators Glass and Vandenberg strove to 
sustain the President's veto. 
Lie;; .. 
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courageous. To veto one during the 
worst of an unprecedented business 
depression, at a time when the bill 
• • • could be represented as one to 
relieve suffering is an heroic thing--
as well as being commendable •••• 
When public opinion was distracted by 
conditions temporarily very adverse, 
you stood for a principle when you 
knew you would go down with it for the 
time. 51 
The third session of the Seventy-first Congress adjourned on 
1931, with many of the pledges for Administrative and 
cooperative action unfulfilled. 
That the President's efforts to cushion the shock of depres-
were effective was indicated in general signs of recovery 
the denression toward the end of March, 1931. Official re-
ports made on March 30 indicating better business prospects and a 
oontinued upward trend in employment cheered the President. Sec-
retary of Labor William N. Doak advised the President that the 
gradual business improvement and the upward trend in employment 
shown in February had continued through March. The President's 
emergency committee on unemployment reported fewer men out of 
work, particularly in MiChigan, the New England states, and in 
52 
several states of the South. The Federal Reserve Board in Janu-
ary, 1931, reported that bank failures had abated. The enormous 
speculative account in stocks had been liquidated, and the prices 
51 Myers, 69-70. 
52 ChicagQ Dail! Tribune, March 31, 1931. 
In Michigan the pick up in the automobile trades had im-
proved employment. 
:g 
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f industrial securities in the stock exchange showed a gradual 
o 53 
increase of about ten per cent in prices from mid-January. The 
eIDPloyment improvement in Chicago was reflected in the closing 0 
the headquarters of the Government Commission on Unemployment 
the transfer of the major part of relief work to re 
54 
social agencies. 
Hardly had the domestic scene begun to show signs of re-
habilitation when a new crisis of European origin threatened. 
Signs of the impending economic disturbance were apparent first 
in stock-market fluctuations. Beginning in the middle of April 
and continuing through May financial pages carried reports of 
declining prices in commodities and steady decreases in trade on 
the stock-market. Excerpts taken from the Chicago Daily Tribune 
show this progressive downward trend through April and May: 
April 16, 1931 
PRICES ALL DECLINE - STEEL AT NEW LOW 
• • • Most issues broke to new lows • 
• • including such redoubtable timber 
as United States Steel common which 
dropped through the lows of last De-
cember. 
53 Chicago Daily Tribune, April 4, 1931. 
This fact is confirmed in a report on the financial page 
of the Chicago Daily Tribune: rtwhereas the monthly average of 
commodities compiled by Dun's Reivew had shown a decrease of s 
~-tenths of one per cent in March, yesterday's Bradstreet Index 
LApri1 27 ... shows an advance of six-tenths of one per cent. 
This is the first month since September, 1929, for which 
Bradstreet has failed to report a reduction in commodities ••• 
Both home and forei~ reviews on the general movement of staple 
prices have indicated that the line of resistance has been met." 
54 Ibid., March 31, 1931. 
April 26, 1931 
Cautious traders continued to back 
out of the stock market today and values 
once more trended sharply downward. • • 
• The finish found the averages flirting 
more earnestly with the lows of December 
16 last. 
May 8, 1931 
United States Steel and American 
Can, recognized leaders of the list were 
depressed to new lows by selling which 
reached its peak in the last hour of 
trading. 
May 15, 1931 
United States Steel Lbreaking7 to 
a new seven-year low on the New York 
board. Uniformly lower prices ruled 
throughout the list, but the variations 
from the previous day's quotations were 
not large. The 65,000-odd shares of 
stock which were exchanged represent one 
of the lightest trading days on the mar-
ket in the last twelve months. 
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An investigation into the cause of the sudden change from 
recent favorable outlook revealed that the turn of events in 
States was the refle,tion of a rapidly approaching economi 
in Germany and Central Europe, in which the burden of rep-
tions and general political instability were salient factors. 
er financial crisis was precipitated by the announcement of 
55 
German-~ustrian Customs Agreement on March 31, 1931. 
55 Walter Consuelo Langsam, The World Since 1914. (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1936), 187. 
Germany and Austria agreed to abolish customs duties dur-
a transitional period and to levy identical duties on goods 
other countries. Fearing an Anschluss LUnion? between the 
countries as a result of agreement, France protested--and 
ed to prevent its culmination--by offering a needed loan of 
1,000,000 to save the Kredit Anstalt from collapse if Austria 
uld renounce the plan. Austria declined, obtained money from 
94 
The next step in the European crisis was the announcement on 
11, 1931, that the Austrian government had come to the relief 
the great Viennese bank, the Credit Anstalt, a bank which con-
lIed two-thirds of Austria's bank resources and--through its 
1nvestments--controlled a large share of her industry. This bank 
close relations with the large banks in Berlin, London, Paris 
56 
in most European capitals as well as those in New York. 
The news of the difficulties of Credit Anstalt led to a wi 
of short-time credits and very soon endangered the stabil-
other European banks. The financial condition of all Cen-
tral European countries remained critical and definitely affect 
57 
the United States. Especially was this true of Germany, 
of circumstances--the influence of communists 
at home and French diplomatic relations--made manda-
56 The American Year Book, 1931, 23. 
57 Myers, 74, 75. 
A large number of banks in the United States had loaned 
an aggregate sum of from #1,200,000,000 to #1,500,000,000 on this 
short-term paper from countries in Central Europe on the assump-
tion that it was a normal advance in export trade. Actually, a 
great deal of the short-term money had been invested in capital 
improvements--and therefore could not be paid on demand. 
Another factor affecting the United States--and perhaps 
the one most directly affecting our financial system--was the 
practice by foreign governments and foreign national banks of 
sending their gold reserves abroad on deposit, thereby earning i 
terest on their reserves. There was on deposit in this country 
gold or currency reserves from foreign countries and foreign na-
tional banks amounting to about #1,500,000,000, which our insti-
tutions had loaned to citizens, or on doubtful short loans to 
other countries. When foreign depositors demanded this money, 
American banks--unable to collect the bills of other countries--
had to call domestic loans, thereby causing a drain on our whole 
financial system. . 
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tory extraordinary measures within the country to avert economic 
An agreement participated in by the Bank for International 
settlements, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the central banks of 
theD of the Central European countries tried to meet the emerg 
arranging for an extension of large credit to the National 
Germany ffie ReichsbanlV and also for a restriction on the 
58 
of short-time loans. Despite every effort to prevent 
disaster, affairs in Germany--aggravated by the exigencies aris 
the Austrian crisis--grew steadily worse. A very integral 
of this whole financial disintegration in Europe was the 
t of German reparations to the European Allies. A report 
the President showed that the total annual interest payments 
repara~ions and inter-governmental debts amounted to about 
This was proving to be an almost insurmountable 
n on international exchange and currency stability. The sum 
59 
owed to the United States amounted to about $250,000,000. 
In an attempt to relieve this heavy financial burden, which 
was devitalizing the financial and economic stability of Europe 
and threatening our own financial equilibrium, President Hoover--
early in June--met with Cabinet-members, Secretaries Mills, Mel-
, and Stimson, to whom he outlined a plan for the suspension 
58 The American Year Book, 1931, 23. 
59 Myers, 83-90. 
96 
~ll inter-governmental debts for one year. Because Congress 
not in session LInternational agreements required the approva 
oongres~7 and the President wished to have the plan effective 
. (rom the beginning of the fiscal year, July 1, when the next debt 
installments were due, it was necessary to secure the approval of 
60 
ers of Congress before taking official action. Since Senator 
binson, Democratic leader of the Senate, and John N. Garner, 
was slated to be Speaker of the House, refused their approval 
the president--between June 18 and 19--telephoned to thirty out-
_town Con~ressional leaders with reference to the proposed mo 
torium in order to make sure of enough Democratic votes to carry 
Certain senators consulted by the President dis-
his plans to the Press--necessitating President Hoover's 
ving publicity to the moratorium before the foreign governments 
informed. As a result, the President 
61 
1I~~,~~.cssly criticized for lack of diplomatic courtesy. 
Excerpts from the moratorium, released to the Press by Pres-
ident Hoover on Sunday morning, June 20, 1931, included the fol-
significant statements: 
• • • The American Government proposes 
the postponement during one year of all 
payments on inter-governmental debts, 
60 Myers, 91-92. 
The American Year Book, 1931, 
61 Myers, 91, 92. 
reparations and relief debts, both 
principal and interest, of course 
not including obligations of govern-
ments held by private parties. Sub-ject to confirmation by Congress, the 
American Government will postpone all 
payments upon the debts of foreign 
governments to the American Government 
payable during the fiscal year begin-
ning July 1st next, conditional on a 
like postponement for one year of all 
payments on inter-governmental debts 
owing the important creditor powers. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The world-wide depression has af-
fected the countries of Europe more 
severely than our own. Some of these 
countries are feeling to a serious ex-
tent the drain of this depression on 
national economy. The fabric of inter-
governmental debts, supportable in nor-
mal times, weighs heavily in the midst 
of this depression. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I do not approve in any remote 
sense of the cancellation of the debts 
to us. World confidence would not be 
enhanced by such action. • • 62 
97 
Approbation of the President's action was almost universal. 
The President telegraphed to all members of the Senate and House 
whose approval he had not previously asked, and nearly all re-
sponded favorable. Prime Minister Ramsay Mac Donald commented 
that it was "an action of great wisdom, courage and deep insight. 
Newspapers throughout the country, with scarcely any dissent, ex-
pressed approval. Immediate improvement followed the issuance of 
the moratorium; prices on the stock market rose from three to el 
ven pOints, wheat rose from four to five cents a bushel; retail 
98 
63 
improved, and unemployment began to decrease. Interesting 
ts in newspapers and periodicals included those of Arthur 
Henning: 
That President Hoover's new pro-
gram of international policies is fraught 
with far-reaching consequences to the 
world generally, to the United States in 
particular, and to the President's politi-
cal future--most particularly, appears to 
be the common opinion, not only of those 
who point to it with pride, but also of 
those who view it with alarm. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The step taken by the President in 
proposing a one year holiday in the pay-
ment of German reparations and allied war 
debts is being hailed by his friends and 
foes alike as a turning point in world 
history. 64 
of Allan Nevins appearing in an article in Current His-
• • • Very little leadership entered 
into his dramatic stroke of June, 1931, 
in announcing the one-year moratorium 
on reparations and war debts. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nevertheless, the moratorium was a great 
achievement. Next to the Washington Con-
ference and its treaties, it was the 
greatest single achievement by an Ameri-
can President since Wilson left the White 
House. . . • 65 
63 The American Year~, 1931, 3, 4. 
64 Chicago Daily Tribune, July 27, 1931. 
65 Nevins, Current History, 36: 393-394. 
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countries affected by the moratorium readily agreed to the 
~rlU.r) __ ents with the exception of France; but, after careful de-
beration, she too agreed to cooperate with the plan. This was 
66 
July 6, 1931. While the moratorium affor~ed temporary relief 
tension in inter-national affairs, it did not offer the 
to the complicated financial and economic problems, ei-
within Germany or on the international scene. The end of 
found the constructive effects of the moratorium on the wane 
rmation made available to the President at this time revealed 
the prices of industrial stocks had fallen fifteen points 
their moratorium recovery; that the prices of wheat, cotton, 
livestock were down to the lowest point in years; and that 
loyment had increased by an additional 500,000 since March, 
67 
total to about 7,000,000. 
66 Myers, 95-98 
"ffiy June 221 the British, Italian, Rumanian, German, Jap 
se, Polish, Czech, Finnish, New Zealand, Hungarian, Austrran, 
gian, Swedish, Canadian, and Greek governments had now ac-
ted the moratorium." . 
France was unwilling at first to accept the terms of the 
ratorium because~of her annual reparations par.ment from Germany, 
ch amounted to about $130,000,000 including 'unconditional rep 
tions" and "reparations in kind." A preferable plan for France 
uld have been a moratorium for the Allies while Germany contin-
d to pay her obligations to France. 
67 Ibid., 211. 
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Suggestions for the oa11ing of a speoial session of Congres 
to deal with the problem were turned down by the President, but 
~e took steps to give some Federal support to the relief work al-
~ 68 
ready in progress. On August 19, 1931, the President instruoted 
the new ohairman of the President's Unemployment Relief Organiza-
tion, Walter S. Gifford, to set up an organization adequate to 
care for the needy during the ooming winter. "The whole foroes 
the Administration are at your disposal," the President oon-
69 
eluded. 
In September the nation was oonfronted with another great 
crisis as a result of the suspension of the gold standard by 
70 
t Britain. The extent to whioh this affeoted the United 
states is best desoribed in a report of the Federal Reserve Board 
68 Brown, Current History, 36: 415. 
69 Myers, 114, 115. 
Walter S. Gifford, President of the American Telephone 
Telegraph Company, had been appointed by the President to succeed 
lonel Arthur Woods, who had resigned. 
70 Paul M. Mazur, "The Gold Crisis: its Causes and Signifi-
canoe," Current History, 35: 167-169, November, 1931. 
"For a long time there had been a drain on the gold re-
serves of the Bank of England and during this same period the 
gold basis for currency established by Parliament in 1925 had be 
threatened. With the misfortunes of her debtors the flow of gold 
into the English coffers lessened and finally, with the freezing 
of German short-term loans, the assets of many banks and the 
slight but adverse effect of the German moratorium, the gold re-
serves of the Bank of England reached a danger point in August, 
1931 ••• Funds were withdrawn in $100,000,000 amounts. France 
alone withdrew $125,000,000 in gold on July 24, acoording to a 
BS statement.1t 
Suspension of the gold standard 
in England not only tended to mobilize 
foreign balances still held in London 
but also to impair confidence in such 
balances held elsewhere and to cause 
European banks to convert large por-
tions of their foreign funds into gold. 
Since a large part of the realizable 
short-term foreign balances of the world 
was held in the United states, it was 
largely upon this country that this move-
ment then concentrated. As a consequence, 
the United States lost $725,000,000 gold 
from the middle of September to the end 
of October. About three-fifths of this 
amount was taken by France, the bulk of 
the remainder by Belgium, Switzerland, 
and Netherland. These are the countries 
that had been drawing heavily on the Bank 
of England reserves. 
To a considerable extent this move-
ment reflected the desire'of the central 
banks in these countries to increase their 
metallic reserves with a view to showing 
a stronger gold position. 71 
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Apprehension was intensified by the exodus of gold from the 
United States, and people in every part of the country began 
hoarding gold until a total of over a billion dollars in gold and 
currency was taken out of circulation. Conditions were further 
aggravated by the abandonment of the gold standard by Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Columbia, Bolivia, and India and by exchange re-
strictions in Greece, Italy, Germany, Austria, Hun~ary and Chile 
as well as by a number of import restrictions on trade. The sus-
picion that the united States would follow the example of Great i 
71 Eighteenth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 
United States Government Printing Office, 1932, 11. 
1 
aritain led to a continued heavy withdrawal of gold and exchange 
the United States. This heavy drain on the banks forced 
to call in loans and to seek increased credit from the Fed-
Reserve system. Hoarding increased to an estimated rate of 
a week, and new bank failures were reported daily. 
were on the verge of panic, and many--alarmed over the in-
in bank failures--rushed to the banks to withdraw their 
thereby further jeopardizing the bank reserves. The 
inadequacy of the Federal Reserve system to meet this unprece-
dented emergency and the weakness in our banking system generally 
revealed. 
It was evident to the President that the needs of the coun-
demanded the adoption of some unprecedented measures. Acco 
1ngly, with the advice of Cabinet members and other advisers, a 
broad program was agreed upon to meet the new situation. This in 
eluded conferences with heads of the leading insurance companies, 
heads of the Clearing House banks in New York, and a meeting with 
ranking members of banking, finance, and other committees in both 
73 
Houses of Congress. In placing the problem before the financial 
leaders, the President pointed out salient points. Excerpts from 
his report included: 
72 Wilbur, 413. 
73 Myers, 124-126. 
• •• the situation since the British 
collapse ten days ago is apnroaching 
disaster at an accelerated speed until 
it has reached a panic condition. 
, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • The Federal Reserve system is 
expanding credit by every device to 
meet the sapping of our credit foun-
dations • • • the fears of the people 
were, since the British failed ten 
days ago, expressed in unprecedented 
hoarding of currency •.. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• •• But beyond this, the banks in 
the large centers are calling interior 
loans to fortify themselves against 
foreign drains ••• the secondary bank-
ing centers being drained are fortify-
ing themselves against it by calling 
loans from country banks and customers. 
· .the imminent collapse of banks threat-
ens in many interior centers particularly 
in the south and mid-west. • • 
• •• In all, a senseless "bankers I panic ll 
and public fears are contributing to 
dragging the country down. 74 
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His plan included the creation of a national credit associa-
tion with a credit of $500,000,000 to support the financial 
structure, lito be subscribed by all the banks in a ratio of two 
per cent of their depositsll and an agreement not to foreclose on 
mortgages of farmers and home-owners who were making an effort 
to pay. President Hoover stated that he would call Congress into 
special session and bring in government support if the bankers 
rejected the plan. Opinions on this plan were divided, but the 
bankers--after considering the idea--sent word to the Fresident 
74 Myers, 126. 
1 
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on october 5 that they would form the organization. The Presi-
dent also decided to recommend to Congress an appropriation of 
1125 ,000,000 to strengthen the land banks, to be used as a re-
fund. 
At a meeting with about thirty Congressional leaders the 
reviewed the whole economic situation and outlined the 
pro~ram for relief. The cooperation of Congress in the forth-
ooming session of the Seventy-second Congress (in which there 
Democratic majority) was essential to the success of 
the relief program. The course pursued at that session will be 
delineated in the next chapter. Some object10n was expressed 
over setting up a governmental f1nancial agency similar to the 
Finance Corporation and to the foreclosure policy of the 
Federal Land Banks, but on the whole, the meeting was looked 
76 
as "a SUbstantial achievement." 
Because of its significance, the relief program as outlined 
by the President 1s quoted here: 
1. To mobilize the banking resources 
of the country to meet these conditions, 
I request the bankers of the nation to 
form a national institution of at least 
$500,000,000. The purpose of this insti-
tution to be the rediscount of banking 
assets not now eligible for rediscount at 
the Federal Reserve Banks in order to as-
75 Myers, 127. 
76 Ibid., 126-130. 
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sure our banks, being sound, that 
they may attain liquidity in case of 
necessity, and thereby enable them 
to continue their business without 
the restriction of credits or the sao-
rifice of their assets. I have sub-
mitted my proposal to the leading bank-
ers of New York. I have been advised 
by them that it will receive their sup-
port, and that at my request they will 
assume the leadership in the formula-
tion of such an organization. Themem-
bers of the New York City Clearing House 
Association have unanimously agreed to 
oontribute their share by pledging $150 , 
000,000, which is two per cent of their 
net demand and time deposits. I have 
been assured from other large centers, 
as far as I have been able to reach, of 
their support also. I oonsider that it 
is in the national interest, inoluding 
the interest of all individual banks and 
depositors, that all the banks of the 
country should support this movement to 
their full responsibility. It is a move-
ment of national assurance and of unity 
of action in an American way to assist 
business, employment, and agriculture. 
2. On September 8th, I requested the 
governors of the Federal Reserve Banks 
to endeavor to secure the co-operation 
of the bankers of their territory to 
make some advances on the security of the 
assets of closed banks or to take over 
some of these assets in order that the 
receivers of those banks may pay some divi-
dends to their depositors in advance of 
what would otherwise be the case pending 
liquidation. Suoh a measure will contri-
bute to free many business activities and 
to relieve many families from hardship o-
ver the forthcoming winter, and in a meas-
ure reverse the prooess of deflation in-
volved in the tying up'of deposits. Sev-
eral of the districts have already made 
considerable progress to this end, and I 
request that it should be taken up vigor-
ously as a oommunity responsibility. 
3. In order that the above program of 
unification and solidarity of action may 
105 
be carried out and that all parts of the 
country be enlisted, I request the govern-
ors of the Federal Reserve Banks in each 
district to secure the appOintment of 
working committees of bankers for each _ 
Reserve district to co-operate with the 
New York group and in carrying out the 
other activities which I have mentioned. 
4. I shall propose to the Congress that 
the eligibility provisions of the Federal 
Reserve Act should be broadened in order 
to give greater liquidity to the assets 
of the banks, and thus a greater assur-
ance to the bankers in the granting of 
credits by enabling them to obtain legit-
imate accommodation on sound security in 
times of stress. Such measures are al-
ready under consideration by the Senate 
Committee upon Currency and Banking. 
5. Furthermore, if necessity requires, 
I will recommend the creation of a finance 
corporation similar in character and pur-
pose to the War Finance Corporation, with 
available funds sufficient for any legit-
imate call in support of credit. 
6. I shall recommend to Congress the 
subscription of further capital stock by 
the government to the Federal Land Banks 
(as was done at their founding) to strength-
en their resources so that, on the one hand, 
the farmer may be assured to auch accommo-
dation as he may require and, on the other 
hand, their credit may be of such high char-
acter that they may obtain their funds at 
low rates of interest. 
7. I have submitted the above-mentioned 
proposals which require legislation to the 
members of Congress, whose attendance I 
was able to secure on short notice at the 
evening's meeting--being largely the mem-
bers of committees particularly concerned--
and they approve of them in principle. 
8. Premier Laval of France is visiting 
the United states. It is my purpose to 
discuss with him the question of such fur-
ther arrangements as are imperative during 
the period of the depression in respect of 
inter-governmental debts. The policy of 
the American Government in this matter is 
well-known, and was set out by me in pub-
lic statement on June 20th in announcing 
106 
the American proposal for a year's 
postponement of debt payments. Our 
problem in this respect is one of such 
adjustment during the period of depres-
sion as will at the same time aid our 
own and world recovery. This being a 
subject first of negotiation with for-
eign governments was not submitted for 
determination at this evening's confer-
ence. 
9. The times call for unity of action 
on the part of our people. We have met 
with great difficulties not of our own 
making. It requires determination to over-
come these difficulties and above all to 
restore and maintain, confidence. Our peo-
ple owe it not only to themselves and in 
their own interest, but they can by such 
an example of stability and purpose give 
hope and confidence in our own country 
and to the rest of the world. 77 
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A summary of the general economic condition of the country 
in November, 1931, reveals that the downward tre~d of business 
activity and security values had not been entirely checked nor 
had unemployment decreased in spite of optimistic reports that 
~the United States is at last emerging from its economic depres-
slon." According to R. G. Dun and Company, business failures de-
clined from 2362 in October to 2195 in November, showing an in-
crease of eight and one-tenth per cent over November, 1930. The 
total value of exports for October, 1931, showed a drop of $121, 
896,000 over the exports for the same month in 1930--although the 
October exports in 1931 had increased $25,000,000 over those in 
September, 1931. 
Bank failures declined perceptibly in November from the rec-
77 State Paners II, 4. 
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ord of five hundred twelve for October. A survey of the Americ 
sapkers' Association on November 15 showed a decline in the na. 
tiOP's savings deposits of #270,085,000 for the year ended June 
Bank failures resulted in an increase of #67,000,000 
in the Postal Savings System. On November 17 the American Fede 
,tiOn of Labor's monthly survey estimated the number of unem-
at 6,200,000. A week later President William Green pre-
that 7,500,000 would be out of work in January. One en-
couraging fact was that the increase for November, 1931, had be 
78 
greater than is usual at that time of year. 
The responsibility placed upon the President during the 
grave crisis involving the financial structure of the country re 
a hitherto unrecognized quality of leadership in the Pres 
Overlooking partisanship and politics, he worked with 
small groups of leaders of finance and industry and pushed for-
ward programs that offered a timely and appropriate solution to 
79 
difficult details of the problem. 
From the evidence presented in this chauter it is obvious 
that misunderstanding resulted in an almost incredible amount of 
mischief being done to the amiable relations of Congress and 
80 
President Hoover. Members of Congress--anxious to vindicate 
78 E. Francis Brown, tlMr. Hoover Faces Nation's PrOblems," 
Current History, 35:578-580, January, 1932. 
79 See page 7, Chapter I. 
80 See footnote 14 in Chapter I. 
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tb6Wselves in the eyes of their constituents, and wholly unpre-
p~red for the stubborn taciturnity displayed by the President--
!~iled to realize that his attitude was probably conditioned by 
81 
background and training. When a sympathetic analysis with 
President might have won Hoover to the Congressional view-
point, criticism--vitriolic in its effect upon the sensitive Q 
et President--was directed at him and left him unable to adjust 
biwself gracefully to the impetuous reasoning of Congress. On 
the other hand, had the President been more politic in his atti-
he might have rationalized Congressional behavior to the 
where he could realize the criticism for what it was--a 
normal reaction of Congress when violently opposed to Administra-
tive proposals. 
81 See footnotes 19 and 37 in Chapter I. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EVIDENCES OF PARTISANSHIP IN CONGRESS, 1931-1933 
At the approach of the opening of the Seventy-second Con-
gress in December, 1931, the nation was still confronted with 
problems calling for emergency measures. It was apparent before 
the end of November that the enlarged program for relief already 
under consideration would have to be carried into action if an-
other crisis was to be averted. Congress convened on December 7 
with the Democrats in control of the House for the first time in 
twelve years. The Democrats held two hundred nineteen seats, 
while the Republicans numbered two hundred fourteen, fifteen of 
whom were Progressives, and the Farm-Laborites one. Changes in 
leadership included the selection of John N. Garner, Democrat of 
Texas, for Speaker; Bertrand N. Snell of New York to replace John 
Q. Tilson as Republican floor leader; and Henry T. Rainey of 111-
inois, Democratic floor leader. The Senate was comprised of 
forty-seven Democrats, forty-eight Republicans, including twelve 
Progressives and one Farm-Labor vote. Republicans organized the 
Senate, although as far as the President was concerned, it was 
only nominally Republican inasmuch as the coalition of Progres-
sives and Democrats would number from fifty to sixty, giving them 
1 
a majority. 
1 Brown, Current Histor~, 578. 
Myers, 146. 
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In spite of the indioations of another downward trend in 
bUsiness and general eoonomio oonditions, the President's annual 
to Congress delivered on Deoember 8 was not without hope 
ooming months. In it he set the stage for the program of 
legislation he expeoted to have passed, reviewed the aooomplish-
wents and hardships of the past two years, explained the effeot 
of world-wide eoonomio disturbanoes on oonditions in the United 
states, and stressed the need for oonstruotive and aooelerated 
action on all pending relief proposals. Regarding the eoonomio 
conditions of the oountry he said: 
• • • The ohief influenoe affeoting 
the state of the Union during the past 
year has been the oontinued world-wide 
eoonomio disturbanoe. Our national oon-
oern has been to meet the emergenoies it 
has oreated for us, and to lay the founda-
tions for reoovery ••• 
The eoonomio depression has oontin-
ued and deepened in every part of the 
world during the past year. • • 
Within two years there have been 
revolutions or aoute sooial disorders in 
nineteen oountries, embraoing more than 
half the population of the world. • • 
• . • any effort to bring about our own 
reouperation has diotated the neoessity 
of oooperation by us with other nations 
in reasonable effort to restore world oon-
fidenoe and eoonomio stability ••• 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Although some of the oauses of our depres-
sion are due to speoulation, inflation of 
seourities and real estate, unsound for-
eign investments and mismanagement of fi-
nanoial institutions, yet our self-oon-
tained national eoonomy, with its matoh-
less strength and resouroes, would have 
enabled us to reoover long sinoe but for 
the oontinued dislooations, shooks, and 
setback from abroad. • • 
• . • if we can put our financial re-
sources to work and can ameliorate the 
financial situation in the railways, I 
am confident we can make a large measure 
of recovery independent of the rest of 
the world. 2 
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Among the measures singled out for Congressional action in 
the interests of bringing about economic stability were a sub-
scription by the treasury of further canital to the Federal Land 
Banks, establishment of a system of home-loan discount banks as 
a necessary companion to the financial structure of the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Federal Land Banks, and the establishment 
of an emergency reconstruction corporation of the nature of the 
former War Finance Corporation. The President indic.ated that 
penditures on public works, as an aid to unemployment would in-
crease from $260,000,000 in 1928 to $780,000,000 during the cal-
3 
endar year. 
The President's message for the fiscal year beginning July 
1 recommended a decrease in appropriations of $369,000,000 with 
a modification of existing law authorizing further appropriati 
and an increase of $1,300,000,000 in tax revenues by taxes on 
amusements, automobiles and conveyances, and a substantial in-
4 
crease in income and estate taxes. 
The message on December 10, submitting the moratorium on i 
2 State Papers, II, 42-44. 
3 Ibid. 
4 
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ternational debts for formal approval of Congress, requested 
"that a law be enacted before December 15, .Li9317 , authorizing 
the Secretary of the Treasury--with the approval of the Presi-
dent--to postpone all payments due us on account of debts owed 
forei~n governments to the United States Government during the 
year ending June 10, 1932, and to provide for their payment over 
5 
a ten-year period beginning July 1, 1932." 
It was to be expected that this message would be received 
with mixed feelings by the members of Congress inasmuch as the 
sentiment in both Houses was markedly Democratic and there' had 
been a growing tendency in the last few months to discredit the 
President. The fact that unemployment and hardship continued 
and even increased caused many to lose faith in President Hoo-
ver's policies and his repeated assurances of recovery. Opposi-
tion to the moratorium had mounted in the months since individ 
6 
Oongressmen had given it their sanction. The feeling was wide-
spread that foreign countries should not be released from their 
debts while the American people were still in want. Anxious to 
please their constituents and concerned over the effect their 
actions on this issue would have on their chances for reelection 
many Congressmen returned to Washington prepared to oppose it. 
Evidences of opposition were quickly revealed in speeches 
of a political and partisan nature attacking the measure, as we 
5 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 297. 
6 See account referred to in Chapter III footnotes 62 63. 
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the President's method of handling it while Congress was not 
session. Both the President and the Republican party were 
attacked by Representative Oliver, Democrat, who claimed that the 
president set out to redeem a promise to abolish poverty yet all 
that could be found in his recent message was a "gruesome account 
of disaster unprecedented in the history of the nation which had 
befallen the country under Republican guidance." When Repre-
sentative Wood, Republican of Indiana, urged the House members 
to stand by the President, Oliver replied with taunts about the 
way the Republicans "stood by" the President on the tariff issue. 
He continued: 
• • • His own message confesses his 
disastrous failure • • • the greatest 
constructive service that can be ren-
dered to the American people would be 
the obliteration of the Republican 
party. •• 7 
Representative Rankin, Democrat from MisSissippi, who pre-
dicted that one of the hardest battles in Congress would likely 
be over the moratorium, said that if the President wanted this 
question taken up he should have called a special session of Con-
gress in June. Representative Wood intimated that such a course 
might have added to the afflictions of the people, if Congress 
had been there all summer "wrangling • 
• • 
as we are wrangling 
now." When Representative Rankin said in a threatening manner 
7 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 339, 340. 
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that he doubted that the measure would be passed by December 15, 
Ilif at all,1t Representative Wood again replied ••• "Is this 
tbe character of support the Democratic side is going to give 
tbe administration for the purpose of relieving the economic 
8 
conditions of the Country?" 
It was the sentiment of Representative Crowe, of Indiana, 
and others that--while world-wide conditions are always a matter 
of concern--the money, something over $300,000,000 per year, due 
9 
us from Europe was needed to assist people in our own country. 
The demonstration of partisan feeling was regretted by Rep-
resentative LaGuardia, Progressive from New York, who observed 
that the Seventy-second Congress "had indeed made a bad start," 
and in his remarks declared "this is no time for Democratic or 
Republican politics and political speeches." He believed that 
the crisis confronting the country was as serious as it was when 
Woodrow Wilson called a special session of Congress before the 
World War. He advised the members to "stop all this ••• 0 
ize our committees and get down to work." While he did not qual 
ify as a supnorter of the administration, according to his own 
statement, he noted that there were "startling statements in the 
President's message which should immediately absorb the attenti 
8 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 336, 338. 
9 Ibid., 336. 
of Congress." Among those he singled out were a sounder bank 
System and changes in banking laws and in the Federal Reserve 
System. 
The situation is very serious LEe 
continueg7 ••• it is not the success 
of the Democratic party and it is not 
the success of the Renublican party. 
It is the very preservation of the 
Union. 10 
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It was idle to talk about it, he felt, when spokesmen from both 
parties had appeared and publicly approved of the moratorium of 
one year. He reminded his colleagues that 
• • • the President took all partisan 
politics out of the question by first 
consulting and obtaining the approval 
of leading and authorative spokesmen 
of both parties • • • 11 
Others in the House expressed regret that partisanship was 
running so high in the debate on the moratorium but expressed 
hope that the President's program, if accepted by Congress, wo 
12 
check the "cruel liquidation," Senator Blaine, of Wisconsin, 
like many others including Senators Couzens, LaFollette, and Co 
nally claimed that the joint resolution before the Senate was not 
the same proposition indicated to the members of Congress in 
10 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses 
sion, 342, 343. 
11 Ibid., 343. 
12 .!:Q14., 484. 
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June, 1931. They objected to the provision for "the payment ovel 
a ten-year period, beginning July 1, 1932.11 It took a good deal 
of patient explaining by Under Seoretary of the Treasury Mills 
before these men and others in the Senate were convinced that it 
was never expected that all the payments due in 1932 would be 
paid in full in 1933, along with the payment due for that year. 
In defense of his own and the President's action, Under Secre-
tary Mills explained, apparently to their satisfaction, that: 
• • • in order to save what we thought 
was a world oatastrophe it became neces-
sary to relieve all debtors from inter-
national debts. 13 
Senator Blaine's critioism of the President's action inferred 
that there had been a serious infraction of the separation of 
powers principle: 
• • • let this practice be oarried but 
one step farther and we shall have in 
Amerioa a dictatorship without, and be-
yond, and over, and above the Constitu-
tion and the laws. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
No one of these ithree7 depart-
ments LOf governmen!7 should trespass 
the field of any other department. •• 14 
Despite all the oontroversy the law was enacted and signed 
by the President on December 23, authorizing the moratorium but 
I 
I 
13 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-second Congress, first ses- I 
sion, 1107. I:' 
[I 
14 Ibid., 1112. 
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declaring agaonst any further postponment of the paying of debts. 
The amendment proposed to the Senate read: 
••• it is the sense of Congress that 
there should be no further moratorium, 
no additional cancellation in whole or 
in part of the debts mentioned in this 
joint resolution. 15 
The attitude displayed toward the measure by the Congressmen in 
session bears out the observation that, had President Hoover not 
taken the precaution to obtain the support of as many Congressme 
as possible and had they not committed themselves in advance, 
they would surely not have voted for the plan when it came before 
16 . 
Congress. None of the acknowledged administration leaders had 
stood up in support of the measure during the heated debates over 
17 
its approval. 
Congress adjourned for the Christmas holidays on December 22 
with the most important relief measures still awaiting legisla-
tive action. Due to the existing crisis the President had urged 
the Congressmen to curtail or forego a Christmas recess, but the 
Senate--after first defeating a motion of Senator Borah to recon-
vene on December 28--agreed to concur with the House decision to 
18 
reconvene on January 4, 1932. Disturbed over the delay thus oc-
casioned and impatient for action, the President addressed anothe 
15 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
Sion, 1931. 
16 , "When Congress Roars", Review of Reviews, 82:23, 
January 9, 1932. 
17 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
Sion, 1118. 
18 Ibid 
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~essage to Congress exhorting them to act with dispatch on the 
relief program in which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
~eld an important place. The message delivered on January 4 and 
referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency called atten-
tion to the non-partisan nature of the program: 
• • • I should be derelict in my duty 
if I did not at this time emphasize the 
paramount importance to the Nation of 
constructive action upon these questions 
at the earliest possible moment. These 
recommendations have been largely devel-
oped in consultation with leading men of 
both parties, of agriculture, or labor, 
the bases for full collaboration to ef-
fect these purposes. They have no part-
isan character. We can and must replace 
the unjustifiable fear in the country by 
confidence. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • Combating a depression is indeed 
like a great war in that it is not a bat-
tle upon a single front but upon many 
fronts. Our people through voluntary 
measures and through state and local ac-
tion are providing for distress ••• Our 
duty is so to supplement these steps as 
to make their efforts more fruitful. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Action in these matters by the Con-
gress will go far to reestablish confi-
dence, to restore the functioning of our 
economic system, and to rebuilding of 
prices and values and to q"uickening em-
ployment. Our justified hope and confi-
dence for the future rest upon unity of 
our people and of the government in prompt 
and courageous action. 19 
Heeding, albeit reluctantly, the President's persistent prod 
ings, both Houses proceeded to take action on the measure to pro-
19 .::::.!::.~~~~~= 
aton, 11 
Record, Seventy-second Conp:ress, first ses-
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1fide for the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
Tbe purpose of the corporation was to provide financial facili-
ties for financial institutions, to aid in financing agriculture 
20 
oommerce, and industry and for other purposes. While delibera-
tions on the measure dealt largely with questions concerning the 
method of selecting members of the board of directors, benefits 
to be derived by banks and farmers in different sections of the 
oountry and with the adequacy or inadequacy of the bill to meet 
the needs for which it was intended, much time was consumed with 
oriticism or a partisan nature. Earlier mistakes of omission 
and commission by the Administration were dwelt upon. The Pres-
ident was criticized again for not calling a special session of 
Congress to deal with the emergency measures in the summer and 
fall of 1931. The plan evolved by President Hoover with the aid 
of bankers, Congressmen and financial experts to save the finan-
oial structure of the country in October, 1931, was referred to 
20 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses 
sion, 2527, 2537. 
The bill provided for "the creation of a body corporate, 
with the name "Reconstruction Finance Cornoration." It was to 
have capital stock of #500,000,000 subscribed by the United 
States of America. The management was vested in a board of di-
rectors consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, or in his 
absence the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the governor of the 
Federal Reserve Board, and the Farm Loan CommiSSioner, as memb 
ex-officio; and four other persons appointed by the President of 
the United States with the consent of the Senate. Not more than 
four of the seven members were to be chosen from anyone politi-
cal party and not more than one from anyone federal reserve dis 
trict. The Corporation was authorized to borrow up to $1,500, 
OOO,OOO--or an amount not to exceed three times the assets--for 
the purpose of making loans to banks, railroads, agriculture, 
industries, and other businesses. 
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Street--Hooverian Plan." Conditions under which the 
Banking and Currency were working to prepare and re-
21 
the bill were termed Ita forced draft" by Senator Bankhead. 
During the first weeks of January President Hoover conferred 
Congressional leaders, including Senator Glass and Repre-
sentative Steagall, chairman of the Committees on Banking and Cur 
rency, in their respective Houses, to secure their cooperation in 
passing the bill to check further deflation. Renresentative 
steagall and others promised they would do all they could to put 
through the emergency bill. A statement to the press following 
this meeting expressed the President's feeling at this time: 
The developments of the past week 
should give great assurances to the 
country. The public statements of the 
Renublican and Democratic leaders of 
the Senate and House show a real non-
partisan determination in cooperation 
with the Administration to assure the 
country of the balancing of the Federal 
expenditures and income for the fiscal 
year beginning July 1st. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
••• With the assurances which have now 
been given from the leaders in Congress 
I do not believe there is any ground for 
apprehension by the public from the flood 
of extravagant proposals which have been 
introduced there. It is true that these 
bills would imply an increase of Govern-
ment expenditure during the next five 
years of over forty billions of dollars 
or more than eight billions per annum. 
The great majority of these bills have 
been advanced by some organization or some 
sectional interest and are little likely 
to see the light of day from congression-
al committees. They do, however, repre-
sent a spirit of spending in the country 
which must be abandoned. 22 
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llepresentative Steagall, who was a member of the ma"ori ty partly 
iDemocra17 in the House was complimented by Representative Strong 
of Kansas for keeping his word. A bill passed by the House on 
December 22, providing Federal aid to Land Banks had been intro-
. 23 
duced by Representative Steagall. That the passage of these meas· 
ures was secured was due, in large measure, to the President's 
contacts with small groups of influential Congressmen. 
After the passage of the bill was assured, although not for-
ma.lly acted, upon by the Senate, leading newspapers announced the 
appOintment by the President of General Charles G. Dawes as Presi. 
dent of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Eugene Meyer ae 
chairman of the Board. Since the measure provided for appoint-
ments by the Board of Directors, the question.was raised in the 
Senate on January 22 as to whether this was "a usurpation of 
24 
power" by President Hoover. By January 16 passage of the bill was 
assured although it was not approved by the Senate and sent to the 
~resident until January 22. In a press statement on this occasior. 
22 State Papers, II, 105. 
23 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
~1on, 1749. 
24 Ibid., 2510. 
EXPlanation given to the Senate in answer to this query 
~as that the President had acted ahead of time in order to secure 
~eneral Dawes's accentance of the position in place of the posi-
'~1on he held at the head of the United states delegation to the 
~18armament conference in Geneva. Publicity was given to the a~­
~ointment to prevent misunderstanding abroad when General Dawes 
failed to show up at Geneva the next day. 
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president Hoover reoognized the efforts of Congressmen who had 
belped in seouring its passage when he said: 
• • • In attaohing my signature to 
this extremely important legislation, 
I wish to pay tribute to the patriot-
ism of the men in both Houses of Con-
gress who have given proof of their 
devotion to the welfare of their ooun-
try irrespeotive of po1itioa1 affilia-
tion. • • ~This ao!7 brings into being 
a powerful organization with adequate 
resouroes, able to strengthen weakness-
es that may develop in our oredit, bank-
ing, and railway struoture •.• 
• • • It is not oreated for the aid of 
big industries-or banks ••• It is 
oreated for the support of the smaller 
banks and finanoia1 institutions ••• 25 
The dispatoh with whioh this bill was passed surpassed that 
shown in handling any administration measure in the following 
months. Had the President delayed his reoommendations until 
Maroh, the ohanoes of their being passed might have been less 
favorable. It has been thought that a bit of strategy may have 
entered into the President's insistenoe on haste in dealing with 
the measure sinoe its passage at this time forestalled the pas-
sage of legislation, in oonf1iot with the Administration program 
mentioned in the President's statement to the press on January 
26 
8. 
Another item on the President's relief program to whioh the 
House gave its approval in Deoember was taken up in the Senate 
25 State Papers, II, 106, 107. 
26 Chamberlain, 295. 
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early in January. This was the measure for strenthening the 
Federal Land Bank System. The bill known as H. R. 6172 , author-
izing an additional capital of $125,000,000, all to be sub-
scribed by the Government, and setting aside $25,000,000 for ex-
tension of time on overdue mortgages, was passed by the Senate 
with very little debate of a partisan nature and sent to the 
27 
president for his signature on January 27. 
While passage of the bill fulfilled a need to which the 
President called attention in his message to Congress, Repre-
sentative Steagall claimed authorship for it with a feeling of 
pride. He told the House that he had worked throughout the 
former session of Congress to secure favorable action on this 
legislation by the Banking and Currency Committee of the House, 
but his efforts were thwarted by the Secretary of the Treasury 
and the Federal Farm Loan Board, who claimed there was no need 
for the legislation. It was only since October, 1931, he stated 
that the Administration committed itself in favor of the legis-
lation and only belatedly did the Administration approve of the 
provision for the extension of loans to relieve borrowers. He 
was of the opinion that, if the need had been recognized earlier 
it would have saved the homes of thousands of farmers in the 
United States whom he said were turned out-of-doors and forced 
28 
to seek shelter for their families along the highway. 
27 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses· 
sion, 2417, 2422. 
28 Ibid., 2426. 
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The great economic strain with which the new year was ushe 
in continued to grow deeper. Unstable economic and currency 
conditions in the countries that followed England off the gold 
standard were reflected in this country. New trade barriers to 
protect their exchanges reduced purchases from United States and 
brought about a drop in prices here. Continued withdrawal of 
deposits from this country by European countries was causing a 
heavy drain on the gold reserve. While the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem did all it couilid to cope with the situation, its power was 
limited. Throughout the month of January bank failures and 
hoarding increased on a large scale. Runs on banks were causing 
the failure of solvent banks. In order to protect their reserve 
banks felt forced to restrict credit and to reduce loans. Figure 
showed that unemployment had increased to approximately 10,000, 
000 before the end of January. Realizing that the situation was 
rapidly approaching the danger stage, the President decided that 
drastic action was needed to stop hoarding and to expedite the 
29 
liquidation of closed banks. 
Leaders from patriotic and civic organizations in all parts 
of the country were urged to cooperate in conducting a drive 
against hoarding. In announcing his plans to create a national 
organization to conduct the drive, under the leadership of Colone 
29 Con~ressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 4139. 
Myers, 159, 165. 
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frank Knox of Chicago, President Hoover pointed to the serious-
ness of the situation when he said: 
• • • I am gratified that the very act 
of creating the corporation has already 
shown results in the dissipation of fear 
and the restoration of public confidence, 
as indicated by the fact that recently 
we have had • . • no increase in hoarding 
of currency in the eountry. 
There is now a patriotic opportunity 
for our citizens unitedly to join in this 
campaign against depression • • • Every 
dollar returned from hoarding to circula-
tion means putting men to work. It means 
help to agriculture and to business. 
Everyone hoarding currency injures not 
only his own prospects and those of his 
family, but is acting contrary to the com-
mon good. It is to their own interest 
that they should return it to Circulation, 
as well as a patriotic service to the 
country as a whole. •• 30 
This group, meeting at the White House on February 6 to perfect 
methods of organization were told by President Hoover that: 
Hoarding of currency had accumulated to 
the extent of $1,250,000,000 to $1,500, 
000,000. Its results had been to immobil-
ize a large portion of the national gold 
supply, to cause drastic deflation and cred-
it contraction, seriously to restrict busi-
ness expansion and maintenance of employment 
and affect commodity prices. A large por-
tion of the hoarding was due to misunder-
standing of the national effect of such acts. 
It arose out of unnecessary fears and appre-
hension. Nothing could contribute more 
• than to restore this money to work. 31 
30 Myers, 167. 
State Papers, II, 108, 109. 
31 Myers, 168. 
In the group were C. G. Dawes, President of the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, Secretary of the Treasury Mills 
and Governor Meyer of the Federal Reserve Board. 
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Three days later General Dawes, Secretary of the Treasury 
and Messrs. Meyer and Harrison of the Federal Reserve 
came to the White House to report the precarious state of 
gold supply and the "imminent danger to the gold standard." 
Due to withdrawal by foreign countries, over $1,000,000,000 of 
gold had been taken from the monetary gold stock. Due to hoard-
ing, the Reserve currency against which gold and eligible paper 
must be held had increased by $1,500,000,000 above normal. A 
memorandum presented to the President showed that the amount of 
gold which could be paid out to foreigners had been reduced to 
32 
#433,000,000. Emergency action seemed imperative. Acting with 
haste, the President summoned Senators Watson and Robinson, Sen-
ate Republican and Democratic floor leaders respectively, and 
Senators Glass, Bulkley, Walcott and Townsend to meet with these 
men at the White House the following day. The President pointed 
out the graveness of the situation and urged immediate legisla-
tion. After three hours of discussion a legislative program was 
agreed upon. Senator Glass, who was interested in a general 
Bank Reform Bill, agreed at this time to do his "patriotic duty" 
and introduce a bill covering the emergency points except one 
making provision for loans to closed banks. LHe planned to in-
clude such a provision in the Bank Reform Bill~7 In order to ex-
32 Myers, 169. 
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pedite the measure through the House and to give it no tinge of 
partisanship, President Hoover suggested that Representative 
33 
steagall introduce the bill in the House. 
Because of the seriousness of the situation, much of the i 
formation divulged at the meeting could not be made public. On-
ly those points which were pertinent to the measure were ex-
plained to the members of the Senate and House. Willingness of 
Oongressmen, therefore, to approve the measure prepared by the 
Bank and Currency Committee depended largely upon their faith in 
the integrity and Judgment of Representative Steagall and Sena-
tor Glass. Senator Glass carried out his promise and handled 
the matter in a praiseworthy manner. The bill, known as the 
Glass-Steagall Bill and designed to improve the facilities of 
the Federal Reserve System for the service of commerce, industry 
and agriculture and to provide means for meeting the needs of 
member banks in exceptional circumstances and for other purposes 
was approved by the House and introduced in the Senate by Sena-
34 
tor Glass on February 11. 
Aside from objection to the secrecy of the testimony given 
to the House Committee and to there being no Senate hearings on 
the bill, deliberations dealt with comments on the amendments to 
33 Myers, 172. 
34 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, second 
seSSion, 3734. 
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tbe bill and questions regarding the conditions of the ba~ks. 
senator Glass told the Senate that, since he could explai~ the 
provisions of the bill, being thoroughly familiar with it, and i~ 
~iew of the existing emergency, he considered hearings on the 
bill unnecessary. To those who objected to the secrecy of the 
testimony he explained: 
The confidential revelations made 
to those in charge of the bill and cau-
tiously conveyed by them to other mem-
bers of the Banking and Currency Com-
mittee as such should not be publicly 
made at this time. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I am convinced that this legisla-
tion is desirable and I do hope the Sen-
ate will pass it as speedily as possible. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I should not interpose the slightest ob-
jection in the world to delay if anything 
could be acoomplished by delay. 35 
The banks were literally engaged in hoarding. The eXPlana-
tion for this lay in the fact that--while most banks had an abun-
dance of money for normal times--they were frightened by the runs 
that had already closed solvent banks. They had. therefore, re-
duced loans and pressed collection of amounts due. Almo$t every 
bank had been threatened with a run. Merits of the bill were 
ably pointed out by Senator Reed for the benefit of those who we 
skeptical: 
The great merit of the bill which 
the Senator has brought here is not that 
35 Oongressional Record, Seventy-second Oongress, second ses 
sion, 4054, 4139, 4140. 
it is going to lead to any kind of infla-
tion, it is not that it is going to be 
resO~ted to in many cases, but that it 
adds to the resources of every bank a new 
bunCh of eligibles which, in the eyes of 
the banker and the depositors, are actu-
ally cash, because they can be converted 
into cash at any minute; and it seems to 
me the assurance that the bill will bring 
to the depositors of the country would 
justify the passage of it at a time like 
this because we all know, these addition-
al eiigibles that are proposed are just 
as good as the United states Government 
is good. 36 
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On February 18 a letter from Secretary of the Treasury Mills 
addressed to Senator Vandenburg urged the Senate to pass the bill 
which he said "authorizes the use of direct obligations of the 
United States as Collateral against Federal Reserve notes.t! He 
stated that every effort must be made to encourage the banks to 
resume normal financing of the requirements of trade and industry, 
37 
without increasing their burden of indebtedness. Repeatedly Sen-
ator Glass appealed for pro~pt and favorable action on the bill, 
36 CongresSional Record Seventy-second Con~ress, second ses sion, 4140. --=== , 
The AIDeriQan Year Book, 1932, 22. 
The bill authorizea-nany Federal Reserve Bank to make ad-
ances to banks Within its district when such banks do not have 
adequate amounts of assets upon which credit could normally have 
een secured. The auproval of five members of the Federal Reserv 
Board is necessary ~ Banks receiving such advances are to furnish 
time or demand pro~issory notes, and the Federal Reserve Bank is 
to charge a rate of one per cent above the regular discount rate. 
Federal Reserve Banks applying to the local Federal Reserve Agent 
for notes may, until March 3, 1933, with the consent of the major 
ity of the Federa~ Reserve Board offer as collateral security 
the direct Obligations of the United States Government.1t 
37 Congressional Record Seventy-second Congress, second ses 
sion, 4232. ~ , 
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.e~1ng Senators "not to delay matters upon technical objection or 
trivialities, but to pass this bill and let us relieve the situa-
38 
" t1on • 
Seemingly alert to the need for cooperation to save the coun 
try from what appeared to be a real catastrophe and convinced of 
tbe need by Senator Glass, the Senate passed the bill without a 
dissenting vote. It was signed by the President on February 27, 
39 
1932. Appreciation of the fine non-partisan spirit that was dis-
played in handling this measure was expressed by the President. 
Tbe bill, he said, was in a sense a national defense measure. Of 
its major purposes he stated: 
By freeing the vast amounts of gold 
in our Federal Reserve System (in excess 
of the gold reserve required by law) it 
so increases the already large available 
resources of the Federal Reserve Banks as 
to enable them beyond question to meet 
any conceivable demands that might be made 
on them at home or from abroad. . • 
This measure, •.• together with the 
additional capital provided for the Feder-
al Land Banks, and the creation of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation, will so 
strengthen our whole credit structure and 
open the channels of credit as now to per-
mit our banks more adequately to serve the 
needs of agriculture, industry, and com-
merce. 40 
38 Congressiona1 Record, Seventy-second Congress, second ses 
sion, 4140. 
39 The American Year Book, 1932 , 16. 
40 State Paners, II, 128. 
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Congress grapuled with legislation of many kinds in the re-
~aining months of the session, but the major issues dealt with 
unemployment relief, government economy, and revenue measures. 
Toe cooperation and dispatch displayed by Congress during January 
and February in disposing of the emergency items on the Presi-
dent's relief program were noticeably lacking in the months fol-
lowing. A Congress dominated by political interests made con-
structive and expeditious action difficult and delayed the pas-
sage of needed legislation. There could no longer be any doubt 
about what the President wanted. Conferences with members of bo 
Houses, appeals through the medium of the press, and frequent 
messages to Congress stressing the need for legislative action 
brought only modest accomplishments until signs of another impe 
41 
ing crisis became apparent late in May. 
The attention of the whole country was focused on balancing 
the budget by the President's statements to the press and his fre 
quent admonitions to Congress. Now more than ever it seemed im-
perative to balance the budget as a part of the urogram for na-
tional recovery. To the need for additional relief measures the 
President called attention in conferences with House and Senate 
leaders during the last week in February. That economies could 
be effected in government departments and bureaus was acknow-
ledged, but the question of who would get the credit for it--the 
41 Myers, 200, 214. 
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legislative or the executive branch--eclipsed the real issue and 
aused unnecessary strain on the relations of the President and 
c 42 
oongress. 
Convinced that action should be taken to provide additional 
relief and being opposed to giving federal aid directly to indi-
~iduals, the President expressed the belief to House members that 
the needs could be met by loans to states at a percentage of the 
exPenditures. Further expansion of the public works program he 
deemed inadvisable inasmuch as it was proving too expensive and 
large numbers of needy families lived in areas remote from the 
43 
public works projects. Federal funds, he believed, should not be 
loaned to states unless they showed that conditions warranted su 
aid. 
The cause of unemployment was championed in the Costigan-
LaFollette bill which provided an appropriation of $375,000,000--
only $125,000,000 to be spent in the current fiscal year--to be 
administered by a Federal Relief Board and distributed for relief 
44 
of distress to agencies designated by the States. It was hard to 
come to a decision on the basis for distributing the money so tha 
the states in greatest need of help would get it. The passage of 
42 The American Year Book, 1932, 18. 
Myers, 190, l~ 
43 Myers, 177. 
It was costing over $1200 a year for relief for one fam-
ily; it would cost $7,200,000 to give relief to 6,000,000 familie 
44 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 3742, 3911. 
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thiS bill was urged in letters from the United Mine Workers of 
",IDerica, social workers, William Green--president of the American 
Federation of Labor--, child welfare workers in various partB of 
the country, and from Jouett Shouse, Chairman of the Democratic 
National Executive Committee. In a communication addressed to 
senator Wagner, Governor Roosevelt of New York expressed belief 
that the bill "WOUld carry out a definite obligation of the Gov-
ernment to prevent starvation and distress in this present cri-
45 
eis." Heated debates ensued over the function of the Federal 
Government in rendering assistance to unemployed. The convicti 
of those who were opposed to federal aid were ably presented by 
Senator Fess. The necessity for the Government to take care of 
the needs of the people was emphasized by Senators Borah and B 
ley. Referring to a statement of President Hoover, made in Feb-
ruary, 1931, that he would "ask the aid of every resource of the 
Federal Government" • "if the time should ever come that the 
voluntary agencies of the country, together with the local and 
state governments, are unable to prevent hunger and suffering," 
rah said: 
••• the evidence is ample, it is over-
whelming, that the time has arrived when 
as the President said, if there is suffer-
46 
45 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
Sion, 3636, 3739, 3741, 3744, 3910. 
46 See Chapter III, page 80, footnote 39. 
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ing and hunger we should take care of it • 
• • • From the President down, all agree, 
with the exception of the Senator from 
Ohio LSenator Fes~7, that if hungry peo-
ple are amongst us who are not being taken 
care of, the Federal Government should take 
care of them. 47 
The bill was amended so that one-half of the appropriation 
should be used for public works to provide employment, but the 
bill was defeated in the Senate on February 16 by a vote of forty 
eight to thirty-five. While it was defeated mostly by Democrats, 
~ 
opposition included leaders of both parties. The President was 
opposed to distribution of money to the states on a per capita 
basis. The task of working out a program that would offer some 
means of relief to the unemployed was still a major concern of 
Congress. 
Late in February a gesture was made by the House Economy Com 
mittee to reorganize federal bureaus and effect other economies, 
but little progress was made. In March a bill was reported out 
by the Ways and Means Committee proposing a cut in Governmen.t ex-
penditures of $125,000,000 to balance the budget and to raise 
49 
additional revenue of $1,246,000,000 by taxation. The President 
indicated that further cuts were necessary and again declared, 
47 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
Sion, 3671. 
48.The American Year~, 1932, 16. 
49 Tbid., 1932, 17. The bill known as H. R. 10236, provided 
for a 2.~general manufacturers' sales tax exnected to raise 
#595,000,000 of the $1,241,000,000 needed to balance the budget, 
an increase in income taxes up to a 40% surtax on incomes above 
$100,000, a gift tax, amusement taxes, and special excise taxes. 
1 
"Nothing is more important than balancing the budget with the 
50 
least increase in taxes." The bill prepared by a Democratic Ways 
a.nd Means Committee was an example of what could be accomplished 
bY united bipartisan planning, and it was expected that the bill 
would be passed with little delay. But it met with strong oppo-
sition from Democratic members of the House who objected to the 
sales tax. 
The first opposition being overcome by an urgent appeal f 
Secretary of the Treasury Mills for passage of the bill, a new 
move was started to defeat the sales tax by a coalition of Demo-
ora,ts and Progressives led by Representative LaGuardia of New Yo 
This group began to IItear the bill apart." Their proposal was to 
Ifconscript wealth" by raising surtax rates on incomes above $100, 
000 from the snecified maximum of forty per cent to sixty-five 
per cent, and by raising the rate on incomes above $8000 from 
five per cent to seven per cent. An effort was made to appease 
the opposition by exempting certain farm and medical supplies f 
the sales tax. An amendment was added which increased taxes on 
inheritances to a maximum of forty-five per cent on estates of 
more than $10,000,000. On March 24, by a vote of two hundred 
twenty-three to one hundred fifty-three, the House struck the 
50 Myers, 182. 
• 
51 
from the bill. 
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In a move to find new sources of revenue, import duties were 
le~ied on coal and oil. Finally, through the efforts of Sneaker 
made a simple and patriotic appeal for cooperation, a 
compromise measure was agreed upon. In his appeal to his House 
~embers he explained the fine spirit that prevailed in the prep-
aration of the bill and expressed his firm belief in the princi-
ple of freedom of expression, which he said had been extended to 
the House on this occasion. Then he continued: 
I appeal to you, not only in the 
name of my party but my country, that 
in view of the fact that there has been 
stricken from this bill more than $500, 
000,000 of taxation, it is your duty, 
your paramount duty, to help this House 
and this committee restore some taxes to 
this bill in order that this country's 
financial integrity may be maintained. 52 
Within the next few days action was taken that restored many fea-
tures that the original bill, including the forty per cent surtax 
increase on incomes above $100,000. The re-written tax bill was 
approved by a vote of 327 to 64 and sent to the Senate on April 1 
where it was referred to the Senate Finance Committee. 
51 E. Francis Brown, "Congress Wrestles with the Budget," 
rent History, 36:206, 207. May, 1932. This article will be re-
ferred to in the succeeding pages as Brown, Current History. 
The American Year Book, 1932, 17. 
One hundred eight Republicans and forty-five Democrats 
voted against the sales tax and in favor of the increase in in-
heritance and income taxes. 
52 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 7028. 
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Serious doubts were expressed by the Secretary of the Treas-
that the revenues provided in the bill would balance the bud-
because of the uncertainty regarding governmental economies. 
The bill, bearing little resemblance to the House measure, was 
ported out by Senator Fess of Connecticut on May 9. Attention of 
the Senate was focused on three items in the bill, namely, the 
proposal for a sales tax, import duties, and the levying of heavy 
income and inheritance taxes were included. The Senate-revised 
bill was sent to a conference of House and Senate members on June 
1. After some opposition, the House approved the amended bill. 
The Senate approved it on June 4 by a vote of seventy-two to elev 
en and the bill went to the President for his signature. In spit 
of the upheaval in Congress over the measure, the bill in its fi-
53 
nal form surpassed all expectations. While it did not coincide 
in every respect with the wishes of the President, he was satis-
fied that its passage would give assurance to the country and to 
the world that the American people were determined to maintain 
54 
their finances and currency on a sound basis. 
By the middle of March reports indicated that the financial 
and economic conditions in the country were improving and that 
confidence was bein~ restored. The President felt that the Rec 
struction Finance Corporation, the Glass-Steagal Bank Bill, the 
extension of credit for the Federal Reserve System and the anti-
53 Brown, Current Histo~, 36:467. 
54 Myers, 219. 
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boarding campaign had all contributed to restore confidence in the 
banks and to relieve economic strain. Prices of stocks rose about 
ten per cent, banks were reopening, and gold was being returned 
55 
from its hiding places. 
By the end of May, however, there were signs of another down-
~ard trend in economic conditions, and people were becoming appre-
bensive of the financial status of the country. The President 
felt that the failure of Congress to pass legislation to provide 
more revenue and to out government expenses was in part responsi-
ble for this new turn of events. There was a noticeable increase 
in hoarding, prices of industrial stocks showed a drop of over 
fifty per cent since March, and withdrawal of capital was on the 
increase. Unsettled business oonditions in this country were 
causing some trepidation in Europe over the soundness of our fi-
nancial structure. The result was an unjustified run on the Amer-
ican dollar by foreign countries. Fear was expressed that United 
56 
States would be compelled to abandon the gold standard. 
In spite of frequent appeals and proposals from the President, 
little progress was made in the reduction of government expendi-
55 Myers, 183. The Republican National Committee weekly let· 
ter issued March 31, 1932, reported that Colonel Knox, Chairman 
of the Citizens' Reconstruction Organization (the anti-hoarding 
organization) declared that dollars were rolling back into employ-
ment from under carpets, between mattresses, from cans, trunks, 
coffee pots, and safety deposit boxes. A bank in Atlanta, Georgie, 
had a #200,000 increase in de~osits since February 1; a business 
man in New York transferred '380,000 in gold certificates from a 
safety deposit box to his cheoking account. 
56. Myers, 214. 
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tures • The President's recommendation to Congress in April, 1932 
tbat a group composed of representatives of the legislative and 
executive branches of the government be authorized to frame for 
action by Congress a complete national program of economy and s 
ges t adequate legislation to carry it out was condemned by Sena 
57 
Robinson. He attacked the idea of appointing "another commission 
and asked that specific recommendations be sent to Congress. The 
resident replied to the challenge by issuing a press statement 
in which he outlined three general directions in which expenses 
could be reduced, namely--reductions in apnropriations, changes 
in laws to permit reduction in expenditures within bureaus and de 
partments, and a plan for reorganizing and consolidating of gov-
ernment functions. He declared that what he asked for was not a 
commission but merely that representatives of the two branches 
58 
rk together on a comprehensive national economy bill. Follow-
the House Economy Committee did confer with Ad-
nistration officials on two occasions in March and April. Fi-
Omnibus Economy Bill, H. R. 11267, was worked out which 
for a saving of #150,000,000 by cutting the government 
yroll through compulsory furloughs--a five-day week for five 
ys pay--which was the President's idea. The House Committee 
referred direct salary cuts. The President's plan was backed by 
57 State Paners, II, 153. 
Myers, 191. 
58 state Paners, II, 155. 
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59 
organized labor and received the support of the Senate. On May 3 
the House finally passed the Omnibus Economy Bill with only #30, 
000,000 of the $250,000,000 savings which had been recommended by 
the President. The measure for budget balancing was then taken ul 
bY the Senate. 
The struggle to balance the budget went on through May and 
June. Democratic leaders were blamed for delaying the whole re-
covery program in the hope of "lessening the fortunes of the Pres-
60 
ident and his party in the fall election." On May 5, 1932 , the 
President addressed a message to Congress in which he repeated 
that the most essential factor to national recovery was the resto-
ration of confidence. He condemned the House for rejecting the 
revenue programs proposed by the treasury, the program unanimous-
ly reported by the Commission on Ways and Means, and for their 
IIvirtual destruction" of both the national economy program pro-
posed by the executive officials and the program of the special 
House Committee on Economy. "Nothing is more necessary at this 
time than balancing the budget," he told Congress again. He gave 
the details and requirements of the situation which he said were 
well known to Congress. They included pro,pt enactment of a rev-
enue bill and a drastic program of economy to bring about a sav-
ing in excess of $700,000,000 a year. In conclusion he urged 
59 The American Year Book, 1932, 18. 
60 Myers, 200, 201 • 
courageous action: 142 
• • • let me urge the national necessity 
for pro~pt and resolute and unified ac-
tion keeping constantly in mind the 
larger aspects of the problem and that. 
the necessity for these measures is born 
of a great national emergency. If such 
a program should be agreed to by the 
leaders and members of both Houses, it 
would go far to restore business, employ_ 
ment, and a~riculture alike. 61 
The Senate bill provided for a thirty-day furlough without 
instead of a salary reduction of ten per cent which they fi 
considered. Final approval of the bill which would result in an 
estimated saving of between !~34,000,000 and $156,000,000 was giv 
Senate on June 30. A cut of $350,000,000 was made in 
customary appropriations, but the apprepriations for special ne 
called for increases of #848,000,000. Even with the savings pro-
vided in the bill, it was doubtful if the effort to balance the 
budget would be successful. President Hoover was disapPointed in 
the measure and made no effort to conceal his feelings. He had 
indicated and recommended savings of $300,000,000. Upon signing 
the measure he pointed out that it fell short of the economies 
proposed by the Cabinet and "imposed unnecessary hardships on gov 
ernment employees in minor matters of little consequence economi-
63 
cally." Senator Glass,whose opinions on banking and finance were 
valued and who had demonstrated his non-partisanship before,said 
,: on ~ 
r ~ 61 State Papers, II, 180. 
62 The American Year Book, 1932, 18. 
63 State Paners, II, 216. 
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June 9 that the estimates of the Federal Treasury were so "awry" 
that it was impossible to pass intelligent revenue legislation. 
He also criticized the President for his vacillation and lack of 
64 
foresight and courage. 
The task of providing some form of employment relief was 
still before Congress since the plan evolved in the Costigan-
LaFollette Bill had failed of enactment. The unemployment situa-
tion had grown steadily worse, and the administration came to 
recognize the need for more federal aid. Early in May the Presi-
dent began holding a series of conferences with congressmen re-
garding legislation that would grant the full powers originally 
asked for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Summarily thes 
were to make loans to public and semi-public institutions for 
construction of reproductive works, to agriculture, to industry 
65 
for plant modernization, and to create emergency export credits. 
This idea was adopted by Democratic Senate leaders as their plan 
but contained some unworkable prOVisions. 
To expedite matters the President had a conference with Sen-
66 
ator Robinson in which some agreement on legislation was reached. 
Subsequently a bill embodying some 'of the ideas .of the President 
was introduced in the Senate by Senators Wagner, Robinson, Pitt-
man, Walsh, and Bulkley on May 25. In this bill, S. 4755, to aid 
64 Brown, Current History, 36:468. 
65 Myers, 204. 
66 .IQ1.9.., 204. 
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in furnishing relief and work relief to the needy and distressed 
people, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was "authorized 
and empowered to make grants to the several states • in an 
aggregate amount not to exceed $300,000,000." It also provided 
expenditures for emergency construction on the federal aid high-
67 
way system totaling $120,000,000. 
Meanwhile a relief bill had been introduced in the House by 
Speaker Garner based largely on the sale of bonds and providing 
that #100,000,000 be given to the President to be used as an 
emergency fund at his discretion. A bill providing for a $300, 
000,000 relief fund to be loaned to states for needy and dis-
tressed people was passed by the Senate and went to the confer-
ence committee of both Houses. Knowing the great need for legis 
lation and the eagerness of the House to have a relief measure 
passed, the Senate and House conferees, during an eight-day ses-
sion, strove to reach an agreement that would meet the approval 
of all three groups--the Senate, the House, and the Administra-
tion. An agreement was reached which created a total relief bud 
get of $2,100,000,000 to be used as follows: $1,500,000,000 to g 
to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for loans to public an 
67 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses 
sion 11085. The purpose of the bill as written in the Record 
was hto provide for grants and loans to the several states, to a 
in relieving unemployment, to facilitate the construction of Bel 
liquidating projects, to provide for the construction of certain 
authorized federal public-works projects and other purposes. 
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~nd private enterprises; $200,000,000 for loans to states for re-
lief on the basis of population; $100,000,000 for loans to states 
for relief on the basis of need; and $300,000,000 for constructio 
68 
of public works. 
Before this agreement could be reported out, President Hoove 
invited Senate and House leaders to a White House conference on 
June 5 to tell them that he would not agree to the plan of the 
conferees and to make it clear that if it were accepted he would 
veto it. Bein~ unable to agree on a compromise measure, a smalle 
group, selected from the representation of the previous day, met 
69 
for another conference the following morning. Changes made in th~ 
bill at the President's conference and reported to the House by 
Speaker Garner provided that the Reconstruction Finance Coruora-
tion should have $300,000,000 specifically allocated for loans to 
70 
states or municipalities. The vote, taken the following day on 
this so-called Wagner-Garner Bill, including the conference repor , 
revealed a marked partisan attitude. It was approved in the Hous~ 
by a vote of two hundred two to one hundred fifty-seven and in thE 
68 The American Year Book, 1932, 16. 
69 Con~ressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 14684; Those in attendance at the June 5 meeting were 
Speaker Garner, the House conferees and Representatives Hawley am 
Snell, the Senate conferees and Senators Glass, Robinson, Harris, 
Wagner, Reed, McNary, watson and Norbeck, Secretary of the Treas-
ury Mills, Governor Meyer of the Federal Reserve Board, and 
Messrs. Jones and McCarthy, directors of the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation. At the meeting the following day Representa-
tives Garner, Rainey and Snell, and Senators Robinson, Norbeck 
and Wagner were in attendance. 
70 Ibid., 14684. 
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Senate by a vote of forty-three to thirty-one. On July 11 Presi-
.. 
dent Hoover vetoed the measure, as he had indicated he would, 
stating as his major objection the provision giving the Reconstruo 
tion Finance Corporation the authority to make loans to individu-
ale, to trusts, estates, partnerships, corporations, and other 
~unicipal and financial groups. He stated his belief that such a 
tprocedure "would place the government in private business, in such 
~ fashion as to violate the very principle of public relations 
!upon which we have builded our nation." ••• and make the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation "the greatest banking and money-
ilending institution of all history." He concluded: 
With the utmost seriousness I urge 
the Congress to enact a relief measure, 
but I cannot approve the measure before 
me, fraught as it is with possibilities 
of malfeasance and special privileges, 
so impractical of administration, so dan-
gerous to public credit, and so damaging 
to our whole conception of governmental 
relations to the people as to bring far 
more distress than it will cure. 72 
It was acknowledged by Congress and they had "the President's 
~uthority for it", according to Representative Garner, Speaker of 
~he House, that the country was in worse shape than it had ever 
peen. Definite action was eagerly awaited, not only by members of 
71 The American Xear Book, 1932, 16. In the House 166 Demo-
~rats, 35 Republicans, and 1 Farm-Laborite voted "yes"; 155 Repub-
~icans and 2 Democrats voted against the bill. In the Senate 29 
pemocrats, 14 Republicans voted for the bill, while 25 Republicans 
5 Democrats, and 1 Farm-Laborite voted "no". 
72 State Papers, II, 233. 
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APPENDIX B 
STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT HOOVER ON PRESS RELATIONS 4 
The statement of president Hoover regarding press relations, 
made in an address before the Gridiron Club, April 13, 1929, was 
as follows: 
• • • I have found in all the repre-
sentatives of the press at all times 
a desire to be helpful in most unex-
pected ways. For instance, they daily 
assist me beyond my greatest hopes by 
their suspicious research in new im-
plications for my most carefully form-
ulated phrases. I discover by the time 
an idea of mine bas filtered through the 
clear and crystal minds of one hundred 
different correspondents, that particu-
lar idea throbs with a sense of courage 
and public service, that it has sinister 
implications, that it is impractical, 
that it sDells malevolence, that it is 
weak and vacillating, that it is filled 
witb personal bias, that it bristles with 
idealism, sanity, and progress. When I 
take refuge in silence, the gentlemen of 
the Press again assist me by the workings 
of their own sDeculative minds to the ex-
tent of Column I, page 1 ••• --State Pa-
pers, I, 27. 
I 
I 
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73 
oongress, but by nearly every individual in the whole country. 
~ redrafted bill, H. R. 8642, which more nearly resembled the 
urged by President Hoover, authorizing a total expenditure of 0 
$2,000,000,000--#1,800,000,000 for loans to public agencies for 
relief work and self-liquidation projects, and $322,000,000 for 
federal public works--was passed on July 15. The House provision 
for publication of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans 
was vigorously protested by the President, on the basis that it 
cause runs on banks. The Senate modified it and both Demo-
crats and Republicans stated that, as amended, it required only a 
74 
confidential communication to the House and Senate. 
Heated controversy marked the course of the bill. Speaker 
Garner, the Democratic nominee for Vice-President of United State 
openly condemned President Hoover for calling Senate and House 
leaders and conferees to the executive mansion to discuss the con 
ferees' report before it was reported back to the House and Sen-
teo Of this action he declared: 
I do not think it quite in keeping 
with the Constitution or the thought of 
the makers of the Constitution as they 
fixed the relation between the Executive 
and Legislative branch of government • • 
• It ought not to be done; and I ••• 
protest against it. 75 
73 State Papers, II, 233. 
74 The American Year Book, 1932, 16. 
75 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 14684. 
~------------------------------------------------~1~4~8 
senator Goldsborough from Maryland agreed that it was "extremely 
unusual" for a President to take it upon himself to notify Con-
gress in advance that he would veto legislation. He maintained, 
"Congress has its responsibility and if it does not please him, 
76 
he has his responsibility." 
The Garner relief plan was referred to by President Hoover 
as "the most gigantic pork-barrel ever proposed to the American 
Conp:,ress" and as "an unprecedented raid upon the Treasury." In 
turn, Senator Garner accused the President of spo~soring class 
legislation. During the White House conference, and later on the 
floor of the House, he claimed that the Renublicans pronosed to 
consider only a preferential class. He directed his remarks at 
the President and the Republicans in Conp:,ress when he said: 
You want to provide this $3,500,000, 
000 and ••• hand it to the railroads, 
insurance companies, the mortgage compan-
ies and similar interests ••• Now in so 
dOing, I plead w1.th you to let all the 
people have some dripnings from this won-
derful banking institution. Do not keep 
it just for a few ••• I am through with 
class legislation. 77 
liThe issue, II he declared, Ilis between the President and Conp:ress. I 
Representative Snell voiced the sentiment of the Renublican 
House members in his condemnation of Senator Garner's remarks. H 
76 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 14684. 
77 Ibid., 14684. 
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accused the House Speaker--"without fear of successful contradic-
tion"--of having made, in his speech, more direct appeal for clas 
distinction and class discrimination than had ever been made on 
the floor of the House during the session. He declared that the 
issue was not between the President and Congress, but between the 
president and the vice-presidential nominee. He defended the 
president's right to ask members of Congress to the White House 
to talk matters over, and called attention to the President's 
willingness to compromise on Title I of the bill, ithe provision 
78 
for $300,000,000 in temporary loans by the R. F. c~7 
In anticipation of signing the bill, the President remarked 
that the obnoxious features had been eliminated, referring to the 
provision for loans to states on the basis of population, which hE 
termed a "pork-barrel infection,1l and to the provision for estab-
lishing a gigantic centralized banking business. On the whole he 
79 
considered the measure a strong step toward recovery. 
Another last minute action by Congress on one of the items 
in the President's relief program was the approving of the Home 
Loan Bank Bill on July 16, the day before the adjournment of the 
session. This statute created a system of Home Loan Banks along 
78 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses-
sion, 14687. 
79 State Paners, II, 232 236. The major features of the 
bill were the provisions for 6300,000,000 in temporary loans by 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to states in need of help 
to relieve distress, for $1,500,000,000 in loans by the Reconstruc~ 
tion Finance Corporation for reproductive construction work of a 
public nature, and for broadening the power of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation to make loans to agriculture. 
auL. sa 
150 lines advocated by President Hoover in November, 1931, and 
explained in his message to Congress in December of the same yea~ 
The bill was introduced on December 10 by Representative Luce in 
the House and by Senator watson in the Senate, but opposition led 
by Senator Couzens resulted in shelving the bill for about seven 
80 
months. Opposition still apparent in the final deliberations on 
the bill resulted in its being passed without any provision for 
an appropriation for carrying it out, thereby rendering it inef-
fective. Through a move by Senators Moses and Jones, over the 
objections of Senator Couzens, the needed appropriation was voted 
as an amendment to a minor House bill at the last minute. 
While the bill had moved slowly through committee considera-
tions, mortgages on thousands of homes had been foreclosed which 
81 
might have been saved had the bill been enacted more promptly. 
The President signed it on July 22 and commented that the creatiol 
of these institutions did "not involve the government in business 
except in the initial work of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion." He explained: 
The purpose • • • is both to meet 
the present emergency and to build up 
home ownership on more favorable terms 
than exist today • • • to renew existing 
mortgages with resultant foreclosures 
80 Wilbur and Hyde, 439. 
81 Myers, 234. 
The American Year Book, 1932, 22, 23. The bill created 
a system of from eight to twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks, 
with a total capital of $125,000,000 to be initially subscribed b~ 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. These banks were author-
ized to make advances both to member and non-member institutions 
and to private individuals who are unable to finance their mort-
gages through an institution. 
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and great hardships. 82 
The policy of artificial expansion of credit by the Federal 
Reserve Board was looked upon disapprovingly by President Hoover 
from the beginning of his administration. In his first annual 
message to Congress on December 3, 1929, he urged the creation 
of a special joint commission of Congressional and administratio 
representatives to investigate the whole banking system and rec-
83 
ommend legislation. After the collapse of the stock-market, eve 
a greater need for reform seemed apparent. To such a need the 
President called attention on numerous occasions after taking of 
fice. On May 5, 1930, a banking bill introduced by Senator Glas 
went to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee for considera-
tion. Later in the month the committee announced that the bill 
would not be ready until the next session of Congress, but the 
next session from Decembe~4 1930, to March, 1931, passed and the 
bill did not materialize. 
In the meantime the depression had entered its second stage 
Emergency policies were advanced by the President to save the 
I 
collapse of the banking system and were gradually dealt with by I 
Congress, as delineated in the preceding pages of this chapter. 
To the need for a revision of the banking laws to safeguard de-
82 State Papers, I, 239. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Wilbur and Hyde, 333, 334. 
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posits, the President called the attention of Congress on Decembe 
85 
8 and 11, 1931, and again on January 4, 1932. Frequent meetings 
with the Senate Banking and Finance Committee resulted in the in-
troduction of a Banking Reform Bill by Senator Glass on January 
22, 1932. The bill, approved by the President, created a corpor-
ation for loans to expedite liquidation of closed banks, made re-
vision in laws on group bank1ng, gave encouragement ,to branch 
banking, placed limits on loans for speculation, and insisted on 
membership in the Federal Reserve System. So much opposition was 
expressed by bankers that the measure was returned to the commit-
tee for revision. The outcome was that the first session of the 
seventy-second Congress adjourned with no action having been tak-
. 86 
en toward the enactment of a sound banking reform bill. 
When Congress adjourned on July 17, 1932, with sOIDe excep-
tions, most of the relief measures had been dealt with to the sat· 
isfaction of the President--due to his persistence. Obviously, 
more prompt and complete action by Congress on the measures of an 
emergency nature would have alleviated much suffering and have 
given greater impetus to the recovery program. The economic de-
terioration which began in March continued until the middle of 
July, when the great depression is considered to have reached its 
87 
lowest point. While Congress deliberated on the relief bill, the 
85 State Papers, II, 47, 84, 103. 
86 Wilbur and Hyde, 337. 
87 Myers, 236. 
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status of the unemployed grew worse, and their numbers increased. 
In the middle of June, estimates by the Department of Labor and 
the American Federation of Labor placed the number of unemployed 
workers at more than 10,000,000. European nations had withdrawn 
$550,000,000 in gold and large amounts in exchange, hoarding had 
88 
increased during this period by $500,000,000. Conditions might 
have been more serious but for the benefits afforded by the Re-
construction Finance Corporation and the GlaSS-Steagall Bank Bill 
Before the end of July there were encouraging signs of recov 
ery in all parts of the world, but in the United States where a 
change in national policies was anticipated--pending the outcome 
89 
of the national election--signs of recovery were less noticeable. 
However, the banking situation appeared sounder. The withdra~al 
of gold from the United States seemed to have stopped, and a smal 
amount had returned, the amount of currency in circulation showed 
some decrease and the number of bank failures was smaller. These 
encouraging signs of economic recovery were offset somewhat by 
discouraging business conditions. At the end of the first week 
in September the steel industry was operating at fourteen and one· 
half per cent of capacity, the earnings of industrial and mercan-
tile enterprises showed a noticeable falling off, and the rail-
roads were threatening their employees with a twenty per cent re-
duction in wages. Undoubtedly the drop in purchasing power of thE 
88 Brown, Current History, 36:584. 
89 Myers, 237-8. 
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~ass of the population had a negative effect on industrial recov-
ery. A report of the National Industrial Conference Board showed 
a decrease of twenty-seven per cent in the buying power of the 
average worker from June, 1929, to June, 1932. During the same 
~eriod the cost of living had fallen only twenty-two and three 
90 
tenths per cent. 
From July to November, President Hoover, who had accepted the 
Republican nomination for President on August 11, 1932 , was en-
gaged in campaign activities in anticipation of the election in 
~ovember. To the recovery program, however, he continued'to give 
a large share of his time. A conference of business and industri-
al leaders was held in Washington on August 26, 1932, to hasten 
economic recovery. Business and industrial committees from the 
twelve Federal Reserve districts attended the meeting which the 
!-president opened with the statement that "the major financial cri .. 
sis had been overcome" and • • • "confidence and hope have reap-
peared." A six-point program was adopted providing for the dis-
tribution of credit and the spreading of work through shortening 
of hours. This "share-the-work" program was designed to meet the 
91 
problem of the unemployed millions. The President told this grou~: 
The reason for calling this confer-
ence at this particular moment is that 
we are convinced that we have overcome 
90 E. Francis Brown, "Reviving American Confidence," Current 
Historv, 37:79, October, 1932. 
91 State Paners, II, 268, 269. 
Brown, Current History, 37:81 
the major financial crisis--a crisis 
unparalleled in the history of the 
world--and that with its relaxation 
confidence and hope have reappeared 
in the world. We are now able to take 
further steps in solution of the indus-
trial and agricultural problems with 
which we are still confronted. 92 
155 
The President continued to stress the need for a sound banking 
reform as essential to economic recovery and the restoration of 
national confidence. In a campaign speech at Indianapolis on 
October 28, 1932, he called attention to the failure of Congress 
to pass this needed legislation when he said: 
I recommend to ~he Congress the 
sane reform of our banking laws. The 
Democratic House of Representatives did 
not see fit to pass that legislation in 
the last session. I shall persist in 
securing its accomplishment. 93 
In the election on November 8, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
the Democratic candidate, was elected President of the United 
states. From this time the people naturally looked to the Presi-
dent-elect for future national policies. As far as positive in-
fluence on recovery was concerned, the Hoover administration was 
over on November 9, yet President Hoover made a last minute effor 
94 
to bring about the needed banking reform and government economies 
In his fourth annual and final message to Con~ress on December 5, 
1932, he emphasized again the need for reorganization of the gov-
92 stat~ Paner§, II, 268. 
93 Ibid., 389. 
94 Wilbur and Hyde, 334. 
Myers, 275. 
156 
ernment departments and for a stable improvement in the banking 
system. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal 
Reserve Act, he said, were only remedies--passed in a time of 
emergency--to meet a crisis, and could not go on functioning in-
definitely. On this occasion he told the Congress: 
• • • widespread banking reforms are a 
national necessity and are the first 
requisite for further recovery in agri-
culture and business. They should have 
immediate consideration as steps greatly 
needed to further recovery. 95 
Government finances at the beginning of the short session of 
the Seventy-second Congress on December 5 were in a precarious 
state. Taxes imposed had not yielded the revenue estimated by 
the Senate and House, and treasury collections had fallen off. 
Under the Wagner-Garner bill, prodigious spending resulted in an 
increase during the year 1932 of approximately three billion dol-
96 
lars in the gross national debt. The President's budget message 
on December 6 laid before Congress the financial situation of the 
government and made pronosals for drastic reduction in expendi-
tures and increases in revenues. Campaign pledges made by the 
Democratic party for economy in government and a reduction of fed 
eral expenditures gave President Hoover reason to expect coopera-
tion from the Democratic controlled Congress in a program to bal-
ance the budget. Obviously the critical conditions of the neriod 
95 State PaDer~, II, 268. 
96 Lawrence Sullivan~ Prelude to PaniC, (Washington, D. C., 
The Statesman Press, 1936), 55. 
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called for cooperation between the outgoing and incoming adminis-
trations if the recovery program was to continue. In his budget 
message President Hoover told Congress: 
The great problem before the world • 
• • is restoration and maintenance of con-
fidence • • • essential steps in strengthen-
ing the foundations for recovery ••• This 
all-important objective is definitely with-
in reach, and more determined effort will 
bring us to the goal we have been striving 
to reach in the face of unparalleled diffi-
culties ••• I cannot too strongly urge 
that every effort be made to limit expendi-
ture and avoid additional obligations not 
only in the interests of the taxpayer but 
in the interests of the very integrity of 
the finances of the Federal Government. 97 
The bUdget submitted called for net reductions of $580,000,000 in 
98 
federal expenses for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1933. 
The President received much acclaim for his courageous 
statesmanship. Speaker Garner and Democratic Floor Leader Rainey 
endorsed the President's recommendations, but nothing happened. 
99 
No action had been taken up to the time for the Christmas recess. 
Meanwhile the President-elect had conferred with Democratic Con-
gressional leaders and plans to balance the budget were set aside 
until the calling of the snecial session. On January 18 the Demo 
cratic majority in the House defeated the President's plan for 
97 State Paners, II, 576-578. 
98 Sullivan, 56. This figure was derived from a plan to 
pare the estimate for government department expenses by $830,000, 
000 and allow an additional $250,000,000 for anticipated relief 
and emergency expenses. 
99 Ibid., 58. 
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reorganization of government bureaus and reduction of expendi-
100 
tures. 
On December 8, 1932, the Glass Banking Reform Bill was again 
brought to the attention of Congress. In opening the debate on 
the bill January 5, 1933, Senator Glass explained that--after 
long investigation--he had concluded that branch banking (the 
issue over which there had been so much controversy) was about 
the only remedy for the menacing situation facing the banking 
community of the United States. To focus attention on the need 
for this legislation, he pointed out that twenty-eight bank fail-
ures had occurred in the first week of January, three of them na-
tional and twenty-five state banks. In the previous December--
the month following the election of President Roosevelt--there ha 
been one hundred forty-five bank failures, nineteen of which were 
national banks and one hundred twenty-six were state banks. Op-
position to the bill was displayed in the Senate from the begin-
ning. A filibuster lasting from January 12 to 19, begun by Sena-
tor Huey Long of Louisiana and Senator Thomas of Oklahoma, tried 
to prevent action on the bill. When it was decided to limit de-
bate on the bill, normal debate was continued and the bill was 
100 Myers, 275. 
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passed by a Senate vote of fifty-four to nine on January 26. 
When House leaders refused a hearing on the bill, President Hoo-
ver addressed a message to Congress urging the Democratic major-
ity to pass the bill--to reestablish confidence and remedy the 
102 
organization of our credit system. But the bill was not passed 
until after March 4, 1933. 
On January 11, 1933, President Hoover urged Congress to re-
vise the bankruptcy laws to facilitate the adjustment of "inflat-
ed" and itunbearable ll debt--a measure which he had previously laid 
before Congress on February 29, 1932. He emphasized the need for 
immediate consideration of legislation for the relief of indivi-
103 
dual and corporate debtors as a matter of vital imnortance. A 
bill was passed by the House on January 30, but its passage was 
delayed in the Senate. Another message to Congress on February 
20 urging favorable action by the Senate on the House-approved 
bill to secure orderly cooperation between creditor and debtor 
was sent by the President. Such a bill was enacted by the Senate 
on February 27, which provided means of reducing indebtedness of 
individuals and aiding the reorganization of the affairs of rail-
101 Con~ressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, second 
session, 133 , 1404, 1405, 1406, 1624. 
The bill S. 4412 provided for the safer and more effec-
tive use of the assets of the Federal Reserve Banks and of nation 
al bank associations to regulate inter-bank control, to prevent 
the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations and for 
other purposes.--Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, 
second session, 1336. 
102 State Papers, II, 597. 
103 Myers, 323. 
Brown, Current History, 37:723. 
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roads but excluding the provision for corporate reorganization. 
The failure of Oon~ress to approve the economy measures 
recommended by the President and the needed banking reform bill 
did incalculable harm to the recovery program and contributed in 
large part to the uneasiness over the financial situation in the 
country following the November election. The situation was fur-
ther aggravated when the House passed a resolution on January 4, 
1933, to publish all loans made by the Reconstruction Finance 
Oorporation prior to July 21, 1932. This publication of loans to 
banks that had been considered sound induced runs on banks and 
encouraged hoarding of currency and gold. An appeal from the 
President for the repeal of this procedure because it was 
ing the usefulness and effectiveness of the Reconstruction Financ 
Oorporation and exaggerating fears proved unavailing. Apprehen-
sion over the soundness of the banks spread and caused more harm 
to the financial structure already weakened from the fear of cur-
IOS 
rency inflation. 
Consideration of currency inflation bills by the Democratic 
House in the previous session of Congress gave rise to some spec-
ulation in the public mind regarding the attitude of the incoming 
administration toward inflation. On being asked to make clear 
his position with regard to the gold standard, the President-
104 Myers, 324. 
105 Il2.1J1. 
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elect, a few days before the election in November, evasively 
stated that "sound money is an international necessity not a do-106 J' 
ti id t " mes c cons eration for one coun rYe This attitude, as well 
as the fact that his close associates were known to favor currencJ 
manipulation, gave rise to apprehension over the monetary policieE 
of the incoming administration. Concern over the fate of the gola 
standard spread quickly after the election and gave rise to un-
precedented withdrawals and demands on banks for gold. Many peo-
ple, in an effort to protect themselves, began to invest in for-
eign securities. According to close associates of President Hoo-
ver, this so-called "flight of the dollar" ran into unprecedented 
107 
figures. 
Realizing before the end of January that the country was 
heading for a panic, the President worked ceaselessly to ward off 
108 
a national disaster. During the period prior to January 18, 193~, 
gold had been returning to this country from abroad. The "flip;ht 
of the dollar" reversed this situation after the week of January 
18. During the period of January 18 to February 1, $38,000,000 
of gold was marked for European countries. From the first of Feb-
ruary to the middle of the month withdrawal of currency and gold 
for hoarding increased from about $5,000,000 a day to $15,000,000 
106 Myers, 347. 
107 Joslin, 352. 
108 Ibid. 
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a day. Since there was no pressure for gold from abroad, it was 
clear that its flight was due to the domestic financial situa-
tion. When it appeared that fear of a change in currency was ap 
proaching the panic stage, President Hoover addressed a letter to 
President-elect Roosevelt on February 17, 1933, asking him to 
"clarify the public mind on certain essentials which will give 
renewed confidence." 
The reply from the President-elect, received twelve days 
later on March 1, 1933, expressed concern over the gravity of the 
situation but stated that he doubted that a general statement 
would have a definite effect. The President and his advisers 
thought that a statement from the President-elect would provide 
some basis for cooperation in mapping a course that would protect 
110 
the interests of the public--irrespective of politics. 
Some form of legislation, it was felt, was necessary to con-
trol temporarily the situation. Such a course was contemplated, 
but no legislation could be achieved without the cooperation of 
the Democratic-controlled Congress--and they had already demon-
strated their reluctance to take action on issues affecting na-
tional welfare without the approval of the Democratic President-
elect. That this was the case was verified at a White House con-
109 Myers, 334. 
110 Ibid., 345. 
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ference with Senate leaders on March 2, 1933. President Hoover 
called Senators Robinson and Glass to the White House to discuss 
possibilities of legislative action. After giving the matter 
careful consideration, the senators concluded that it was useles 
to attempt to get any legislative action in Congress independent 
111 
of the President-elect. With this decision it appeared that th 
last hope of averting a crisis was removed. 
111 Myers, 361-363. 
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APPENDIX A 
ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS HELD BY HERBERT HOOVER 
DURING WORLD WAR I 
164 
When the World War broke out in July, 1914, Herbert Hoover 
and his family were residing in London where he was engaged at 
the time as consultant engineer in large mining operations. Wher; 
the task of organizing relief work in Belgium was undertaken, 
United States Ambassador to England, Walter H. Page, and the Bel-
gian authorities formally asked Mr. Hoover to take charge of the 
work, if satisfactory diplomatic arrangements 'could be made with 
United States and Germany. This done, Hoover became the active 
head of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium, with the 
title of chairman, on October 22, 19l4--a position he held all 
through the war and for several months of the armistice period. 
At the request of President Wilson, he returned to Washing-
ton on May 3, 1917, to begin making plans for the administration 
of American food. On August 10, 1917, he was appointed United 
States Food Administrator and began the important work of food 
conservation as provided in the Food Control Act passed by Con-
gress on the same day. This work centered largely around the 
curtailment of profiteering and speculation during the war emer-
gency. Demobilization of the Food Administration was begun the 
day after the Armistice was signed, it being the belief of Hoover 
that all such legislation, except in war time, tends to strike 
at the roots of individual initiative. 
~z ____________________ ...... _ .... 
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Ten days after the Armistice he left for Paris, again at the 
request of President Wilson, to direct the participation of the 
United States in the urgently needed relief of the war-ravaged 
countries of Eastern Europe. For the direction of this work he 
was appointed Director General of the American Relief Administra-
tion. It is believed by one closely associated with him in this 
work during the first eight months after the Armistice that it 
was owing more to the superhuman efforts of Hoover than to any 
other single factor that complete disorder, anarchy, and Bolshe-
vik domination in Eastern Europe were averted. -- Vernon Kellogg, 
Herbert Hoover, the Man and His Work (New York: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1920), 102-123; 198-255; 267. 
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APPENDIX C 
HOW THE DEBENTURE PLAN WOULD OPERATE 
As an instance of how the debenture plan would work, Senato 
Caraway cited the following example in his speech before the Sen-
ate on June 14, 1929: 
Congress has said that wheat is en-
titled to a tariff duty of forty-two cents 
per bushel in order to equalize the cost 
of producing in America and in other coun-
tries where the standards of living were 
lower and, therefore the cost of living 
less than here. Since a large quantity of 
wheat has to be shipped abroad for a mar-
ket and the price for which it sells fixes 
the market price for the time being of 
wheat in America, the debenture plan pro-
vided that, for every bushel of wheat sold 
abroad, the farmer should receive the world 
price, plus twenty-one cents a bushel, that 
being one-half the tariff rate. -- Congres-
sional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 2884. 
Thus the farmer would be given what amounts to a bounty on 
the farm product he exports--such bounty amounting to one-half 
the duty that would be paid on the same product if imported into 
this country. At the port of shipment he would be given a certi-
ficate called a "debenture ll of the face value of one-half the im-
port duty. If he exported one thousand bushels of grain, he 
would get the world price plus twenty-one cents on each bushel or 
two hundred ten dollars in addition to the price he got for his 
wheat. This certificate could be sold to a customs' broker or 
importer, at a discount of say five per cent, to be used by him 
in payment of import duties. -- Ibid. 
New York Times, June 10, 1929. 
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APPENDIX D 
CAUSES OF THE STOCK-MARKET COLLAPSE IN 1929 
Economists disagree to some extent over the conditions re-
sponsible for the collapse of the stock market in October, 1929. 
The belief is generally held that the fundamental causes lay in 
the unstable economic and financial conditions in the wake of 
World War I. In the post-war years the nations were confronted 
with problems of adjusting to chan~ed economic, political and 
financial conditions involving international relations, in which 
reparations and war debts were a major item. Intergovernmented 
debts of combatant nations had climbed to over $50,000,000,000, 
including war loans and reparations. The war had been financed 
by inflation or credit, and private debts had been piled up on 
these inflated values. 
In the United States alone there were signs of sound econom-
ic recovery reflected in increased prosperity of the people. It 
is thought by some economists that the years from 1922 to 1929 
should be called a period of expansion rather than of prosperity. 
Numerous changes in industrial technology noticeably affected 
economic and industrial conditions. MeChanical processes reduced 
operating costs and increased output, but prices were not reduced 
as fast as costs, and profits of industrial corDorations rose be-
yond normal needs. Some of,the profits went into eXDansion and 
some into surplus reserves. More prosperous corporations loaned 
large sums to Stock Exchanp;e speculators and to foreign countries 
169 
These forms of profit distribution led to further increased pro-
duction and inflation of capital values. But the newly produced 
goods required consumers--and wages had not kept pace with pro-
duction. 
Overproduction that resulted, installment buying, weaknesses 
in our banking system, and false expansion of credit are looked 
upon as the immediate causes for the stock market collapse. Larg 
amounts of European capital and gold were sent to United states 
becauseiof unstable conditions abroad. The false prosperity thus 
created and the inflation policy undertaken by the Federal Re-
serve System resulted in mass speculation unprecedented in our 
history. --Myers, 4-10. Rexford G. Tugwell, "Flaws in the Hoover 
Economic Plan," Current History, 35: 525-527, January, 1932. 
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